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**General Yazov On Slowness of Democratization,
One-man Command**

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in Russian 18 Nov 88 First Edition pp 1,2*

[Interview with Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office: "Democratization and the Armed Forces. Army General D.T. Yazov, Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Defense Minister, Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Readers' Questions"—date, place not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A significant proportion of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA mailbag is made up of letters touching one way or another on questions linked with the development of the democratization process in the Armed Forces. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office asked Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, to answer these questions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Army General, our readers are asking to what extent the democratization of Soviet society affects the Armed Forces and how it is seen in the Army and Navy.

[Yazov] Our party sees democratization as the key to resolving the tasks of the revolutionary restructuring of Soviet society and bringing it up to qualitatively new levels. The 27th CPSU Congress called democracy the healthy fresh air which alone allows the socialist social organism to live properly. Our Armed Forces are an inalienable component of this organism. The extension of the democratization process to them is quite natural.

Probably this process is seen in the Army and Navy first and foremost in the boosting of the sociopolitical and service activeness of servicemen. The ice of complacency and the passivity of some of the personnel have been broken. An atmosphere of mutual respect, trust, and openness is being asserted in collectives, and business-like criticism and self-criticism are being developed. The creative potential of party and Komsomol organizations and of all the Armed Forces' democratic institutions is being revealed more and more fully. The reaction of the Army and Navy public to negative phenomena is becoming more acute, which, incidentally, is being felt with regard to items in the press. All these are undoubtedly manifestations of democratization.

Unfortunately, the democratization of military life is not proceeding as quickly and as thoroughly as one would wish everywhere. Many units and ships still have a considerable proportion of personnel who have not joined in the common—I emphasize common—committed and responsible work of restructuring. The main thing is that in some places the democratization process still boils down primarily to just revealing, publicizing,

and criticizing shortcomings. In any event, the denunciatory aspect of the structure of this process continues to prevail over the creative aspect. But the time has long since come for specific practical work—as was stated at the 19th all-union party conference. Command and political cadres and all Armed Forces personnel should now view the democratization of military life from this angle.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many readers, particularly young people who have yet to be drafted, are interested in the question of social protection for servicemen and the political and civil rights of Army and Navy servicemen.

[Yazov] The resolution of this question was on the agenda of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Smashing the old military machine, the Leninist party placed at the head of military development in the Soviet republic the principle of the equality of the political and civil rights of servicemen. The Statute on the Organization of a New Socialist Army adopted by the December 1917 all-Army congress reflected the line of the equality of the political rights of servicemen. The statute envisaged broad participation by soldiers in the country's political life and in the formation and activity of organs of Soviet power.

The equal rights of servicemen as Soviet citizens were legislatively enshrined in the USSR Constitution. The Law on General Military Duty notes: "Servicemen and persons liable for draft summoned to assembly points enjoy full socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms and bear all the responsibilities of Soviet citizens stipulated by the USSR Constitution." Thus, the constitutional principle that each serviceman is a citizen and each citizen is a defender of the socialist fatherland has operated in our country for many decades. It is this fundamental principle that determines the democratic nature of the Soviet system of military building. Virtually all the institutions of socialist democracy exist in our Armed Forces. Participating in their work, servicemen, like all citizens, foster in themselves the sense of being masters of their country and full members of Soviet society.

The democratization of Army life is impossible to imagine without concern by commanders and political organs for the implementation of the principle of social justice. Military people, like all Soviet citizens, need reliable social protection and protection from violations of Army laws. This demand can be carried out by observing the rule: The principle of justice should always prevail. We note in this connection that those who act unfairly should be very severely dealt with, and any manifestation of injustice should be seen as a deviation from military order and a violation and discrediting of the law.

Military councils, commanders, and political organs should constantly assert in Army and Navy collectives the most just relations and an atmosphere where one sole criterion for distinguishing servicemen prevails—the results of military labor and its quality. As a rule, a sense of genuine fairness toward people comes when they live in a system of objective assessments. Ensuring objective assessments is a difficult problem. They are often hampered by subjectivism and its extreme form—egoism. The main way of neutralizing these phenomena is to honestly assess each serviceman's contribution to the cause of restructuring and enhancing Army and Navy combat readiness.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Major V. Syabro of the North Caucasus Military District, Ensign G. Plaksitskiy of the Baltic Fleet, and certain other readers of ours ask how democracy ties in with one-man leadership.

[Yazov] This question was answered by V.I. Lenin. In justifying the need for one-man leadership as a management system which ensures unity of will and action on the part of many people, the best use of human abilities, and real, not verbal, checks on their work, he noted that "there is decidedly no fundamental contradiction between Soviet (that is, socialist) democracy and the use of dictatorial power by certain individuals."

Democracy presupposes a sensible social order. The responsible approach of all Soviet citizens to their duties and state interests creates a reliable basis for the fullest implementation of its principles. One-man leadership ensures the personal responsibility of both leaders and subordinates. All one-man commanders, irrespective of their position, operate within the limits of the rights accorded them under the party's control and pursue its policies, which reflect the people's vital interests. This is the essence of the party basis of Soviet one-man leadership, which ensures its organic combination with socialist democracy.

If one-man leadership is important and necessary in running the national economy and production activity, then in the Army, where centralization and cosubordination play a paramount role, it is—as Lenin put it—the "only correct way of arranging work." In our Army, which is socialist in its origins, nature, and mission, this work is conducted under conditions of the social unity and commonality of interests and goals of the entire personnel—from soldiers to generals. One-man commanders organize and conduct this work together with political organs, firmly relying on party organizations and the conscientiousness and sociopolitical and service activeness of servicemen. That is how democracy ties in and merges with one-man leadership.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As is well known, the principle of one-man leadership was not immediately established in our Army. Some letters touch on the history of this question. Could you briefly describe it?

[Yazov] To present the history of the establishment of the principle of one-man leadership in our Army it is necessary to go back over 70 years, to the situation prevailing shortly after the victory of great October. The civil war unleashed by international imperialism and the foreign military intervention confronted the young state with the need to create a new, socialist type of mass combat-capable army very rapidly. We passed through a number of stages en route to full one-man leadership: the broad democratism of the revolutionary masses and the institution of military commissars. The Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets of July 1918 pointed out in its resolution, at V.I. Lenin's suggestion, that "consistent centralism in military management, that is to say, strict and absolute subordination, is a precondition for the success of all measures in creating an army."

However, it was impossible immediately to fully implement the principle of one-man leadership in those conditions. There was an acute dearth of command cadres from a proletarian background, and the Red Army masses were not trained for this. The party was forced to enlist tens of thousands of military specialists—former generals and officers of the old army—in defense building and leadership of troop combat operations. By no means all of them immediately or fully sided with Soviet power. It was very risky to entrust one-man authority to them. Time was needed to train a sufficient number of Red officers, as V.I. Lenin called them, capable of consolidating socialism in our Army. It was also needed so that that Red Army men could see in practice the radical difference between the new command staff and that of the old army.

In view of this, the institution of military commissars was created in the Red Army in 1918. The commissars were invested with political, educational, and monitoring functions, while operational and command rights and duties and the leadership of technical aspects of the activity of formations and units remained with commanders.

The conditions for a widespread switch to one-man leadership emerged later, when the system for training military cadres created by the party began to meet the Red Army's needs. The full provision of the troops with ideologically tempered commanders with good professional training made it possible to carry out a gradual transition to one-man leadership in the mid-twenties, and by 1932 already 90 percent of commanders enjoyed the rights of full one-man commanders in the army and navy. It should be noted that the institution of military commissars was introduced into our Armed Forces for short periods twice later—in 1937-1940 and 1941-1942. Full one-man leadership has existed in our Armed Forces since 9 October 1942.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Readers' interest is aroused by disagreements on military questions, including the question of one-man leadership that arose in the Red Army in 1919 at the Eighth Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress. What was the essence of these disagreements?

[Yazov] The need for and expediency of one-man leadership and the conformity of this principle of military organizational development and leadership of the troops with the interests of socialism were not grasped by everyone immediately. A group of party and military workers who formed the so-called "military opposition" at the Eighth Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress opposed one-man leadership as contrary to democracy and advocated "collective command," essentially a return to partisan warfare.

The mistaken and unacceptable nature of the "military opposition's" views was revealed by V.I. Lenin. He demonstrated the need for regulations and iron military order in the Army and comprehensively substantiated the conclusion that it can be combat-capable only if there is firm, conscious discipline and strict centralization. The specifics of a military organization and the special nature of the tasks performed by it demand absolute subordination, unquestioning execution, the very highest coordination and unity of action, flexibility, and controllability. This made it necessary for the commander's authority to be exercised in the form of one-man leadership. In a socialist army this authority embodies the will of the people aimed at ensuring the reliable defense of their revolutionary gains.

V.I. Lenin's clear, well argued, and firm position helped to overcome the disagreement which had led to the debate and played the decisive role in establishing the course of strengthening the regular Red Army. The congress in fact unanimously adopted a resolution on the military question which formulated the main principles of building a regular centralized army whose socialist nature ensured the organic combination of democracy and one-man leadership.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is necessary, asks Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Mazurov, who is serving in a unit in the Urals Military District, to ensure that the combination of democracy and one-man leadership natural for our Armed Forces is embodied in the everyday practical activity of actual leaders?

[Yazov] One-man leadership as a principle of military building and a form of management of troops is exercised via relations among people. It is very important to ensure that the person endowed with the rights of one-man leadership knows how to use them not only as fully as possible but also correctly, in the interests of the motherland and in accordance with his duties and the requirements of the law and military regulations. For this it is necessary that at least two conditions are observed. The first relates to the qualities of the leader himself. Naturally he must be competent and possess a firm will, determination, courage, and boldness. But that is not all. Equally important for successful leadership are personal modesty, accessibility, justice, and the ability to listen to people, win them over, and carry them along. The second relates to the style of work, the essential components of which must be unity of word and deed, a

high level of organization and purposefulness, consideration of the opinions of subordinates and their suggestions and feelings, and reliance on the collective.

The fulfillment of these conditions in indissoluble unity makes it possible to fully realize the potential of one-man leadership in practice. It must be said that such unity is reflected in the relevant provisions of the regulations, for example, in the general duties of commanders and other direct leaders. Just take the decisionmaking procedure legitimized in the Armed Forces and tested by actual combat. As a rule, the commander listens to his subordinates' suggestions, weighs them up, compares opinions, and adopts the most rational ones. A decision produced in this way is essentially an accumulation of the reason and will of the entire collective. When it is subsequently expressed in an instruction, directive, or order it becomes law for subordinates and not only legally but also morally binding and is perceived by servicemen as the motherland's command.

The fruitfulness of this approach to the elaboration, adoption, and implementation of decisions is confirmed by the rich combat experience of our Armed Forces and the practical work of many thousands of commanders in the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, men such as V.K. Blyukher, G.I. Kotovskiy, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, M.V. Frunze or I.V. Panfilov, I.D. Chernyakhovskiy, and K.K. Rokossovskiy, for example. What was the "secret" of their success? Not just military talent and a high level of combat organization and management but also the fact that they had a very good knowledge of the soldier's soul and never forgot that ultimately it was by his blood and sweat that decisions were carried out.

I remember the significance that was attached during the last war to conveying to frontline servicemen and every soldier the point and spirit of the order to defend or attack. The commanding officer gained the confidence that his decision would be fulfilled when he saw for himself that it was correctly understood and received by personnel. Today, too, the Army and Navy have quite a few commanders who are closely or inseparably linked with their subordinates and enjoy their unbounded trust and support. They skillfully create around themselves and in the environment of their immediate entourage and the military collective as a whole an atmosphere of openness, mutual respect, free expression of opinions, and high responsibility of each individual both for his own personal assignment and the common cause. This is the most favorable soil for molding and strengthening the serviceman's conscious, active, and creative attitude toward fulfilling the duties of military service, without which it is impossible to achieve the high quality assimilation of modern combat work or to ensure success in battle.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Some readers' letters ask the question: What correlation should there be between the administrative and, so to speak, democratic and social aspects of the activity of the one-man commander?

[Yazov] It must be said right away that such a division of the structure of one-man leadership can only be hypothetical. With this in mind, I would say that the correlation between the above-mentioned aspects should be a well considered, balanced one. Practice shows that the predominance of the so-called administrative aspect of one-man leadership in the activity of a particular commander inevitably, sooner or later, leads him to undervalue and even actually repudiate democratic forms and methods of work with people and to his alienation from subordinates. Equally harmful is the other extreme, which manifests itself in a wish to constantly consult on every occasion, to go through an endless process of settling and coordinating all questions in order, so to speak, not to "offend" anyone and please everyone. This breeds an atmosphere of vague uncertainty, indecision, half-bakedness, and a lack of unity and purposefulness of action.

It must be clearly understood that the process of democratization in the Armed Forces by no means signifies a shift in the center of gravity of one-man leadership from, say, the "administrative" aspect to the "democratic" aspect. No, what it presupposes is restoring the correct balance between these aspects where it has been upset.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nowadays the "command-pressure" method of work is associated with a negative style of leadership. Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Vishnya from the Central Group of Forces and Senior Warrant Officer V. Shkolnyy from the Urals Military District consider this approach wrong in relation to army conditions. What can you say about this?

[Yazov] The question does not arise by accident. In fact, the word "commander" has the same root as the aforementioned term. Troops are controlled primarily by means of orders, commands, and instructions, which must be carried out undeviatingly. They are the levers whereby such qualities of the military organism as flexibility, controllability, mobility, and coordinated and united action are realized. Without orders, which have the force of the law in the Army, there is neither efficient interaction, nor strict regulation of mutual relations, nor efficient performance, nor discipline—that is, no army.

Essentially, the "command-pressure" style has nothing to do with the activity of a real commander or with one-man leadership in general. It means all you do is rely on "strong-arm" methods, shout, punish, and use crude coercion. Who are the people who usually resort to such methods? Those who do not know how or do not wish to organize people and get them to follow them. Such a leader creates a semblance of exactingness, but it is like a soapbubble. Arbitrariness, rudeness, and arrogance go hand in hand, as a rule, with incompetence and organizational ineptitude, at the root of which are an inability and reluctance to rely on people.

In the Army and Navy a great deal of work is being done to eradicate this style. But it is no simple task. For some officers it means demolishing a customary pattern of activity that has taken years to establish, and which is essentially a desire to "command" without bothering to choose your methods and means. It is hard for such officers to understand the demands of restructuring. It seems to them that they are all but being deprived of the right to command when they are accused of high-handed administration. Yet only one thing is demanded of them: Give orders, ensure unswerving implementation of the orders of senior commanders and your own orders and of the regulation demands, but at the same time study without fail the art of mobilizing subordinates, using to this end all the means and potential at your disposal, above all democratic means, and the creative potential of the party and Komsomol organizations, the public, and all officers, sergeants and petty officers, and soldiers and seamen.

Some leaders find it hard to acquire the ability to take public opinion into account in their practical activity, to find live forms of communication with subordinates, to keep the personnel informed, and to encourage their initiative and creativity. It is largely for this reason that by no means everywhere has it been possible so far to organize work in such a way that every serviceman has a clear picture of his place and role in the elimination of shortcomings, is clearly aware of his responsibility for improving the qualitative condition of the subunit, unit, or ship, and seeks to invest the maximum energy, knowledge, and expertise in the common cause of improving combat readiness and combat training and strengthening discipline.

Of course, it would be wrong to expect restructuring and democratization to proceed without a hitch. It is a revolutionary process, reaching down into the deepest layers of army and navy life and, consequently, difficulties are unavoidable. But it is important that it develop and develop actively so that our vigorous and persistent work on solving concrete, practical tasks of renewal ensures its irreversibility.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Readers' attention is drawn to the relationship between democratization and the enhancement of military cadres' responsibility. What governs this relationship?

[Yazov] Responsibility is, if you like, the key to restructuring and democratization. Military cadres have responsibility for consistently implementing party policy in the Army and Navy, for the combat readiness and training of troops, for their condition, and for the successful implementation of the tasks facing them. Democratization widens its boundaries.

This is manifested primarily in the realization of military cadres' social and moral responsibility for the style and results of their activity, for the quality of management, for the general state of affairs in the section in

their charge, for basing life in the subunit and unit or on the ship on mutual respect, trust, sincerity, and openness, and for ensuring that every serviceman feels a direct involvement in everything taking place in the collective and in the Armed Forces as a whole.

Democratization increases the officer's responsibility as Communist or Komsomol member to the party or Komsomol organization. It means responsibility for the conscientious fulfillment by him and by the personnel in his charge of official duties, orders, and the requirements of the oath and the regulations, for observance of the norms and rules of military life, and for personal conduct. In this connection, I must stress another idea. We often say that an officer must combine strict, fair exactingness with concern for people and interest in them. The officer must impose primarily on himself the exactingness shown toward subordinates and he must defend their honor and dignity as he would his own. Subordinates put vigor and heart into their work only when they can see that their initiative and endeavor are being supported, when officers are exacting, caring, and fair.

If personnel are passive in social and political life and service and display no commitment to high-quality performance then the officers are primarily to blame for this. And they must ask themselves how this could have happened. Clearly, this is the angle from which to approach military cadres' responsibility.

What is the main task here? On the one hand, ensuring that the methods used by military cadres accord with the level of development of personnel. On the other hand, making servicemen's initiative, creativity, and abilities, that is, all that we understand by the human factor, part of the processes of restructuring and democratization, and bringing them to bear on the steady improvement of military training standards and troops' combat readiness and military discipline.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Letters devote special attention to the commander's responsibility. The democratization process in a specific subunit, unit, or ship is frequently directly dependent on its level. What can be said in this connection?

[Yazov] There is a large share of truth in this. It is rightly said that in the Army and the Navy it is the commander who is in charge of everything and accountable for everything. The commander is responsible not only for his own decisions and actions but also for the decisions and actions of his subordinates, for their attitude to work, for their blunders and mistakes. Therefore he must clearly see the extent of his duties and of those of his subordinates and not permit either attempts to take on everything without exception or the desire to shift responsibility onto others.

There is an important and, I would say, key aspect to understanding the commander's responsibility. It consists in clear and precise awareness that success in

leadership is determined, as V.I. Lenin emphasized, "not by dint of power but by dint of authority, by dint of energy, greater experience, greater versatility, and greater talent." Precisely the commander must set an example of professionalism, capacity for work, selflessness, and purposefulness. Precisely he, and no one else, is obliged personally to tackle the most difficult and most complex matters and see them through to the end.

This, I would say, is the axiom of the commander's responsibility.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The readers' mail contains many letters whose authors ask: Of what, specifically, do restructuring and democratization consist for each military collective or serviceman taken separately? This is how the question is posed, for example, by Guards Senior Lieutenant R. Tserunyan and Seaman V. Grigovich.

[Yazov] A principled reply to this question can be found in M.S. Gorbachev's speeches. The crux of this reply is that everyone must set himself the task of doing everything conscientiously, with greater effort and with greater responsibility to himself and the people. With regard to the Army this means stepping up combat training, service, and everyday military labor. Of course, there are no ready-made prescriptions suitable for each collective and person individually in every specific case. But still it is possible, it seems to me, to single out a number of questions which we cannot omit to resolve when concretizing the tasks of restructuring with regard to ourselves.

The first is connected with resolutely eliminating elements of formalism and red tape from our activity, overcoming freeloading sentiments, and rejecting the position of "timeservers" in resolving both combat training tasks and problems of peripheral development [obustroystvo] and social, cultural, domestic, and other problems. The second relates to mastering new approaches and work methods geared to qualitative indicators. And finally, the third consists in formulating a self-critical assessment of one's own activity and the level of one's training and in shaping an inner need for constant self-improvement and development.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Some readers ask about ways and possibilities of deepening democratism in the life of military collectives. What are they?

[Yazov] I would like to emphasize that democratism was in no way alien to the life of our Army's military collectives previously, either. Much of value and use was accumulated in this sphere in the past. And, as the experience acquired over the more than 3 years of restructuring shows, all this is being utilized successfully. Naturally, each specific instance can have its own ways and methods of deepening democracy. Incidentally, by

all accounts the editorial mail contains a growing number of letters dealing with this. Obviously, they must more boldly be given the go-ahead.

Deepening democratism means, above all, creating and strengthening in the military collective an atmosphere conducive to servicemen's high sociopolitical activeness. And for this it is important to have good knowledge of their needs, sentiments, and requirements and, if you like, the potential of each of them. In this connection attention is merited by the experience of the democratization of military life in the regiments commanded by Lieutenant Colonels A.M. Yerachin, V.N. Chichko, and V.I. Dobrynin and Colonel V.P. Basov, on the submarine "Minskiy Komsomolets" commanded by Captain 1st Rank E.F. Rybakov, in the military construction detachment headed by Lieutenant Colonel S.V. Piskarev, and in many other units and ships.

What is the chief aspect of this experience? Above all, the fact that people are at the center of the organizational and political work of political command cadres and party and Komsomol organizations in these collectives. Study of the personnel is well organized there—from the moment of admitting new recruits to discharge into the reserve. Commanders and political workers carry out painstaking individual work with subordinates. Links are established and maintained with the parents of soldiers and sergeants and with the collectives from which servicemen joined the Army.

Sentiments and the real situation in subunits and in the families of officers and ensigns are studied constantly, not from time to time. Measures are taken promptly to eliminate bottlenecks and sore points, and the public is regularly informed about how things are going and who and what is hindering the resolution of specific questions. It is a positive fact that commanders and political workers do not do this in secret but involve subordinates and take account of their opinions and suggestions when organizing the resolution of current tasks. Concern for improving the working and living conditions of personnel and servicemen's family members has become more concrete.

The activation of the work of all the democratic institutions in the Armed Forces is opening up broad opportunities for deepening democratism. What do I have in mind? Servicemen's meetings—both general and according to categories—and various kinds of social formations—comrade's courts, people's control groups, councils of clubs and Lenin rooms, editorial boards of wall and radio newspapers, enterprise labor collective councils, sports, cultural, and artistic collectives, women's councils, and so forth.

I wish to emphasize once again that all the aforesaid and other ways and possibilities of deepening democracy or, in other words, links of the democratization mechanism exist in the Armed Forces. They must function, and function not at a command "from above" but thanks to

living creativity at local level. For restructuring, as the 19th all-union party conference pointed out, is certainly not manna from heaven, and we must not wait for it to be brought in from somewhere but create it ourselves, in our own collective.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many readers link the deepening of the process of democratization in the Armed Forces with the improvement of the activity of Military Councils and political organs and the enhancement of the militancy of party organizations. Could you comment on letters such as those?

[Yazov] Enhancing the role and influence of political organs and party organizations in the Army and Navy is a CPSU program demand. The party's leadership of military building and the Armed Forces is the ultimate foundation of the strengthening of our motherland's defense. An important role in implementing the CPSU's policy of restructuring in the Army and Navy is played by the collective organs of leadership—the Military Councils. Major changes are taking place in their activity now, changes which are having a beneficial influence on the course of restructuring and the development of democratization among the troops. But unfortunately there are still quite a few things which must be resolutely eliminated. Such as, first and foremost, the passivity of some council members, a lack of criticism and self-criticism, and the practice whereby individual sessions are turned into carpetings of subordinates for failings in service.

In the process of restructuring, the profound democratic spirit underlying the work of Military Councils is strengthened. Free and businesslike discussion during the collective examination of the most important questions of the troops' life and activity helps the Military Council chairman—the commander—to consider these questions more deeply, to take account of the opinion and experience of other leaders, and to produce the best decision. And the complete unity of actions after that decision has been made ensures that the measures taken and the entire work of command and political cadres are highly effective.

The links between Military Councils and commanders, political organs, primary party organizations at local level, and military collectives are becoming closer all the time. For example, the Moscow Military District Military Council has begun to react more acutely and objectively to instances of formalism, bureaucracy, red tape, irresponsibility and indifference, and other violations of the norms of our life. It has now become obligatory when visiting garrisons to meet with personnel, to hold question and answer sessions, and to receive military servicemen and members of their family to discuss their private matters.

Positive experience has also been accumulated in the Belorussian Military District. Harmonious work and mutual exactingness are characteristic of its leadership.

When analyzing the state of military discipline the district's Military Council drew attention to shortcomings in the reception of young recruits. Incidentally, a number of criticisms have been made on this score in the press. The Military Council instructed commanders and political organs to carefully monitor the reception of recruits in units. Meetings and conversations were held with young servicemen during which many things hitherto unnoticed came to light. The measures taken were quick to have an effect. For young recruits the passage through the very first and not always easiest stage of their service became better organized and they began to blend in with the army system more quickly.

Life shows that one of the most important tasks in the democratization of military life is to reveal the full democratic potential of Military Councils and place it at the service of restructuring.

I should like to return to a question on whose solution the development of the process of democratization depends to a considerable extent. Namely, our cadre work. It must be admitted that during the years of stagnation, favoritism and subjectivism in the evaluation of cadres and their official advancement were widespread. Restructuring requires that these phenomena be removed more quickly. What must be done for that? It is necessary to enhance the role of Military Councils, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the selection, placement, and training of cadres. Party and Komsomol character references must be truthful and principled and must be taken into account in cadre work at all levels. It is necessary to establish the spirit of democratism in the work of certification commissions and to enhance their prestige. A significant role here can and must be played by officers' meetings and other democratic institutions. All these factors are a reliable guarantee of the prevention of mistakes in the selection and placement of cadres, the observance of the principles of social justice, and the affirmation of a healthy moral and psychological atmosphere in collectives.

The requirement that the party organizational and political educational work of political organs and party organizations be practical and professional is paramount now.

Party organizations have a paramount role to play in the process of democratization. They must be true generators of the sociopolitical activeness of personnel and by their entire practical activity set an example of democratism and party and military comradeship. If this strength is fully employed the cause of restructuring and democratization will proceed properly in the Army and Navy.

I should especially like to emphasize the tremendous significance of posing in a principled way in party organizations the question of ensuring strict observance of Leninist norms of party life, the personal example of

Communists in service and discipline, and their vanguard role in restructuring and in the affirmation of new, quality-oriented approaches toward the solution of the tasks facing military collectives. Their attention must be constantly focused on questions of inculcating in officers the ability to work in the conditions of democratization and glasnost, to achieve high end results while relying on the social activeness of personnel, and to be both leaders of and participants in the full-blooded social and political life of military collectives.

To sum up what has been said, it is clear that the essence of improving the activity of Military Councils, political organs, and party organizations consists in ensuring in practice a party approach to the solution of all questions and all tasks and achieving a situation where party-mindedness in the everyday activity of command and political cadres is, as V.I. Lenin demanded, "not just words but deeds."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Senior Warrant Officer S. Sokolov, Lieutenant N. Ivanenko, and certain other readers have asked whether glasnost runs counter to one-man leadership and the specific conditions of military service.

[Yazov] Of course not. Glasnost, if we are to speak of its essence, lies not only—or perhaps not so much—in the fact that each person should know more and be able to judge everything, but above all in the fact that everyone should have a clear vision and understanding of their place and role in restructuring and society's renewal.

Glasnost means serious, responsible, direct, and honest discussions about shortcomings, failings, and negative phenomena. But that is not enough. As I have already said, it is far easier and simpler to denounce than to create. We need a profound knowledge of life and a balanced attitude to assessments and conclusions. We need realism. Neither the gussying up and prettification of reality nor indiscriminate criticism and one-sidedness have anything to do with glasnost. Clearly, it is superfluous to talk about the impermissibility of replacing skilled analysis of problems with gloating over so-called "tasty" facts. It is also quite clear that it is necessary to firmly defend and actively propagandize everything objectively working for restructuring and the successful resolution of the tasks facing the Armed Forces.

All this must be borne in mind when we are talking about glasnost. The party has firmly set its sights on its extensive development in the interests of renewing our society and socialism, and in the people's interests. This is the main determining criterion of glasnost.

Naturally, genuine glasnost in no way contradicts one-man leadership or the conditions of military service. On the contrary, it promotes the eradication of everything

hampering the steady improvement of the forces' qualitative condition. There are sometimes cases when certain one-man commanders carefully guard against glasnost or criticism of their style of work, citing the status of orders in so doing. The following can be said about this. Glasnost is feared by those who work badly and who are out of step with morality. As for commanders' orders, they have been and will continue to be an immutable law for their subordinates. They are not open to any kind of discussion. This is the cornerstone of one-man leadership, discipline, and military order. At the same time, this in no way means prohibiting criticism of shortcomings in our cadres' work, failings in their vocational and moral makeup, and everything that hampers work.

One sometimes encounters supporters of a kind of "selective" criticism, whereby the publicizing of shortcomings and failings uncovered somewhere in the "upper echelons" or other collectives is met with satisfaction or even malicious glee. But any criticism of themselves meets with a hostile reception. This kind of "double" glasnost—one version for oneself, another version for everybody else—along with the substitution of demagoguery for democracy, empty discussions for specific work, and willfulness and total license for organization and order are unacceptable and impermissible. Glasnost, businesslike constructive criticism, and self-criticism are a necessary, if sometimes bitter, pill. They require a responsible approach—both from those doing the criticizing and from those being criticized.

With regard to glasnost I cannot fail to mention the need to take account of the specific tasks facing the Armed Forces. Their resolution is often linked with issues which cannot be open for all or for discussion without damaging the country's defenses and security. Needless to say, in this respect there are limits to glasnost defined by Soviet laws, which determine the structure of military life and take account of the interests of our people and of socialism. The concepts of "vigilance" and "state and military secrets" have by no means been pensioned off.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many readers' letters touch in one way or another on the role of democratization in strengthening military discipline and, in particular, in eliminating nonregulation mutual relations.

[Yazov] It is impossible to overestimate this role. After all, discipline in our Armed Forces is by its very nature socialist, collectivist, and comradely. And, as V.I. Lenin often stressed, it is based on the principles of people's conscientiousness, devotion, and selflessness. It follows from this that the higher the personnel's conscientiousness, the stronger military discipline will be and the fewer opportunities there will be for violations of it—including nonregulation mutual relations—to emerge.

The existence of such cases in Army and Navy activity arouses justifiable concern among Soviet people. The most vigorous measures are being taken in the Armed

Forces to put a stop to any attempts at nonregulation mutual relations or abominable manifestations of bullying. We see this as one of the most important tasks.

We have managed to reduce the overall number of cases of gross misconduct connected with nonregulation relations in the last 3 years. The number of servicemen convicted for this kind of offense has been halved. More than 90 percent of subunits have eliminated ignominious instances of bullying. However, we work from the premise that even isolated cases of it are intolerable. We will therefore be consistent and merciless in combatting this phenomenon. All today's command and administrative activity and party political work in the Army and Navy already contains an effective dose of antidote against breaches of discipline and social parasitism by young people embarking on their Army service and moral and moral passivity on their part. But we will continue to do everything to ensure that our commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol activists do not grumble or despair when something does not work first time, but persistently work to eradicate negative phenomena in the life of the Army and the Navy, overcoming difficulties and relying on public opinion and the vigorous support of military collectives.

It is our duty and our obligation to consolidate in every way the continuity of the generations of the world's first socialist army born of October, to inspire in today's servicemen the desire to augment the Armed Forces' combat traditions, and to make every one of them someone who is spiritually strong with a highly developed sense of his revolutionary lineage and his fatherland. The ancients used to say that the most important thing is not to lose self-respect. Today political and organizational work among the troops is increasingly geared toward ensuring that every serviceman learns to respect himself and value his own dignity, believes in his own strength, possesses a sense of respect for his comrades, and is proud to be a member of the USSR Armed Forces. All this helps maintain a high level of conscious military discipline.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo demanded at its 13 October session this year that we take a range of extra measures to strengthen discipline. It stressed the need to ensure strict regulation order in every unit and subunit, to enhance the effectiveness of all forms of educational work and fundamentally orient it toward people, and to mold in every military serviceman a deep understanding of his patriotic duty and the need for the conscious and irreproachable execution of the requirements of the military oath and military regulations.

As far as the potential for democratization and glasnost in strengthening military discipline is concerned, I would encapsulate it thus: If we are able to enthuse all the personnel, and above all the mass of soldiers, to wage a real, specific, active struggle against the many infractions, including bullying, rather than a purely formal one, we will successfully solve this task. After all, from

the perspective of real life, there is actually no soldier or sailor who does not have an interest in strengthening discipline, since firm military order makes it easier for him to serve.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Readers, particularly the parents of draftees, quite often ask in their letters about the place that the consolidation of spiritual affinity between officers exercising one-man command and their subordinates occupies in the restructuring and democratization of military life.

[Yazov] This is central. The dialectics here are as follows. Democratization makes it possible for the spiritual affinity of commander and subordinates—that very important feature of our Army—to be fully revealed. The securing of this spiritual affinity is, in its turn, an indispensable, obligatory condition of democratization.

It should be stressed that, although the spiritual affinity of officers and men in our Army is socially determined by their class and ideological unity, it is far from being attained automatically; it does not come as a matter of course but is the result of daily, joint martial labor. I am convinced that a commander's respect for his subordinates is the key here. That is the conclusion that underpins the experience of many generations of people who have chosen the profession of defending their fatherland. How can one fail to recall here Suvorov's "The Science of Victory"! The great, undefeated Russian military leader regarded the soldier as a person, not as a "mere mechanism provided for under the Articles of War." That was one of the great secrets of his victories.

A commander is not at all required to make sentimental "declarations of love" to his soldiers. His attitude to his subordinates is reflected in his daily activity. Occasionally the true sense of the term "father-commander" is distorted out of a twisted understanding of their rights and obligations by certain commanders. Yet the true commander is really, as the poet said, a "father to the soldiers." What front-liner does not remember how soldiers quite often twice the age of their regiment's commander described him as its "father" out of love and pride. This did not originate in documents or orders, but came from the mass of the soldiers, who thereby expressed their feelings toward their commander.

However, if there is formalism, indifference, arrogance, willfulness, or disrespect for the human dignity of subordinates in a commander's activity, then no words will help—not even the loudest, finest words. Nothing can take the place of the commander's personal communication with subordinates, just as it is impossible to overestimate the significance of the educational impact of such communication. Sometimes an accurate, weighty word spoken by a commander to a subordinate in an appropriate situation—approbation or, where necessary, a stern reprimand—mean more in education than many measures. Will a soldier forget how a regiment, battalion, or company commander, for example, told him of the

unit's history, traditions, and best people, how he congratulated him paternally on his birthday, visited him in the medical unit or hospital, or frequently dined at the same table in the soldiers' mess room? Only this must not be an ostentatious act but come from the heart.

The soldier's soul is extremely sensitive to any changes in the moral and psychological atmosphere of a subunit, unit, or ship, to any deviations from the norm in relationships within the collective, and to events at home, in his family, about which he learns in letters. For a soldier is in his youth. As yet he has little experience of life. An attentive, solicitous commander will at once see from signs that he alone understands that his subordinate is concerned about something, anxious, depressed, or that his soul is "not in it," as it were, and he will do everything to ascertain the reasons for this state and to support and help the soldier.

How a commander must act is determined by the regulations, according to which he is obliged to combine high exactingness, principledness, and implacability toward shortcomings with trust and respect for people and constant concern for them. This is a matter of conscience, honor, and duty for every commander. The zealous fulfillment of this duty perceived by both the mind and the heart is the chief guarantee of the commander's closeness to his subordinates.

This closeness is the norm for relationships in the socialist Army, in our Armed Forces. Its observance makes the commander's authority unquestionable, gives him firm mastery of the situation, and ensures the possibility of formulating and implementing on this basis the most effective organizational and political educational measures to direct troops and mobilize personnel for the unconditional fulfillment of the set tasks.

V.I. Lenin once laconically and graphically formulated a kind of "code of conduct" for a leader: "Live in the thick of things. Know sentiments. Know everything. Understand the masses. Know how to approach them. Win their absolute trust. Leaders, do not lose touch with the masses being led...." Every commander and political worker and every officer must be guided by this Leninist commandment in his daily work.

Unfortunately, some of our officers are distant from their subordinates. We frequently hear it said: What question can there be of losing touch if an officer lives literally day and night in the barracks? What can be said about this? It is possible to spend 24 hours a day in the barracks and nevertheless be distant from one's subordinates and lose touch with them. This happens when an officer is formally "present" and in the barracks but does not go beyond strictly "official" contact with subordinates, and the personnel essentially remain outside his influence. Soldiers see that the officer "delineates" service and, naturally, will not stretch out to him, confide in him, or turn to him for help.

Of course, we have far more examples of true closeness between officers and soldiers, particularly at the time of our servicemen's actions when fulfilling their international duty in Afghanistan, when eliminating the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, in other extreme situations, on combat duty, and simply when performing everyday service. We are obliged to work persistently to make this the norm everywhere.

Closeness to subordinates is a most reliable guarantee of the successful fulfillment of any tasks both in peacetime and in combat. At the same time it must always be remembered that no one will be able to ensure it from outside, as it were, if the officer himself does not achieve this through his own labor and his own will, energy, knowledge, exactingness, and concern.

In conclusion I would like to say that for many generations of Soviet people military service has been a school of life, a school for fostering civic responsibility, courage, and patriotism. Today too, fulfilling his military duty within the ranks of the Armed Forces, each young person acquires, in addition to high political, professional, and moral qualities, firm conviction as to the need always and in any situation to follow the norms and principles of socialist democracy and the laws of comradeship, and to take an active life stance.

To sum up all I have said about democratization in the Armed Forces, its essence and aims may be formulated as follows. The democratization of military life means eradicating all manifestations of formalism, stagnation, passiveness, red tape, and complacency. It means enhancing servicemen's sociopolitical and service activeness and their interested involvement in the affairs of the subunit, unit, or ship. Most importantly, it means realizing the spiritual potential of political command cadres, party and Komsomol organizations, Army and Navy democratic institutions, and all personnel, in the interests of improving the quality of combat training, strengthening military discipline, enhancing the Armed Forces' combat readiness, and successfully resolving all the tasks facing them.

NGF Commander Reflects On Slowness of Military Restructuring, Independence of Command
18010251a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Sep 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel General I. Korbutov, Northern Group of Forces Commander: "Independence of Command—Everyone is For It, But What is Hindering It"]

[Text] The event with which I would like to begin this discussion about independence of command happened after one of the exercises. Motor Rifle Company Commander Senior Lieutenant K. Sabirov who had been severely criticized for gross errors during the exercise suddenly decided to appeal the measures that were taken with him. There is nothing especially unnatural about this, for an officer has that right if, for example, his

commander exceeded the disciplinary authority given him by regulations. But in this case we are not talking about the severity of the punishment.

According to the official version, Senior Lieutenant Sabirov was punished because he had not been able to manage the column movement during a move. In fact the company commander arrived at the assigned area with only two infantry combat vehicles. It would seem that everything was clear in this case. No one gives strokes to a commander who has lost his personnel and equipment even before the battle has started. However an investigation into what had taken place provided details that forced one to look a little differently at the situation. Here is what happened. It was discovered that Sabirov had practically no chance to make any decisions during the entire move. The company had been commanded by everyone but the commander. Yes, there were several times when Senior Lieutenant attempted to do something to gather the columns that was literally breaking down on the move and to bring up those who were lagging behind... But in every case the exercise umpires themselves took control.

In short, Senior Lieutenant Sabirov was essentially bound hand and foot in a situation where, as the commander, he should legally have had the primary role. And I personally saw a good sign that he had not reconciled himself to this. It was precisely this officer's inability to accept the petty guardianship and the infringement upon his independence of command that reflects the changes in people that have been caused by perestroika.

Yes, Senior Lieutenant Sabirov's position reflects the mood of many of our commanders. Glasnost and democratization, all of those processes that are gaining strength in society, have arisen within the Army environment and have increased resistance against anything that hinders service. It is clear that this has to cause some attempts at re-interpreting the very concept of "independence of command," a quality without which a commander is generally not a commander. People are not complaining about problems—there are always enough of these in our service. They are primarily talking about how dependence on the "power" method of management, subjective approaches and antiquated paragraphs is sapping people's energy.

As a matter of fact, this was discussed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. You now involuntarily catch yourself thinking about how many of the problems that were addressed there are in concert with what is being done in the Armed Forces. I have more than just some partial analogies in mind. We are talking about major issues which every speaker at the conference touched upon in one way or another: what is hindering perestroika, what is showing it down, how can we live and work better? I don't think that there is anyone among us who has not thought about these far from simple issues. What makes them difficult? I, for example,

have not met an officer or general who would say that he was against perestroyka. But in the meantime many units, to include those within our own Group of Forces, have, as before, a long way to go before they reach a turning-point in military training and discipline. Changes for the better are taking place much slower than one would want and the reasons for this are very diverse.

I recently talked with a battalion commander who had set up a defensive area during an exercise without taking terrain relief into account. Even a man who is not very well informed about military art would have noticed that this battalion commander's decision would doom him to failure at the first enemy attack. And did the officer really not understand this when I asked him? He answered that he acted in accordance with instructions from the regimental commander. He said he had had his own ideas about this, but...

I now remember this battalion commander's feeble gesture of helplessness when talk moved around to setbacks that had taken place during the period of stagnation, when there was no thinking and much parasitic smugness. But on the other hand, when thinking about those episodes one has to think about whether that battalion commander is simply worn down by the petty, constant guardianship and the endless hypothetical tactical situations or is simply not being given the chance to prove himself? As we already know, this does happen.

And what is involved in this "we know"? If I am to be frank, I have to say that there are times that you notice how difficult it is not to give in to stereotypical thinking. I was recently in one company and the impressions I got were depressing. The entire area and the structures were in a state of neglect. In short, the major unit commander, the unit commander and officers from group headquarters were at the subunit's location in a short time. I think that they had to see how simply ashamed people had to be to live like that. Naturally work soon got into full swing. But a little later I asked myself this question. Did it really take the presence of so many officials? The company had a starshina [sergeant major] and a commander; they were responsible both for this and for putting it in order. And then I had another thought—would a commission from Moscow "come running" here to this company and would they hold the company commander responsible and not the starshina? Yes, here was something to think about.

True, you can hear that there is less "passion" involved in the issue of "independence of command" than is warranted. There are regulations, orders and source documents. Carry out what you are ordered to do and the discussion is over. This is reasonable, for it is difficult to discuss qualitative advances in military training and in resolving other problems without maintaining efficient, iron discipline. However here is how our reality at times answers this question.

During an exercise two tank battalions approached a water obstacle at the same time. It was not a large river, but the bank was swampy and if you moved straight ahead there was the chance of miring vehicles. Both officers, battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel N. Kulapin and acting battalion commander Major A. Menshikov, equally understood this. However they acted in different ways. Major Menshikov began to wait for the combat engineers to move up as it was their job to make a crossing. Lieutenant Kulapin wasted no time and immediately sent reconnaissance elements out in several directions and one soon found a site suitable for crossing. Major Menshikov's battalion naturally lost. And yet both officers were guided by one and the same regulation.

And this same thing often happens in matters associated with maintaining military order. People are in identical situations, they struggle with identical problems, and the contrast in the results is striking.

There has been discussion about the fact that neither regulations nor the wisest orders will "save" you if you have not shown any of the initiative, creativity and self-dependence that allows you to select the work forms and methods for the specific circumstances at the onset, without looking back. And a lot of this depends on us, the senior chiefs, on how we indoctrinate initiative into our subordinates and how we give them the opportunity to uncover their own abilities. Unfortunately, the chiefs themselves often forget about this. This undoubtedly happens because we still rarely ask an officer or a general how many subordinates who have initiative and are able to work in the spirit of contemporary demands he has personally educated and what he has done so that he has someone to trust in.

Indeed. Where does a commander get initiative when he has been deliberately given the role of statistician in exercises and in everyday life? For example, the Group of Forces Combat Training Section had developed a plan and sent it in for approval by the beginning of the training year. This plan had everything written in, to include how much tank-fire training per week was to be held in subunits. I agree that a lot of work was done. But for whom? This program defined the number of hours for one activity or another. Let the commander himself allocate those hours and decide which exercises and when to hold them on the basis of his specific situation.

I do not maintain that this will eliminate the problem. In my opinion, we have to go further and look at the military training program in other ways. It often turns out that a subunit formally completes its training program, but does not achieve the necessary results. It is clear that it boils down to the quality of the activities. But on the other hand, the program does not consider the conditions under which personnel from one subunit or another operate, the level of their training, the number of guard requirements and so forth.

In my opinion the military training program must present scientifically based recommendations for organizing the training process—as the saying goes, its basic design. Then, as he plans the exercises the commander takes into account the subunits' training, their commitment to garrison obligations and other such conditions and uses his discretion in allotting the time allocated under the program, the motor resources and the material assets.

A commander's independence in the sphere of military training is severely limited by the impact of the administrative concerns which he voluntarily or involuntarily has on his shoulders. There has already been a lot said about the fact that this load is often beyond the commander's strength and that at times people go into units to pull personnel from military training for no real reason. There is no sense in repeating this. I will only say that I fully support the opinion of Central Asian Military District Commander Colonel General A. Kovtunov as reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 4 August. He stated that we have to develop a regular organizational force structure that conforms to contemporary needs.

Of course the expansion of independence of command supposes increased responsibility for the results of this work. People understand independence in different ways. You will see some who will literally go through thick and thin for the words that are behind it, while in other cases it turns out that it was used only to get out from under control or to cover someone's errors, inactivity or incompetence. And there are other cases where people try to attract attention to themselves through some fine-sounding undertaking to "surprise" the command, while really only creating the appearance of work.

At this point I can certainly refer to the tested principle "believe, but verify." However we have many of our problems because while there is a shortage of trust in commanders at the tactical level, there is a clear surplus of verification, instructions, prohibitions and so forth. Take the commander's financial-administrative activities, for example. He is literally surrounded by instructions, circulars and various documents that contain prohibitions. A regimental commander has a lot of money at his disposal. But this money is assigned by the various regulatory articles and may be spent only for their precisely assigned purpose. And even if there are no requirements in the area to which the money is allocated, it is forbidden to spend even a kopeck on something else.

Financial personnel see this strict procedure as a means against possible misuse. But we will look truth in the eye and say that this does not always work out. And it is creating difficulties for inquisitive people who are worried about this. And this is what we get. We talk about how the commander is the leader, but we only make him a spoke in the wheel.

Lieutenant Colonel G. Averyanov, the commander of a motor rifle regiment, recently called me. He was, as the saying goes, hot. It turned out that his best battalion commander was being reassigned and he was the last to be told about it. I began to investigate, starting with the personnel section chief. Yes, this intelligent battalion commander was actually deserving of being advanced. But why was this done behind the back of the unit commander who naturally relied on this officer?

And this is certainly not the only example where I have had to intervene in decisions by personnel sections. Yet who, if not the commander, should decide who is assigned to which position? Of course, it should be decided in light of glasnost and openness and with a feel for social opinion, i.e., in the modern way.

The discussion about command independence has fundamental importance. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference conclusions about the need to guarantee the effectiveness of defensive construction primarily through qualitative parameters, conclusions that are innovative in their essence, force us to take a new look at the figure of the commander/one-man-command and his role in resolving the tasks of perestroika. We will not move far without commanders who are constantly seeking, have initiative and are competent and able to independently make responsible decisions and implement them. And we have to educate them with these qualities.

Sakharov Calls for Unilateral Cut in Soviet Military Manpower

*18010146 Moscow LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 19 Oct 88 p 4*

[Article by V. Pogrebenkov: "How Long Should a Soldier Serve?"]

[Text] Academician A. Sakharov, speaking at a conference of the Pugwash Movement in Dagomys, proposed that there be unilateral reductions in the term of service in the Soviet Armed Forces, and in their numerical strength, of approximately 50 percent. His reasoning for his proposal was that at present there is not a single state that would threaten the USSR with attack. Such a reduction, in the opinion of the academician, would have colossal international importance.

The ideas of academician A. Sakharov on changes in the Soviet military structure have been met with interest both in the USSR and abroad. There have been various reactions to his proposal in our country. And this is entirely natural. I think that competent experts from the USSR Ministry of Defense should set forth the official viewpoint on this matter. Without replacing them, I would like to express my own personal opinions on this question.

Let us begin with the main point. Does the United States plan to attack the USSR? I think not. I am equally sure that the Soviet Union does not have aggressive intentions, either with respect to the U. S., or with respect to any other country.

Consequently, is there no threat? Hardly. The reality is such that both countries possess multi-million man groupings of forces, equipped with thousands of nuclear missiles. And these missiles potentially represent a tremendous danger. This is one of the paradoxes. While acknowledging the fatal consequences of war, from a political and military standpoint, both sides continue to maintain armed forces capable not only of defensive actions, but also of carrying out major offensive operations. This is true although the new Soviet military doctrine promulgated in 1987, as well as the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states, propose a shift to the principle of solely defensive sufficiency.

Apparently, one of the reasons for this paradox is that the army is manned and equipped, as a rule, according to the principle, not of intelligent sufficiency, as much as that of necessary surplus. Such is the psychology of national security: to ensure it a surplus is preferred to a shortage. Therefore, on each side, as a result of the chain reaction of the arms race, a "surplus" developed—everything that has been accumulated above the norm of intelligent defensive sufficiency. It is this "surplus" (and it may constitute a very significant percentage, and should be established by experts, taking into account the military capability of the opposing side) that it is truly necessary to reduce.

But what can be expected if such a reduction is carried out on a unilateral basis? Might the advantages include an undoubted moral gain in the eyes of the peace loving foreign communities, and a favorable propaganda position for pressure on the other side? And the shortcomings? These include the disruption of the parity recognized by both sides, with all of its "surpluses," disbalances and asymmetries in weapons and numbers of personnel. It should also be recalled, obviously, that the unilateral reduction in our armed forces in the early 1960s by 1.2 million men was not supported and did not result in adequate actions from the West. Therefore, the safest path to disarmament is bilateral. That is, a path by which parity is not disrupted, and fears and feelings of vulnerability do not arise on either side.

In my view, a reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces can be accompanied by two changes in length of service: either by an increase, or a decrease. In the first case problems of an economic and demographic nature arise. Therefore, for the army and navy to switch to three and four-year terms of service respectively is inexpedient.

In the opinion of specialists, reducing both terms of service and numerical strength simultaneously may sharply undermine the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Let us also acknowledge honestly another fact. The constantly growing complexity of weapons and equipment, as well as poor pre-military training, still do not allow our draftees to serve "for themselves and for the other fellow."

The most realistic path is to reduce the numerical strength of the armed forces, while preserving the former terms of service for the next few years. Apropos of this, it would be interesting to learn: What is the situation with respect to terms of service in the NATO armies?

Let us recall that the overwhelming majority of NATO armies are voluntary. This means that a soldier finishes his initial contract for three or four years of service, and then can extend it. Is it conceivable to imagine that we would have, say, a tank driver, who perfects his professional skill over the course of 4-6 years? Further, the average age of a NATO soldier of 23-24 years is higher than ours. If you take in their armies the noncommissioned officer corps, and this is the backbone of any army, with an average age of 26-28 years, they have an average of 8-10 years of service.

It is, of course, unsuitable for us to copy the NATO armies. But, it is worthwhile to think seriously about academician A. Sakharov's proposal. This is especially true following the 19th Party Conference, when the specific task was assigned: while preserving high combat effectiveness, shift to qualitative principles of manning the Soviet Armed Forces.

Officer Proposes Militia System as Basis of Military Reform

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No 45, 6 Nov 88 p 6

[Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Savinkin article: "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Civil War in Russia was just in its initial stage when Lenin already included the matter of the socialist transformation of the armed forces in the list of priorities. Can we say that the task has been completed once and for all? The armed forces, being inseparably linked with society, undergo or should undergo changes along with society according to the changes in the world. What direction might these changes take? Below is the viewpoint of a professional with a life-long experience in the Soviet Army.

The question posed in the title is not a rhetorical one. It has arisen by the demands of our time, in particular, by a critical attitude toward the existing form of the organization of our country's armed forces, by the tendencies of the armed forces development in the conditions of

peaceful coexistence, and by the military-political realities of a nuclear and, later, a nuclear-free, world. In my opinion, new models of an army answering the demands of self-governing socialist society under renewal must be developed.

The strength of the armed forces lies in popular support. However, it's impossible to ignore the armed forces present drop in prestige among civilians and young men's dwindling interest in army service. "Illnesses" in society and within the armed forces have manifested themselves, but these are being removed in the process of perestroika. However, a certain dislocation of relations between Soviet society and its armed forces nevertheless remains. There are several reasons for this: armed forces' state-political estrangement from the people has been taking place at various periods of this country's development; the contradiction between the comparatively quicker and essential restructuring of society, in general, and its comparatively slower spread to the military sphere where changes are largely carried out through administrative actions; the controversial influence of the events in Afghanistan on people's conscience; and the insufficiency of information about the processes going on in our defence policy and in the life of the armed forces, and so on.

Of course, there is a way out of this predicament. Complex changes dealing with the social and state system are needed, and they are underway. The need for a military reform has become urgent (it is my personal, and therefore arguable opinion). The restoring of the Leninist image of the socialist army, the developing of its truly nationwide popular, democratic and humanist character is hardly possible without taking such a resolute and serious step. I think that the absence of any immediate threat of aggression, plus the favourable situation in the country, are propitious for carrying out the reform in a relatively short time. This will ensure a gradual transition to a new model of the armed forces.

The military reform core, as I see it, is the transition to a professional-militia army, in other words, to a relatively small, perfectly technically equipped, professionally trained and mainly voluntarily staffed military organization supported by a broad network of local militia formations. Such a system, I believe, would allow us to reduce standing military components without any detriment to the country's security, and provide a better cohesion between the army and the people. As a result, a democratic military structure integrated into society would be created, providing an opportunity for solving a number of problems, including the security and inner stability for the country, as well as enforcement of law and order carried out by citizen-militiamen themselves. The professional-militia army will combine the ideal of a democratic military defence system with the real possibilities for reshaping the armed forces in keeping with the principles of sufficiency and the strategy of military defence. In the course of disarmament, the system can be

transformed into a militia army highly geared to productive work. That army with short terms of reserve military service and a high patriotic spirit will have no regular military organization.

In connection with the above-mentioned proposal, I would like to draw the readers' attention to the following. Military-theoretic works contain a specific view which also found reflection in the actual military-political practice: the standing modern army is part and parcel of the process of building the armed forces in socialist countries. The view is substantiated by corresponding citations from Lenin. However, this contradicts reality. Classics of Marxism-Leninism always stood for the idea of replacing the regular army with a nationwide arming of people (militia). It should be noted that this was meant to be implemented within the context of democratic and socialist changes. A regular and large army created of necessity during the Civil War was considered by Lenin and his comrades to be an interim type of armed forces. It was supposed to be replaced with a militia comprised of workers and peasants (and later by a nationwide militia).

At the height of the Civil War, the 8th and 9th Congresses of the RCP (B) developed the guidelines for building the militia. After the end of the Civil War, in 1924, the armed forces were reduced from five million men to 562 thousand. A military reform was carried out, supervised by Frunze, resulting in the creation of a professional-militia military organization optimally suiting the contemporary military-political situation. "The guideline for the development of the armed forces of the Union," wrote Frunze, "has clearly become the transition to the militia-territorial army with relatively well-trained cadres for the main arm (infantry) and the preservation of the regular character for other arms, especially technical ones."

The policy of building a professional-militia army was artificially interrupted in the 1930. Stalin's political regime needed a regular and docile army, under the conditions of "barrack socialism." Repressions against the people excluded the support of territorial-militia formations which in essence were composed of people. The results of that step were tragic during the Great Patriotic War. A five-million-strong peacetime regular army allowed Nazi troops inside our country as far as Moscow, and suffered heavy losses in the first several months of the war. The army had to be recreated and trained in the course of the war; the partisan movement, the People Volunteers and a universal military education had to be organized from scratch. All that testifies to the fact that the consistent modernization of the professional-militia system could, if not prevent the Nazi aggression altogether, then at least repulse it sooner and with significantly fewer losses. The aggressor would have met the resistance of a mobile perfectly equipped regular army interacting with national militia units.

The revival, under the new conditions, of the professional-militia system (an abortive attempt which was made in the early 1960s, when it was planned to reduce the strength of the USSR armed forces to 2,423 million) would, in my opinion, enable us to overcome the **extremes of military construction**. On the one hand, it would enable us to avoid a continued developing of our peacetime army as a professional, regular and mass-scale army (because, under present conditions, it is too much of a burden for our society, involving a diversion of large masses of people from their productive work for long periods of time), which no longer meets the requirements of the new stage of our society's development. Besides, an army like this is considered by other countries to be a potential military threat, irrespective of political intentions. On the other hand, it would end the widely-spread illusions about the alleged possibility of solving all problems by means of a small professional army: such an army would not be able to safeguard the country, given its vast territory. Nor, of course, during a nuclear war. Such an army would not, in my opinion, be able to become a democratic military organization or popular nationwide. Unfortunately, behind such projects can be discerned some people's disinclination to serve in the army and their attempt to stop our policy of nationwide military conscription.

A professional-militia system would fully correspond to the new military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries, providing us with the means of **flexible** reaction to the dynamics of the disarmament process, as well as to any increase (or decrease) of the threat of aggression. Such a system would, as I see it, be capable of preventing war and containing aggression more effectively and safely than the nuclear deterrence. This has been attested to not only by history, but also by the experience of the modern armed forces buildup in the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Cuba which, to a certain extent, are each developing their professional militia systems. As a number of capitalist and developing countries have territorial military formations as well, it is principally possible to implement practically Engels's idea about concluding an international agreement on the transition to militia systems becoming a war-preventing factor in a nuclear-free world. Thus, it would disprove the main argument of the opponents of universal nuclear disarmament.

The transition to the new system in the course of the Soviet armed forces buildup would upgrade the **quality and orderliness of the armed service**, as well as **boost its appeal**. It would become possible to do away with the overcentralized and cumbersome administrative-command control system. It could be replaced with a flexible control structure based on scientific analysis, automation and elements of public control and self-management. The direct linkage between the armed forces and all strata of Soviet society would be strengthened.

That is my vision of an armed forces model suitable at this new stage of development of socialist society. This model would respond to military-political detente,

ensure effective safety for the country and boost the prestige of the armed forces. An increase in the aforementioned tendency to reduce and restructure the armed forces internationally would represent a triumph for the new political thinking.

Attention to Veterans of All 'Internationalist' Military Actions Urged

18010148 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Nov 88 p 6

[Letter from A. Kozyrev: "Not Only About the 'Afghans'"]

[Text] There is an extensive and serious discussion of the problems of internationalist soldiers being conducted in the press. But currently the term refers only to the "Afghans." Yes, to their lot fell serious trials. But that does not mean, in my opinion, that we must not pay attention to our other soldiers. Didn't my brother in his time in China fulfill the very same obligation? And the Soviet volunteers who fought in Spain, the soldiers who helped in the struggle against the counterrevolution in Hungary? I bow my head before our boys who have suffered in Afghanistan. But I also remember the obligation which fell upon my generation. I was obliged to participate in the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Believe me, they too were costly to many of our boys. Today only the participants recall this. In the papers in those days they did not come close to writing about everything. To this day our history contains a multitude of unmentioned facts.

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National Security in the Nuclear Age

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 9, May 88 pp 32-39

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Serebryannikov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "National Security in the Nuclear Age"]

[Text] Ensuring national security has always been considered the holy of holies of every state. The armed forces and weapons guarantee its sovereignty. Today, when the armies of the leading countries of the world are equipped with nuclear missiles, unilateral security of a state is unthinkable.

Today the essence of security, the ways and methods of achieving it, and the role of military and nonmilitary means of maintaining it have changed radically. The program of creating a comprehensive system of international security, put forward by the Soviet Union, is receiving increasingly broader support and recognition in the world arena. The struggle to implement it is already yielding the first reassuring results.

The comprehensive system of international security, the fundamentals of which were developed by the 27th CPSU Congress, assumes the establishment of relations between countries and peoples which ensure the protection of mankind as a whole and each state individually against nuclear catastrophe and disasters of a military, economic, ecological and humanitarian nature. Its main feature is the concern for protecting the world and every nation against world nuclear and conventional war, and also against local wars, armed conflicts and military terrorism.

Unfortunately, historical experience in this area is limited. Security under conditions of antagonistic socioeconomic formations, if we can talk about it in general as it applies to the past, was temporary, limited and unstable, as evidenced by the endless wars and conflicts.

The victory of the Great October Revolution became a turning point in the approach to the problem of security. From the moment of its emergence, the Soviet state declared war to be the greatest crime facing mankind and called for all countries to build relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and to begin to reduce and eliminate weapons, that is, to destroy the material basis of wars and conflicts. Only the hatred and savage malice of the international bourgeoisie toward the victorious socialist revolution and the attempts by world imperialist reaction to smother it by force of arms compelled the first state of workers and peasants in history to create a strong defense and a powerful regular army. It is only the fault of imperialism that military means of defense also became for socialism the main means of ensuring its security. Without them it was impossible to repel the two major invasions of international forces of imperialism and foil their numerous aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. Encircled by capitalist states for a long time, the USSR was forced to rely on military force to defend socialism and safeguard its security. Objective circumstances dictated this. The Soviet Union's persistent struggle for collective security in the face of the aggressive preparations of Hitler's Germany in the 1930's was not supported by the ruling circles of England and France. In 1939 they refused to conclude a military alliance of collective security with the USSR which could have become an effective obstacle in the path of fascist aggression and prevented World War II.

After it ended, a unique opportunity to build a world without wars appeared. A mechanism of international cooperation—the United Nations—was created for this purpose. But world imperialism, led by the United States, ruined this historic opportunity, having put nuclear weapons at the service of its expansionist goals. The imperialist circles of the United States and other NATO member states, opposing in every possible way a ban on nuclear weapons and, what is more, having unleashed a feverish arms race, embarked on the path of atomic blackmail, sharply exacerbated the confrontation with socialism and stepped up interference in the internal affairs of many countries of the world.

The threat of a world nuclear conflagration poses problems of international security in a completely different way. The task of ensuring external security has gone beyond the exclusive competence of an individual state (or bloc) and can only be achieved within the framework of world society. Security has become indivisible—it is either for all, or for none. For example, there cannot be security for the USSR without security for the USA, or security for the Warsaw Pact countries without security for the NATO countries. It is possible only as universal security.

Security today can only be equal. Less security for one opposing side is disadvantageous for the other side, for it destabilizes the strategic situation and intensifies suspicion and fear. Attempts by one side to raise the level of its own security at the expense or to the detriment of the other or attempts to achieve unilateral superiority provoke corresponding retaliatory actions. This inevitably leads to an increase in the level of military confrontation and lessens both overall security and the security of each state individually.

"The nature of today's weapons," it was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, "leaves no hope for any state to protect itself solely by military-technical means, say, by developing a defense—even the most powerful one. Ensuring security increasingly appears as a political task that can be accomplished only by political means."

New political thinking, dialogue, relations of mutually beneficial cooperation, and an international political and legal, moral and psychological, and organizational mechanism for peaceful coexistence of states are the nonmilitary means which can be used to restructure the entire system of international relations. By relying on them, states are in a position to accomplish an historical task: to change the world from a nuclear to a nuclear-free world; from one fraught with a new war to a secure one; from one torn to pieces by violence, wars, and conflicts to a nonviolent one. Universal and class interests of the working people merge together in accomplishing this task.

The transition from a world in which security would be ensured primarily by military means to a world in which the decisive role would actually shift to nonmilitary (political) means is neither a smooth one-act nor a contradictory process, but a persistent, tenacious and rather lengthy struggle in stages. The transformation of nonmilitary (political) means into universal means of ensuring security is an objective requirement for preserving and prolonging the life of the human race.

The dialectics of this transformation, depending on specific conditions, include a different combination of military and nonmilitary means of ensuring security: 1) a decisive role of military means, with nonmilitary means having secondary importance; 2) relatively equal importance of both; 3) actual predominance of nonmilitary means (creation of an effective political mechanism for

blocking war and military conflicts), with military means fulfilling a secondary role; 4) the transformation of peaceful coexistence into the only form of relations between states with different structures and the disappearance of military confrontation and the danger of war.

Political means (nonmilitary) are intended not only to halt the arms race, this irrational race of mankind toward the precipice, but also to eliminate local wars and conflicts. It is through political measures that the USSR is striving to break this chain decisively, having proposed a specific plan for ending the regional military conflict in Afghanistan. The statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 8 February 1988 on Afghanistan became a new, important Soviet initiative. It specified dates and conditions acceptable to all for withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet forces from this country. A meeting between General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and Mr. Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan and general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took place in Tashkent on 7 April. The leaders of the two countries announced that the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan would act in accordance with this statement. The signing of an agreement on Afghanistan in Geneva and the implementation of a policy toward national reconciliation will promote the strengthening of peace and security not only in Asia but throughout the entire planet and will stimulate the process of ending other regional, conflicts which could be stopped completely in several years.

In advancing a far-reaching program for freeing mankind from the danger of nuclear catastrophe, wars and military conflicts and for establishing a strong peace, the CPSU and other fraternal parties scientifically substantiate real ways and methods of implementing it. An in-depth analysis of complex questions is given in the documents of the Leninist party: Is it possible to block the most dangerous manifestations of the aggressive nature of imperialism? Is a transition of the ruling circles of the West to new political thinking possible? Are there guarantees that they will sincerely support a restructuring of international relations and participate in creating a comprehensive system of international security?

Imperialism has changed substantially in its almost 9 decades of history. It differs in many ways from what it was in the early and even middle of the 20th century. It has proved to be more stable and adaptable to new conditions than it was 50 and even 20 or 30 years ago. At that time it was believed that by the beginning of the 21st century imperialism as a social system would be shattered by revolutionary storms. Now it is obvious that it will enter the next century. Does this allow us to speak about the possibility of creating a security system based on political means?

Up to the mid-1950's, it was asserted that wars would disappear only with the disappearance of capitalism. In the 1950's and 1960's, communists scientifically substantiated that peace could be "imposed" on capitalism

and a new world war prevented. This conclusion was first made at the 20th CPSU Congress. It was substantiated that even with capitalism preserved as a social system it was possible to exclude war from the life of society. In the 1980's, theoretical thought went further: conclusions were reached that it was possible to build a secure, nonnuclear, unarmed and nonviolent world in conditions with capitalism still existing as a social system. The Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence was creatively developed and new political thinking was formulated as a precondition to the establishment of a reliable system of international security. The 27th CPSU Congress and documents associated with the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution made a particularly large contribution to this.

The confidence that peace can be imposed on imperialism and that it can be compelled to renounce militarism and wars is based on strong arguments. First of all, the laws of an integral world can limit the area influenced by the narrow class interests of monopolistic capital, block the most dangerous manifestations of the predatory nature of imperialism, and force it to accept the most important principles of the new political thinking. Secondly, the ever-increasing pressure of the potential of peace is able to change significantly the policy of imperialist reaction and curb its aggressive military aspirations. Thirdly, the achieved military-strategic parity between the socialist world and the capitalist world has nullified the possibility of Western militaristic circles achieving any political goals by means of war against a new social system. Fourthly, the instinct for self-preservation also urges the imperialist bourgeoisie toward restraint in world policy. It will not be able to survive without giving others the opportunity to live.

A major, truly historical event which confirmed the reality of our peace-oriented plans was the signing of the agreement between the USSR and USA on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Washington in early December 1987. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted at its session on 17 December that the INF Treaty is historical, since it states for the first time a decision actually to destroy two classes of nuclear weapons of the USSR and the USA. This is the first real step toward arms reduction. The primary role here belongs to the persistent, steady, and constructive peace-oriented policy of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. Elements of realistically thinking politicians of a number of capitalist countries also played their role. At a meeting in Washington, the parties agreed to complete by late spring or early summer 1988 work on an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the USSR and the USA. The world public considers the implementation of such measures as a serious prerequisite for a significant increase in the level of international security.

When speaking about these positive changes in the political thinking of leading figures of the West, one must not lose sight of the obvious fact that militaristic

circles in the United States and NATO and the bosses of the military-industrial complex of the leading imperialist powers are stubbornly hindering the normalization of relations between states with different social systems, the policy of detente and the ending of the arms race. They have not renounced aggressive plans with respect to the USSR and the entire socialist community. They continue their gross interference in the internal affairs of other states, wage undeclared wars against freedom-loving peoples, and are stepping up their efforts to realize their plans to achieve military superiority. The reactionary circles of the West are obsessed with the wild idea that peace can be built further only on the ruins of socialism.

Thus, the militaristic forces of imperialist states continue to be captive to old illusions. The thinking and actions of many Western politicians with respect to the problems of security are still dominated by the approach formed over centuries. The USA and NATO operate on the concept of ensuring their "absolute security" at the expense of the "absolute danger" of all other countries, primarily the USSR, counting on achieving a decisive military superiority and possessing a new "superweapon."

The ruling circles of imperialist states are trying to convince their people that their security supposedly depend entirely upon military means, above all, nuclear weapons, and upon creation of the notorious SDI and a dominating position in space.

Once the first growth appeared on the field of disarmament—the Soviet-American INF agreement—NATO "hawks" unleashed a feverish campaign to prevent the development of this process, to take immediate steps to "compensate" for the missiles eliminated, to move new nuclear forces closer to and into Europe, to modernize the remaining weapon systems, to accelerate work on SDI, and so forth. "Reactionary, rabidly anti-Soviet forces are consolidating," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev noted at the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "All kinds of 'analysts' and Kremlinologists are making frightening recommendations to the governments, are cluttering up the minds of the public, and intimidating with 'catastrophic' consequences for the West if the process of disarmament continues."

It is perfectly obvious that as long as imperialist politicians think in obsolete categories, as long as there is no effective mechanism for governing military-political processes in the world, as long as the danger of war remains and social revanchism remains the pivot of strategy of the militaristic programs of Western ruling circles, military means retain the most important role for us in holding back the aggressor. However, use of them by socialist countries is subordinated to the policy of struggling for peace, preventing war and strengthening nonmilitary (political) means in establishing universal security.

The truly historical importance of the established military-strategic balance between the USSR and USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, for the fate of all mankind is also perfectly obvious. Preserving and maintaining this balance is an extremely serious factor for ensuring peace and international security. Nonmilitary means cannot be effective in today's situation without this factor, for imperialism has become accustomed to and still follows the old misanthropic logic of ignoring the weak. This creates tremendous difficulties in implementing a program for establishing a universal system of international security. It requires reliable protections of socialism and a high level of vigilance and combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces and the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Our military cadres must thoroughly understand the dialects of these interrelated processes for the correct resolution of the complex problems of protecting socialism in the nuclear-space age under conditions of the consistent struggle of the USSR and other socialist countries to restructure international relations and establish new approaches to ensuring security. Life forces us to rethink the customary ideas of war, policy in the area of defense, military doctrines, organizational development and training of the armed forces, and so forth.

The profound change in the goals, forms, and methods of activities of socialist states in the area of defense, taking into account nuclear realities, is that these activities are directed primarily toward realization of an entire complex of military problems in the process of creating a universal system of international security. Two groups of goals and tasks are clearly identified in the document "Military Doctrine of Warsaw Pact Member-States," adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987. This document reflects the basic policy provisions in the area of defense and military organizational development of the USSR and allied socialist countries. The first group includes long-range, far-reaching, revolutionary measures which transform military affairs so that it is brought to the smallest scale possible and can serve only defense. It is envisaged that this transformation will be implemented on a mutual basis simultaneously and synchronously with the Western states. The second group of goals and tasks is directed toward ensuring protection of socialism under actually existing conditions, when the military might of our state continues to play a decisive role in restraining the aggressor and when, as V.I. Lenin taught, it is necessary to possess all the means, forms and methods of combat that a potential enemy may possess.

The following are defined as fundamental goals in the doctrine: arms reduction and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; restructuring of armed forces in Europe so they can only provide a defense and are unable to initiate offensive operations or execute a surprise attack; mutual renunciation by Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states of the threat or use of force;

simultaneous dissolution of the blocs, with the elimination of their military organizations as a first step; implementation of confidence-building measures, and so forth.

The promulgated military doctrine of the USSR is genuinely innovative, as are the doctrines of the other Warsaw Pact states. Whereas before, Soviet military doctrine, which originated unchanged from the peace-oriented policy of the socialist state, concentrated its primary attention on preparation for and conduct of retaliatory wars in defense of socialism, now it includes a broader content. It reflects our realistic views on the basic questions of war and peace, and the major emphasis is placed on preventing war and strengthening the foundations of universal security and peace. For the first time in history military doctrine does not represent a code of basic rules for preparing for and conducting wars, but a political-theoretical foundation for preventing them. The Soviet Union has promulgated not simply a defensive doctrine but a doctrine directed against war. It fully conforms to the new political thinking developed by the 27th CPSU Congress. For the first time in history the primary mission of the armed forces is to prevent war, both nuclear and conventional.

The defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, like the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, is that it originates from the commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. There is no place in it for concepts inherent to U.S. and NATO military doctrine such as "first strike," "preemptive strike," "preventive strike," and so forth.

The USSR and the fraternal socialist countries have stated firmly and clearly before the entire world that they will never under any circumstances initiate military actions first against any state or alliance of states whatsoever if they themselves are not the object of armed attack. It has been said with all certainty that we have no territorial claims against anyone, do not consider any state or people to be our enemy, and are prepared to build relations with all on a peace-oriented basis.

The new doctrine has been creatively developed; views on fundamental questions of military organizational development and preparation of the country and the armed forces to repel aggression have been rethought and changed. The principle of reasonable sufficiency must be the basis for solving problems of the reliable protection of socialism. However, it is clear that the level of this sufficiency is limited by the position and actions of the opposing side—the USA and its military bloc partners.

Maintaining the defense potential of the country and the combat might of the armed forces within the limits of reasonable sufficiency has a fully concrete expression. The essence of sufficiency for the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces is determined by the need not to permit a nuclear strike with impunity in any situation, even the most unfavorable. Sufficiency for conventional

forces means that quantity and quality of armed forces and arms which is capable of ensuring the reliable defense of our country and its socialist allies. The Soviet Union does not seek greater security than the USA and NATO, but will not accept less.

We have no intention of competing with the West in creating specific types of weapons; we choose those measures which ensure the security of the Soviet state and its allies. Proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, the USSR is making efforts to lower decisively the level of confrontation and reduce military potentials so the West and the East have only the forces and resources necessary for defense. But this must apply to everyone. The socialist states proceed from the fact that lowering the level of strategic balance and mutually reducing offensive capabilities guarantee greater security.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states is aimed at preserving the military balance between socialism and imperialism at that level which has been established at a specific moment.

Our cadres must realize that significant changes have taken place not only in the political but also the military-technical side of the military doctrine, which determines the methods of preparing for and conducting an armed struggle in defense of socialism and the directions of organizational development and training of the armed forces. The directive not to use nuclear weapons first and not to initiate military actions first is realized in the training of staffs and troops at the strategic and tactical levels and in increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops to repel aggression under the most unfavorable conditions. The doctrine is aimed at the creative development of military science and military art and at comprehensive improvement of the armed forces within the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

The views toward the basic methods of actions by the Soviet Armed Forces in repelling aggression are also changing substantially. The need to prevent war and reliably protect socialism under today's conditions imperatively demands a consistent defensive approach in determining the method of repelling aggression. What is new is that defensive operations and combat actions will be the main method of actions by the Soviet Armed Forces in the event we are attacked by an aggressor. Of course, this orientation in training the Army and Navy puts them in a more difficult position in the event of aggression, but the interests of preventing war and establishing trust in the military area dictate this as the only reasonable approach which will work for a peaceful future. The new approach in repelling possible aggression assumes a significant increase in vigilance, stronger moral-political and psychological training of personnel, and the ability to conduct successful combat operations in the most complex conditions. In this connection, the emphasis in military art, military planning, combat training, and troop control is changing.

Emphasis on defensive actions does not at all mean that our military doctrine is losing the spirit of activeness and decisiveness or that it is oriented on passiveness. It would be an intolerable mistake to comprehend the defensive nature of the doctrine in this manner. On the contrary, all its content is aimed at the highest activeness, decisiveness, initiative and creativity in carrying out combat missions, and heroic and unselfish fulfillment of military duty.

It is clear that it is impossible to defeat an aggressor by defense. Therefore, our troops and naval forces must be capable of conducting a decisive offensive after repelling an enemy attack; it will take the form of a counteroffensive.

The USSR Armed Forces are developing in accordance with the new military doctrine. Combat and political training and the entire life and activities of the troops are being restructured based on its provisions and guidelines.

Fundamentally important is the program provision that the CPSU also considers it necessary in the future to intensify its organizing and guiding influence on the life and activities of the armed forces, strengthen one-man command on a party basis, increase the role and influence of political bodies and party organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy, and see to it that principles of democratism are implemented more persistently and that the vital bond between the Army and the people becomes stronger.

In connection with the prospects of creating a comprehensive system of international security, the party is examining not only ways to achieve this goal but also specific tasks of reliably ensuring the country's defensive capability. It proceeds from the fact that we will go through a number of stages related to lowering the level of military confrontation and that a mutual reduction of armed forces by states cannot diminish the role of high vigilance and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Equipped with everything necessary and improved types of weapons and equipment, they are reliably safeguarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the achievements of socialism.

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Admiral Bondarenko Obituary

18010152 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 88 p 4

[Unsigned article; "G.A. Bondarenko"]

[Text] The Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Combat Training, Chief of Combat Training, and Hero of Socialist Labor Admiral Bondarenko Grigoriy Alekseyevich died suddenly. All of his conscious life he devoted to selfless service of the socialist motherland and the Communist Party, into the ranks of which he entered in 1943.

G.A. Bondarenko was born on the 7th of May 1921 in the city of Krivoy Rog in Dnepropetrovsk oblast into a working family. In 1938 he began his service in the Navy and completed the road from student to admiral.

In the years of the Great Fatherland War G.A. Bondarenko actively participated in combat activities in the Black Sea Fleet in the roles of marine platoon commander, assistant to the commander of a patrol boat, and commander of a patrol boat unit.

In the post war period he commanded a destroyer, a brigade, and a division of surface ships. After graduating in 1962 from the Voroshilov Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Academy he was a chief of staff and a deputy fleet commander. From 1973 on he was the deputy commander in chief of the Navy for combat training—the chief of combat training.

G.A. Bondarenko fulfilled his military obligation with a sense of high responsibility in all the posts with which he was entrusted. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government highly valued the services of G.A. Bondarenko to the motherland. He was worthy of the calling of Hero of Socialist Labor, was awarded the orders of Lenin, and of the October Revolution, and was awarded the order of the Red Banner four times. He received the order of Alexander Nevskiy, was twice awarded the orders of the Fatherland war, 1st degree, the order of the Red Star, the order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd degree, and many medals. The memory of Grigoriy Alekseyevich Bondarenko, a faithful son of the Communist Party, and an ardent patriot of the Soviet Fatherland, will forever be preserved in our hearts.

(D.T. Yazov, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, P.G. Lushev, A.D. Lizichev, Yu.P. Maksimov, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.F. Shestopalov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, A.I. Sorokin, V.I. Panin, I.M. Kapitanets, K.V. Makarov, F.I. Novoselov, V.V. Zaytsev, V.V. Sidorov, V.P. Potapov, N.I. Smirnov, F.N. Gromov, G.A. Khvatov, V.P. Ivanov, M.N. Khronopulo, V.A. Samoylov, V.Ye. Lyashenko, V.M. Grishanov.)

'Typical' Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Reflect Spirit of Glasnost, Perestroika

18010225 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Oct 88 First Edition p 1

[Letters received by the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and published in the column: "Today Is USSR Constitution Day"]

[Text] The letters published in this issue are quite typical of our mail. They deal with the most ordinary, everyday matters, and in their way pass along the spirit of the times, reflecting processes of perestroika and democratization taking place in the country and lending strength to

glasnost. Although the writers discuss various topics, in essence their main thrust lies in promoting more complete and consistent assurance of constitutional rights and strict observance of constitutional obligations of citizens; strengthening and improving the legal basis of governmental and social life; and struggling ceaselessly against manifestations of bureaucracy, red tape, and heartlessness. Such an active position of people is a sign of the times, an effective form of personal participation in affairs of their socialist state, in the development of its democratic principles.

Superiority of the Law

I read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA the interview with Academician V.N. Kudryavtsev, "Toward a Law-Abiding State." It is correctly stated that legal reform should be extended to our Armed Forces. Not only because the shortcomings existing in the country in general also apply here: weakness of the judicial process; shortage of jurists; inadequate scope of disseminating information on the law; absence or poor development of a number of democratic institutions, etc. The task consists of creating a socialist law-abiding state; rendering the law superior in all areas of social life; and strengthening of mechanisms which promote law and order by developing the people's sovereignty.

In working on these tasks, I think that it is worthwhile to look back at past experience, since we simply must have lost something substantial. For example, at one time there was the Military Justice Academy. It no longer exists. There were comrades' courts in companies and batteries. They are a thing of the past. In divisions there were prosecutors with their own small staffs. What great things we officers and they accomplished! What value we derived in the area of legal questions: disciplinary practice, conduct of investigations and legal inquiries, etc. Personnel reductions were then made, and this useful activity came to an end. There are other examples that could be brought forward to advantage in discussions about preparing aspects of legal reform which pertain directly to our Armed Forces.

Colonel (Ret.) I. Shutemov (Perm)

One Hundred Georgian Words

The strengthening of friendship between the peoples and nationalities of our multinational state is a constitutional obligation of each citizen of the USSR, including of course each Soviet soldier. In my opinion, Warrant Officer A. Malykhin (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 August 1988) was quite right in pointing out that an effective way to strengthen this friendship is to study the language of the republic on whose territory you are serving. I will cite my own experience.

During my tour I was in contact with lads from Georgia. I undertook the study of the Georgian language. I learned one or two words a day. I mastered the alphabet. In a

short time I even attempted to sing songs in Georgian. I still have warm memories of my first teacher—Private Temur Mamrikishvili—and of others who gave me lessons on their own time.

One of my fellow Ukrainians was surprised at the time: "Why do you need this? In such a short period of time it is virtually impossible to achieve complete mastery of the Georgian language." Complete mastery, perhaps. The hundred Georgian words I learned, though, helped me acquire many friends. And not only Georgians. My desire to learn a brotherly language attracted the attention of Azerbaijanis and Uzbeks who were serving with us. They liked what I was doing. It goes without saying that the same was true for the Georgians.

Last year Georgia suffered flooding. I followed the events occurring in the republic with alarm. I determined that none of my friends had been affected, but still sent more than 100 rubles to a fund set up to assist flood victims. Who knows if I would have acted the same way if I had not known the 100 words, which included "brotherhood," "friendship," and "Motherland."

It would of course be difficult to offer courses in officer schools to teach languages spoken by peoples of the USSR. But the organization of elective courses for familiarizing cadets with the cultural life of a republic where the school is located is undoubtedly possible and necessary. And this will be a real contribution to the fostering of internationalism, of which our Armed Forces should become a school.

Senior Lieutenant S. Lashchenko (Irpen, Kiev Oblast)

Excerpts from Letters

Every day I follow with alarm and a heavy heart the events occurring in Nagornyy Karabakh and vicinity. I never thought that such a thing could happen. We all know that Armenians and Azerbaijanis are brotherly peoples. We are all united by the great Soviet Union created by V.I. Lenin. We share the same Motherland. And we share the same interests.

Private First Class V. Mnatsakanyan

What can be done to get rid of "dedovshchina" (hazing of new conscripts), which is an outright violation of elementary rights of a young soldier? We should return to the time when there was no such thing. Have the call-up once a year. Enhance the role of sergeants, and have more confidence in them. And, of course, officers should be aware of what is going on in the subunit.

Yu. Sendyukov (Moscow)

Allegiance to Principles

The press has much to say about negative events and sharply criticizes persons who do not live in accordance with our ethical standards. This is understandable. Shortcomings should be made public. We must not forget, however, that most of our people are honorable in their doings.

I would like to write a few lines about a worthy person: Major Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Komarov, my former commanding officer.

I became acquainted with him when I was on duty on a military installation in the Moscow Military District. Even higher headquarters had this to say: "You are lucky. Military Transport Aircraft Flight Commander Major Komarov is a thoroughly pleasant fellow, an accomplished pilot and commander."

A military pilot first class, an experienced training specialist, he does much flying himself, with the most flying time in the unit. He has an unbroken succession of excellent ratings. In a word, no matter what needs to be done, the tried and true principle of "do as I do" certainly pertains to Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. What I especially wish to point out, however, is his closeness to people, his skill in working with them. At conferences and meetings I often heard the comment "he comes across to everyone" circulate. Indeed he does. At the same time, he demands the best from his people and never acts out of line with his principles.

That is the way I remember Major A. Komarov.

I still remember you, Commander, here at my new duty station. For me, you will always be a shining example of service to the Motherland.

Captain V. Bondarenko, (flight technician, Kiev Military District)

Isolated

Our last year as cadets started out with the usual trials for us on our way to realizing a dream. We as a rule have nothing against difficulties, since we all know that they mold character, build will power, and teach a person to be resolute in the face of the trials and tribulations of military service. But there are different kinds of trials; the ones I want to discuss have nothing to do with necessity. They are artificially created, often on the whim or by default on the part of officials.

We have become accustomed to doing housekeeping and construction chores on a regular basis, the same as we have become accustomed to the fact that our commanders and superior officers are not always tactful and proper with us. This is something we can live with. However, a decision made by school headquarters to move graduates from the dormitories to unfinished

barracks has had a disheartening effect on many cadets. It is not a matter whereby we graduates are being deprived of certain comforts. In the barracks there are no facilities where we can study, let alone enjoy "incidentals" such as a place to keep drawings or dry clothing, have use of hot water, serviceable toilets and wash basins. At the same time, we are facing a number of academic challenges, including preparing and defending our dissertations. This will require much time and effort on our part. Some cadets need more time than that allotted for study, requiring additional time evenings and holidays. But there can be no discussion of productivity: not all rooms in the barracks are furnished with lighting. The future is even worse. Third-year students who lived here before us said that in winter the room temperature did not rise above 10 degrees. No particular attempts have been made to repair the heating system.

The situation is made worse by the fact that the reading room is kept locked, thus forcing us to carry around piles of textbooks from place to place. Attempts to somehow resolve all these problems have not been successful. No evenings of question and answer sessions have been held for two years. We are under the impression that our superior officers have isolated themselves from us. It may be that they feel that we graduates are already "on our own."

Cadet S. Khomko, Cadet I. Voronov, and others (Lenin-grad Higher Railroad Troop and Military Communications School imeni M.V. Frunze)

People's Opinion Should Be Sought

It would seem that there would be no problem, with thousands of families in the country seeking to improve their residential situation. There are many such people on our base. Nevertheless, excellent apartments remain vacant, not for a day or two, but for months.

In December of last year, the rayon housing section, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Ratiyev, was assigned responsibility over a new nine-story building. It was erected in the vicinity of a military unit in which many officers and warrant officers were eagerly waiting for new living quarters. Their hope was that they would finally secure a roof over their head, with their families living under normal conditions. However, not many families were able to move into these nice new apartments.

An order came from the military district: to improve combat readiness, officers quartered in the city are to be moved into this building. It would appear that a decision dictated by the interests of the service would be carried out immediately. But not in this case: many people refused to move, offering various excuses. Clearly, who would want to move from the city onto a military installation, especially if his day of discharge is not far off. In a word, carrying out this order was not so simple. This had resulted in the presently vacant two dozen or so apartments, which could have been the happy homes of

some people. The "idle time" had already cost the government 5,000 rubles. All kinds of rumors and talk are circulating throughout the post. Dissatisfaction is openly expressed: "Some people are forced to live in misery in places not of their choosing, while others..."

Let me say openly that the dissatisfaction is justified. The complaints people are making are completely in line with our ethical principles and existing housing legislation. The Military Procuracy has a number of times brought this to the attention of the district deputy commander for construction and troop billeting. Nothing has been done about it, however.

Questions involuntarily come to mind: Are all officials in tune with the spirit of the times? Are they changing the way they operate? We know that many problems can now be prevented by talking it over with people.

Is it possible that this note in the newspaper will help to improve housing utilization?

Colonel Justice I. Kovalenko (Belorussian Military District)

Navy Ship 'Brezhnev' Renamed 'Tbilisi'
18010158 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Nov 88 p 4

[Letter to the editor by N. Levushin and response; "The Ship Changes Names"]

[Text] It is known that after the death of L.I. Brezhnev his name was to have been given to one of the Navy's ships. Now the city of Naberezhnye Chelny, and Chere-mushkinskiy Rayon in the capital, which were earlier

renamed in honor of Brezhnev, have been given back their former names. But what is the situation with regard to the warship? (N. Levushin, Moscow)

Indeed on the 18th of November 1982 the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers accepted a resolution on the memorializing of the memory of L.I. Brezhnev (the resolution was published in the press on the 23rd of November 1982). In particular, it was decided that the name Brezhnev would be given to one of the navy's ships. The choice fell on one of the ships under construction.

As the editorial offices in the Navy's political directorate announced, this decision was renounced this year due to numerous requests from workers, sailors, and navy veterans. The ship has been given the name Tbilisi. In this instance the old naval tradition was not forgotten according to which the names of sunken or retired ships are given over again to ships under construction. The destroyer flotilla leader, the Tbilisi was part of the Pacific fleet during the Great Fatherland War.

Deputy Chief of GlavPU in Cuba

18010254 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 12 October 1988 published in its first Edition on page 3 an unattributed 100-word article entitled: "Meetings on the Island of Freedom." It states that Colonel-General V.S. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate, visited Cuba from 3-9 October at the head of a delegation of political workers. Discussions were held with the chief of the Central Political Directorate of the Cuban Armed Forces, Division General R. Asevedo Gonsales [transliteration].

Ud/335

SGF: Shortage of Battalion Officers

18010238 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 27 October 1988 Second Edition p 1 publishes an article entitled "They are Only on Record in the Battalion" in which the author complains that the battalion which he commands, having hundreds of men, various vehicles, combat equipment, etc., has less than three "living" officers. The officers are listed on the battalion's TO&E, but are not in fact present for duty. They are serving elsewhere. "The commander of the signals platoon, for example, is working as the chief

of the television center. The commander of the anti-tank platoon plays soccer for an army team in the Group of Forces. We have no deputy chief of staff..."

The Major, concerned for his unit's combat readiness, discussed the problem with the deputy chief of the Group cadre directorate. Cadres promised help, but nothing materialized.

He concludes: "Indeed, must this not inflict damage on the combat readiness of the troops? Apparently it is necessary, in all similar cases, to develop a legal solution..."

UD/335

Yazov Returns from Bulgaria

18010259a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Oct 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed article entitled: "Visit Completed"]

[Excerpt] Candidate Member of the CPSU CC Politburo, General of the Army D.T. Yazov returned to Moscow on 13 October from an official friendly visit to the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

At the airfield General of the Army D.T. Yazov was met by member of the CPSU CC Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.V. Talyzin, USSR 1st Deputy Minister of Defense—Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, General of the Army A.D. Lizichev, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and General of the Army V.M. Arkhipov, the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, V.N. Lobov, ...

UD/335

Yazov Invited to Yugoslavia

18010255 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article, entitled "On an Official Friendly Visit"]

[Text] Candidate Member of the CPSU CC Politburo, General of the Army D.T. Yazov, at the invitation of the Federal Secretary for National Defense of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Colonel-General V. Kadijevich, will make an official friendly visit to Yugoslavia in the first half of November of this year.

UD/335

'Dedovshchina' Correspondent Visits Complainant's Unit

18010118 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Aug 88 pp 1-2

[Article by Maj O. Vladykin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Carpathian Military District: "Letter to the Minister on How a Regiment Decided to Root Out 'Dedovshchina'"]

[Text] On 16 August KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a letter from soldiers of the "N" guards motorized rifle unit to the USSR Ministry of Defense about non-regulation relationships and the response by Arm Gen D. Yazov. Our correspondent visited the regiment where the letter's authors are serving.

Enough talk—it is necessary to act! Thus, I believe, can be expressed in general the mood of the participants in an open komsomol meeting, which has now become memorable for all the soldiers of the "N" guards motorized rifle regiment. At that time, for hardly the first time of late, a discussion took place about non-regulation relationships among military personnel.

They all have long been familiar with this word: "dedovshchina." Young fellows were frightened by it while they were still awaiting their callup papers from the military commissariat. Some mothers sending their sons off into the army made mention of it with tears in their eyes.

"I do not take it upon myself to judge the armed forces as a whole, but in our regiment it is shameful," states one of the unit komsomol activists, Gds Jr Sgt Boris Blagovidov. "How long will the shadow of this shame be on us? And frequently the problem of the 'Dedovshchina' is exaggerated artificially in the army. I, for example, was never confronted by humiliations or physical abuse in general. Is it really necessary to make a big deal out of minor deviations in the behavior of certain soldiers...?"

I am sitting alone with Boris in the unit komsomol committee room. I listen to his tale about how good it is to serve in this glorious regiment, where a cohesive, truly military collective has taken shape, and I think about the relatively recent past of this same unit. Yes, Blagovidov and his comrades today already can no longer recall the sad events of early 1986. Then one of the motorized riflemen was convicted by a court of the military tribunal. He struck a fellow soldier in the jaw with his fist. The conflict took place, as it is customary to say, because of non-regulation relationships.

The officers told me about this. They remember well how much effort they had to make in order to keep under control the situation in the subunits, where one, and then right away several barracks hooligans got established. All kinds of things happened. And great patience and persistence were required in order to find methods of eliminating the dangerous sickness.

They wrote letters to the parents of literally every soldier, in order to learn a bit better the character, habits and inclinations of their subordinates. They held meetings of the men with military lawyers, who discussed responsibilities for military crimes. They invited soldier-internationalists to the unit, and then it was no longer necessary to explain to anyone in the regiment the value of military comradeship in a combat environment. There were occasions when trips to the disciplinary battalion, and meetings with servicemen who were serving their punishment there, were also employed as form of indoctrinatory work.

As Gds Lt Col Vladimir Nikolayevich Zhadobin emphasized, there was a feature of particular importance in the struggle against non-regulation relationships and their

prevention—concern about the needs of the soldier, and complete satisfaction of his daily requirements. If all of the soldiers in the unit are always well fed, it is doubtful that any of them will look at his neighbor's plate. And a soldier from the senior callup, who is dressed in clean, well-fitting clothing that is in good repair, will not look askance at a new recruit who has just arrived from the clothing depot. In short, as commonplace as it seems, regulation conditions of service, and regulatory order, including strict observance of clothing allowance norms, are a most important guarantee preventing conflict situations that are possible among soldiers.

This is why the reality in which Gds Jr Sgt Blagovidov and his comrades live and serve today in no way corresponds to the widespread views about "dedovshchina" in the army. It is hard for them to believe, and is even embarrassing to think that it could have been manifested in their collective. But, it would no doubt have been abnormal, had the commanders, political workers, all officers in the regiment, and much more experienced people been in the same state of equanimity. They know with what, at times "inoffensive," trivialities dissidence in the soldier's environment begins. And they do not tire of explaining this to their subordinates.

Such a conversation also took place repeatedly at meetings of the unit komsomol activists. They were truly amazed: "After all, we have nothing serious wrong..." But Gds Sr Lt Sergey Pepelev, regiment komsomol committee secretary, stood his ground: "Look a little more carefully, is there perhaps something you simply don't want to notice?" They argued and tried to prove their points to one another. But one day Pepelev suddenly suggested: "If you are so sure that you are right, take responsibility and state clearly that you will guarantee not to allow non-regulation relationships in any form, and that you will take full responsibility for this." The suggestion was so unexpected that all the arguments immediately died. The activists could find nothing to respond. It is true, they promised to think about it.

Then this regiment-wide komsomol meeting took place. At that time Pepelev up and stated his suggestion to all komsomol members in the unit. "Will you give a guarantee?" He asked loudly. From various sides exclamations resounded: "We will!"

"We were indeed taken aback initially," recalls Gds Jr Sgt Blagovidov. "You know, such an unusual commitment to take on... We somehow began to think more seriously about whether everything was going so well in our subunits. We looked more attentively toward our comrades, and something unexpectedly flared up in our memory. Gds Sr Lt Pepelev turned out to be right. Some second-year soldiers sometimes were crude toward the young soldiers, and aimed to make their work more difficult and their own a bit easier. Judging myself, sometimes I lacked the patience to explain something to a new soldier, and shouted at him. Later, it is true, I felt

badly about having hurt someone's feelings for no reason. In general we discussed this with those soldiers who had already served for more than a year, and we decided thusly. Since we have said that we already have rid ourselves completely of non-regulation incidents, we will make demands on one another, put things in order, and not hurt the pride of the young soldiers in any way. All agreed."

At the meeting the position of the komsomol members was clearly indicated. The resolution recorded the general opinion: not to permit "dedovshchina" in the unit, to struggle resolutely against any of its manifestations, and in order to raise the responsibility to the maximum extent, it was decided to send the letter to the minister of defense, and to accept the responsibility that it entails. Immediately the text was compiled. Six secretaries of the subunit komsomol organizations signed it on behalf of all the soldiers in the unit. They were Gds Sgt A. Treuberlin, guards junior sergeants V. Dedlovskiy, A. Glinskiy, I. Molodykh, B. Blagovidov, and Gds Pvt P. Glodan. And we voted to send the letter. No, it was not unanimous. Two of those present at the meeting abstained.

I spoke with one of those who abstained. He was Gds Jr Sgt V. Gritsay, also secretary of a subunit komsomol organization.

"I still believe that we were hasty," stated Vyacheslav. "It is necessary first to do what needs to be done, and then to give assurances and reports about it. We have all kinds of people, you see. I for example, cannot guarantee for everyone. Let them prove, say, for a year, that they are capable of not deviating a step from regulatory requirements. Then I will be first to vote."

Events showed that Gritsay's carefulness was not without cause. Soon after the meeting an unpleasant fact became known in the regiment. Gds Pvt Ismail Mukhamedov while on daily detail forced Gds Pvt Sergey Skidan, a soldier from the junior callup group, who had nothing at all to do with the detail, to wash the floor for him.

"Why did you act this way?" I asked Mukhamedov.

"Our custom in Uzbekistan is to respect our elders. And he did not reckon with me, although I am senior. He is a clerk in headquarters, and often comes from there after retreat and walks on the clean floor in his dirty boots. He snarled at my comments. So it was necessary to force him to clean up after himself."

"But, as it turned out, you acted this way repeatedly. Did he really always ignore your comments?"

Mukhamedov silently shrugged his shoulders.

At the moment of my meeting with Ismail I already knew that he had had to answer for his deeds before his comrades at the next komsomol meeting following that mentioned. Other acts of arbitrariness in his behavior, besides the instances with Skidan, were also noted. It is true, that he was not given any punishment, but they said right to his face everything that they were thinking about him.

"They were hard on me then," said Ismail in a hollow voice. "Suddenly I felt that I was entirely alone."

He promised that in the future his comrades would have no reason to reproach him. So far he is keeping his word. Moreover, recently they have begun to notice not only bad things about Mukhamedov. It was revealed that he had an excellent memory. He knows the regulations by heart, and patiently helps the young soldiers study them.

"I have been thinking a lot in these days, and this is what I understood," acknowledged Mukhamedov. "It is much more difficult to bring respect for one's self by force and shouting, than it is by doing good and showing attention toward those from whom one expects a respectful relationship."

There is, of course, little comfort in the fact that a man arrives at well known truths by such a difficult path. But, at least he gets there! And this, no doubt, is the very essence of the moral climate that is being affirmed in the guards motorized rifle regiment. Officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers, everyone is striving to structure relationships based on good will, just demands, and attention toward one another. They are striving, no matter how difficult it may be, to keep on the path they have chosen.

And there are plenty of difficulties. Military service, in and of itself, is harsh, and masculine characters are sharply involved. But, here is something else I was told in the unit. Year after year among the new draftees one finds more and more young people who are violent, or even frankly embittered. They, if we can express it in this manner, are ready material for non-regulation relationships.

I became interested in what the soldiers who signed the letter to the USSR minister of defense think in this regard. Various views were expressed. However, they all agreed in one thing: In "civilian life" young people frequently acquire living experience before military service in an atmosphere of cruelty and disdain toward human worth.

Gds Jr Sgt Boris Blagovidov told about what morals reign in SPTU [Rural Vocational-Technical School] No 64 in Moscow, where his twin brother Oleg studied. Oleg, by the way, is now also serving in the regiment. There the students, depending on their term of study, were divided into categories: "plebes," "buckets" and "old timers." In every way possible belittlement of

junior students by their seniors was propagated, and extortion and blackmail was widespread. Unfortunately, I was not able to question Oleg in more detail, as he was on a trip. But I heard a similar story from Gds Sgt Aleksandr Boshkov, who rather recently studied in Rostov-na-Donu in SPTU No 1 of the Rostselmash Factory.

"We lived in constant fear," recalls Aleksandr with bitterness. "In the dormitory we were afraid to go out of our rooms. But even they did not always save us. There were times when they would break down the door, senior classmates would break into the room, drunk or having smoked some kind of trash, and would force us to carry out their every whim. Fights frequently arose."

Boshkov quit his studies in this school and went to another city. But, there are those who pass through all the humiliations, rise to the status of a so-called "old timer," and themselves begin to dictate their will to others. And then, imbued with the model of such behavior, are sent into the service and end up in the barracks. What can be expected of them?

"Nevertheless, we are confident that we can achieve the goals we set for ourselves," states Gds Sgt Dedlovskiy (recently promoted), one of the authors of the letter to the minister. "We believe that this ugly tradition can be broken in any unit, if the men live there without the 'dedovshchina' at least for a year. Subsequently, everything will go normally. The young soldiers, feeling an attitude of comradeship toward themselves, will invariably follow the example they have received, when they find themselves in the role of the senior group in the subunit."

Yes, cruelty sows the seeds for cruelty, but good also begets good. And so it will be, if directly in each unit, and in each subunit, everyone will resolve, altogether, once and for all: No to the "dedovshchina"! Even in places where it is flourishing, the bearers, its adherents, are individuals. Those soldiers whom it makes sick, and who consider this ugly phenomenon shameful for the army, are undoubtedly in the majority. So let the majority have its say.

FROM THE EDITORS. The initiative discussed by our correspondent is interesting in that it was not sanctioned in advance by anyone, and was not organized from above, as frequently was the case in the recent past, but was engendered right in the masses. We decided to monitor its implementation. Will the good intentions of the soldiers have a real effect? Do the guards motorized riflemen have enough will and persistence to keep their word, and to defeat the "dedovshchina" for once and for all? We will periodically discuss how things are going in this regiment.

Complaints of Poor Pay for Regular Officers
18010257 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 88 First Edition p 2

[Excerpts from readers' letters and response by Col V. Martynenko: "Does the Service Seem Like Honey?: The Officer's Life as It Is in Idle Fantasy and in Reality"]

[Text] Painful as the admission is, the occupation of defender of the homeland is clearly losing its prestige today. One hears such things as the following with increasing frequency: "I can earn twice as much in civilian life and spend days-off with my family."

This is due in great part to the fact that a young officer receives less money today than his counterpart who works as a radio repairman, for example, a truck driver or an auto mechanic. And his working conditions, if I may put it that way, are far more difficult.—Captain Senin, Warrant Officer Afanasyev and others (a total of 25 signatures)

I served 41 years in the army, and I witnessed it all. I earned 145 rubles a month, in today's equivalent, as a lieutenant in the '50s and received an extra 15-20 rubles for housing. There were three in the family, and we had enough to live on.

Much in life has changed in the intervening years, and one has to assume that support for the officers has improved. One sometimes "overhears" statements about how a major earns as much as a docent, a colonel approximately as much as a professor or even an obkom secretary....—Colonel (Retired) V. Polishchuk

In addition to its specific military orientation, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA differs from other central publications also in the fact that it carries practically no articles on the officers' pay except for a few comments to the effect that the pay must be differentiated. This subject is apparently considered too sensitive.

I have served at three garrisons during my service career. My wife has never worked; there were no jobs. And so, the money which I earn is our only source of income, amounting to 80 rubles per person. We all know, however, that officers spend 10-12 hours a day on duty, not considering 24-hour alert duty. Days-off are rare. Our children do not have the advantages of city life at the military posts, and television is the family's main entertainment....—Major V. Solovyev

We have cited excerpts from a few letters from our readers in response to the article "A 'Sensitive' Subject" (14 August), which discussed officer pay. We asked Colonel V. Martynenko, candidate of economic sciences and instructor at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, who has studied this matter, to comment on these and other letters.

Some of the population is indeed of the opinion that regular military personnel are just about the best paid group among the Soviet people. The data from a sociological study conducted among school children and students at vocational and technical schools were cited in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on 2 September 1987, for example. In answer to the question "Who, in your opinion, has a lot of money?" the teenagers put military personnel in third place after the currency speculator and the profiteer (?) and above a minister (!).

It should be stated that some of the mass media, which do not bother to seek reliable data, also contribute to the shaping of such ideas. What is the reality? Let us look at the figures. Here are the data from a study of the budgets of 560 officers' families conducted in four typical military units of the Baltic, Moscow and Belorussian military districts, compared with similar, average statistical data from the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics].

Average pay for the junior officer at the regimental level is several dozen rubles above the average wage of blue- and white-collar workers—even more for senior officers. I believe that this is the ratio which gives rise to assertions that officers practically "rake in" the money.

When one looks at the family, however, the picture changes drastically. The total amount of monthly payments and benefits per family for the junior officer is approximately 120 rubles—20 rubles for the senior officer—below that of the average statistical Soviet family. The figure is therefore 20-30 rubles less per family member. This is due to the fact that around one fourth of the officers' wives simply do not have the opportunity to work (while only 10 percent of them have small children requiring their care).

Furthermore, it is apparent from these data that existing pay and benefits for the regular serviceman, including one-time monetary allowances, allowances for uniforms and travel documents, rent reductions and other services, are not so very great. They do not even compensate him for additional expenses stemming from his specific service activities—frequent moves, among others.

If we take those officers who are not provided housing—and 18-20 percent of them are not, depending upon the area and combat arm—their situation is markedly worse. The junior officer receives 95 rubles per family member, the senior officer 101 rubles (the average is 149 rubles for the nation as a whole according to USSR Goskomstat data).

These amounts are not impressive enough, of course, to consider officers the highest paid people in the nation, particularly in view of the fact that we conducted our study in one of the nation's areas with the best service conditions. The situation is more difficult in a large number of districts.

At the same time, one cannot entirely agree with those letter-writers who, like Major A. Yevlampyev, make a comparison based on hourly wages. They put the matter of why the "operator" of a fighter receives less than a bus driver into more absolute terms, maintaining that when hourly wages are considered, no one receives less than an officer. He has to be vigilant from morning to night, and alert duty and unforeseen call-outs are frequent. This comparison of types of work totally different in content and nature would not appear to be accurate. A civilian job can always be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively based on output. It is extremely difficult to make a quantitative assessment of the officer's work, and the stress, the intensity and the complexity of working with personnel can only be discussed in purely empirical terms.

Whether officers are paid a lot or a little, based on these figures, is open to debate. Many things in life cannot be bought with money, however, and the situation is far more acute when one considers the standard of living of the families of regular military personnel.

The standard of living is not defined by the amount of wages and real income alone. It involves also access to public consumption funds, working conditions, amount of free time, housing conditions, access to public health, education and cultural facilities, and other factors. Special studies and expansion of the statistical data base would be required to take them fully into account. However, certain trends can be observed with the naked eye, so to speak.

Housing is one of the most acute problems in the army. Many officers have to pay rent ranging from 60 to 100 rubles. It is not just a matter of money, however, but also one of living conditions, of psychological comfort and physical convenience. Unfortunately, this is a different matter entirely. While more than 80 percent of the nation's total housing is provided with running water, sewage systems, central heat, gas, hot water and bathing facilities, the figure is approximately 50 percent for the vast majority of garrisons. The situation is made worse by the fact that a considerable portion of the housing pool of the Ministry of Defense is hopelessly antiquated and dilapidated.

I have more than once heard officers and warrant officers complain about a lack of free time. A great many of them regard this time as a blessing for which no sort of material incentives can compensate. In many military units, however, particularly in the Air Defense Forces and Strategic Rocket Troops, duty time for the officer amounts to 340-360 hours per month. This exceeds all reasonable bounds. It is almost twice as great as that at civilian enterprises, even considering work Saturdays and overtime.

Among the most acute social problems for families of officers are those of finding jobs for the wives, who lose their skills and length of service status, lack of normal

facilities for educating their children, engaging in sports and spending their leisure time, and poor medical services. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has recently written about this more than once. "Just when will these problems be resolved?" M. Panina, A. Zimina, Z. Yakovleva and many other readers of the newspaper are asking in their letters.

Many letter-writers typically submit specific proposals for somehow improving the situation of the officer and his family. This is what Major V. Solovyev writes, for example: "I do not think that our rates should be raised with state subsidies, of course, but a great deal could be done without additional monetary 'infusions.' In the first place, the pay rates could be raised by eliminating a number of nonessential positions. In the second place, this could be done by redistributing military pay among the officers themselves. And greater freedom needs to be granted the unit and formation commanders in financial matters. Incentives could be provided for serving on details, for example. I believe that this would stimulate the officers, and performance would improve."

I feel that there is a certain rationale in these proposals. Effective material incentives should be established also for proficiency ratings, for the standing of alert duty and the performance of combat duty, and for the results of economic work.

A certain amount of experience has been acquired in the forces also in optimizing the work time of officers and warrant officers by establishing firm regulation order and regulation conditions for the performance of the serviceman's duty. Some units are engaged in an innovative quest. This includes, among other things, sliding schedules for days-off and alternation of the beginning or the end of the work day for specific categories of officers and warrant officers.

Something else. A 13 October session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which analyzed the fulfillment of decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee on the strengthening of military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy, noted that measures have been specified for improving the material welfare of servicemen and their families. We need to assume that the problems which we have discussed will be taken into account.

Soviet Ambassador on Conventional Talks in Vienna

18010116 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 88 p 7

[Article by B. Dubrovin under the rubric: "Our Interview": "A Realistic Basis": "Soviet Delegation Head Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev Answers Questions Put by PRAVDA Correspondent"]

[Text] After a brief interruption, there has been a reintroduction in Vienna of consultations between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO relative to preparing

a mandate for new talks on armed forces and conventional armament in Europe. The consultations were started last year on the initiative of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee and are being conducted within the framework of the general European Vienna Conference in progress here.

This is no simple matter, due not only to the geographic—general European—scale, but also to the complexity of the subject matter proper of the future talks; to real differences in structure of troops and armaments; asymmetries and unbalances listed on the agenda to be liquidated to enable effecting major reductions and radical decreases in level of military confrontation on the continent.

It has already been possible in the time of the consultations to reach agreement on important elements of the mandate: goals of the future talks; the participants (23 countries, members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO); management and exchange of information; procedures and organizational conditions of the talks; mandatory international nature of future agreements, etc. In general, agreement has already been reached for a large part of the mandate.

Following is an interview held by the PRAVDA correspondent in Austria with the head of the USSR delegation at the Vienna Conference, Ambassador Yu.V. Kashlev.

Question: What specific questions are under discussion in the consultations? Is the effort being conducted in a constructive spirit?

[Kashlev] Within the next few weeks we are to find mutually acceptable solutions to two as yet unsettled problems: exactly which troops and armaments are to be reduced, and the precise area involved.

In August the Warsaw Pact nations took a constructive step forward, in that we offered a detailed formulation of the subject of the talks which in our opinion affords complete consideration of the concerns harbored by both sides. This formulation states that the subject of the talks will be the conventional armed forces of the participants, including conventional armaments and equipment situated on land in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In this connection, there will be no exclusions of weapons which possess capabilities in addition to the conventional (in other words, dual-purpose weapons). Armaments and other equipment of this kind will not be placed into another category, and the existence of additional capabilities will not constitute a basis for changing the subject of the talks.

The NATO countries insist that it be made a matter of record that nuclear weapons will not be the subject of discussion in these talks, the same as naval forces and chemical weapons. We on our part submit that it be made a matter of record to exclude from the talks fighter

aircraft, as a purely defensive type of armament. It does not contribute to potential for surprise attack and cannot render a negative influence on security of nations in Europe. Its exclusion is not at variance with the already agreed-upon goals of the talks, whereby the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries list as their first priority the elimination of offensive potential for surprise attack.

Relative to opinions expressed on the difficulty of dividing aircraft into attack and fighter categories, this question if desired may be resolved in the talks proper.

At the same time, the subjects of the talks must include all tactical (frontal) attack aviation, which should be considered primarily as a component of surprise attack potential along with tanks and artillery.

Question: When may we expect the talks to begin?

[Kashlev] The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries realize the importance of initiating the talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO nations as soon as possible. The draft mandate includes a decision to hold them as early as this year. Incidentally, they should start and be held along with the talks on Confidence and Security Building Measures, in which all 35 countries that are participants in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] will participate. Our Vienna Conference should be completed by then, since both sets of talks are a component part of its decisions.

The program for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe advanced by the socialist countries in the recent Political Consultative Committee conference in Warsaw creates a healthy basis for taking up practical talks on troop and armament reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals and furthers strengthening of confidence and security in Europe.

All-Army Conference on Work With Servicemen's Families

*18010235 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Oct 88 First Edition p 4*

[Article by correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Ye. Agapova: "Family Women's Council. Perestroyka: Notes from All-Army Conference"]

[Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already informed, an All-Army conference of senior instructors for work with families of servicemen of armed service branches, military districts, groups of forces, and fleets took place on 18-20 Oct in Moscow. Family, women's council, and perestroyka, those were the themes of this business meeting, the first one for women's community of the Armed Forces since the 19th All-Union Party conference. However, discussions were much broader and touched all sides of life. The atmosphere of this meeting itself and the round-table discussions, which took place on the first day of work, were favorable for a direct, honest, and responsible conversation. This atmosphere

avored a weighed assessment of problems that have been built up and, above all, an energetic search for practical resolution of these problems. This large women's council was especially important due to participation in its work of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Officer's wife Lyudmila Nikolayevna A. did not know anything about the conference. She arrived on that day in Moscow with a last hope. There was not a place left for her to visit in person or to write to! The essence of the matter is as follows: the closest person delivered a treacherous blow to his family. What is awaiting her after a divorce? Loneliness. A Northern township with a faceless address: 19th kilometer. Search for a permanent job. And constant questions of small sons: When is Daddy coming from a business trip?

Lyudmila Nikolayevna has only one request, namely, that her family would be transferred to another place due to a serious illness of her 6-year-old son.

It so happened that we met her in the editing board offices after the round-table discussion. I remember her eyes. Tiredness and despair. After 30 Nov, when the divorce becomes final, she and her children will immediately become strangers in the township. And, therefore, the situation, which is not unfortunately unique and is not being solved by anybody at the present time, practically condemns the young woman to a social solitude. An unbelievable number of authorities and responses is behind her. One of them is from the political directorate of the Leningrad military district and is signed by Col. A. Semenov on 18 Jun: "A possibility of providing housing for your family in another garrison is being studied. You will be advised of the result on a later date."

Winter is coming, but a concrete answer has not been received at the 19th kilometer yet.

I was listening to her and was thinking that this is a concrete human destiny unadorned and unartificial. And behind this destiny there is a social problem, one of many experienced by the families of servicemen. Obviously, to resolve them, a large amount of work is to be done. Exactly for this reason, that is, in order to think over all these vital issues, those who carry out work with families and who must be the first assistants of commanding officers and political workers, met together in Moscow. Especially now, during the time of rapid changes and democratization, when each person must determine his, or her, place in perestroika and improve the work and its quality. And, finally, when we expect from public organizations (one of which is a women's council) live, real, and morally assured deeds.

Today, more than 240,000 women's councils are organized and actively acting in the country. Many of them have earned their authority based on real deeds. The

question, whether we need the women's councils, is not asked anymore. A better question is whether we can live today without the women's council, without active participation of our women in all spheres of our life and without taking into account their collective input into solving the mentioned social problems. Who, if not a women's council, must boldly and keenly raise questions, regardless of their difficulty, and fight for their resolution?

The participants of the conference stressed that a women's council is a real force. Its best helpers are democratization and glasnost. One of the arguments is, as follows: many problems in military facilities are resolved easier and with more fairness when women's council participates in the problem solving. For example, the same problem of housing and housing distribution. Or family relations. This is the most delicate sphere. Often nobody else, except women with their natural intuition, can reach the people involved. This was noted by Z. Budnitskaya, Ye. Smetanina, V. Saksina, and others.

I would like to quote the following admission of a political worker, officer G. Simikin from a small Far East island garrison: "I do not know what I would do without women's help. Our women's council is the soul and the nervous system of the facility..."

However, there is also another side of life, to which we cannot close our eyes. And it was demonstrated again by discussions during the conference. For example, such an obvious fact. None of the local women's councils have ever been in the not unknown Tashkent district military hospital, where for many years soldiers wounded in Afghanistan are being treated. Recently, an officer's wife A. Abrosimova wrote to the editing board a letter with words: "Hi, women's council, where are you?" She also asked a reasonable question: "Why is it that some women's councils turned into knitting and home making groups? There are too many serious problems and sometimes even dramatic events in family life. Everything is boiling, while a women's council is knitting, cutting, and baking..."

Yes, such an observation exists. It was discussed with pain, and participants were searching for causes of this phenomenon and were thinking. Some young women today are not particularly eager to participate in public work. This phenomenon is generally known and is called social apathy. Some women openly take a parasitical position, which is described by a short word give. And what can you give yourself to others, the facility, where you live, and the society as a whole? This is the question. A thought that in such cases the women's councils should take a more offensive position, was clearly expressed at the conference. A person should constantly ask a question, what can I give to others? Because it is the most reliable vital position.

However, there is another position behind a letter written to the editing board by Lt. S. Sokolov's wife: "I do not believe in perestroyka in the Army. The Army is a constant, a constant value, and is not subjected to changes..."

I gave this letter to the chairmen of the women's councils to read during the conference. I wanted to understand why a young woman does not believe in changes, and where this pessimism comes from. We thought about it together. It is possible that she for the first time in her life encountered difficult living conditions (they rent a room for 60 rubles a month; conveniences are outside). We remembered, how often we ourselves painted an idyllic picture of the type that "with the beloved, a paradise is even in a shack." It is possible that the situation, viewed through a prism of personal life, took the dimensions of a catastrophe. It is also possible that the commanding officer was not exactly the nicest man... The women all together were telling me that we must not turn away from a person with such a position. We should look into such moods. It is good that our psychology also started to change.

L. Mastuygina spoke with great concern on the subject that some young women are totally unprepared for life with a husband-officer. After graduating from a military school, the lieutenants leave for garrisons, while their wives often stay in cities. Half-a-year, one year of such life, and they break up. She gave concrete examples: Riga and Rostov military schools. Today, a women's council cannot bypass this side of life. The brides should also be prepared, they should be initiated into officers' wives, and they should be told the truth rather than fairy tales.

But it is not a secret that there are both active women's councils and those, which are mythical and fake. It looks like they conduct meetings and write resolutions, but do not see live people. Such councils have a face of idleness and formalism. Officer's service is extremely tense. It requires risk and wholeheartedness. At the same time, service and family are inseparable notions. Therefore, work with families must be considered an important task.

Today, nobody will argue that the front of struggle for increasing combat readiness, improving fighting skills, and strengthening discipline, passes not only through the missile site, classroom, or barracks, but also through the servicemen's family. The candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo, USSR Defense Minister, Army General D. Yazov spoke about it at the conference. His speech stressed that exactly in the family, among those close to him, a man, as it is well known, finds spiritual strength and support. Here is the basis of his success in the service. Finally, the combat readiness depends on the family situation. If his wife, a companion in life, does not succeed in creating an atmosphere of comfort and peace of mind at home, the husband-officer

will come to work in a strung-up mood. And anger at work means trouble and misfortune for both the superior himself and the subordinate men.

Unfortunately, not all women manage to act as officers' wives. Some of them, quite often without any real reasons, begin acting as pushy petitioners, asking for advances for their husbands in rank, promotions, transfer to another city, etc. A clear understanding of many problems and, in particular, of origins of outside-the-regulation relations, is required now from women's councils. Because this is the most often-raised subject in the letters written by parents of soldiers, we must say that almost 70 percent of these complaints, when checked at the spot, are not confirmed. However, regardless of what the young man was like when he entered the service, officers must search for ways of approaching and educating him without leaving this work to somebody else.

What can women do today in order to prevent establishing in the military collectives of the shameful "dedovshchina"; to convert the barracks hooligans? Plenty. For example, the parents of the soldier A. Kulikov from Astrakhan write with gratitude about the activities of a women's council in the military unit where their son is serving. The chairman of the women's council N. Shulgina asked them to send a sound letter to their son, his childhood photographs, and letters from friends. Later on the parents were invited for a visit. There was an atmosphere of home and warmth, surprises, drinking tea, and a heart-to-heart talk. The parents think that no lecture can leave the same effect on the boys. Until recently, a woman was practically prohibited to enter a barracks. Life has shown that without motherly participation and woman's thrifty master's eye the cause of education itself is suffering.

The chairman of a women's council in Siberia T. Yulgusheva, who is a mother of five children and a wife of unit's commanding officer, told during a round-table discussion about "mother's heart" evenings, of their council's sponsorship over soldiers-orphans, and heart-to-heart talks with those who have problems in the service. And such work became usual for many women actively engaged in public life. A thought that today women's council activities must be directed toward people, whether they are an officer or his son-teenager, officer's wife or his mother, warrant officer, sergeant, or soldier. Thus, the women's council today is given a "green light." It makes us happy.

However, the time has come to get rid of social parasitism and hopes for an omnipotent uncle, who will come to a garrison and at once will resolve all problems. Alas, some women are still dreaming about it. And this habit and inertia were affecting certain questions asked by women during their meeting with the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the Main Political Directorate. There were many questions regarding shortages of summer camps for children, job opportunities in the groups

of forces, possibilities of organizing cooperatives, pensions, long terms of construction and law violations by trading organizations and during housing distribution....

As it was told at the 27th Party congress, it is exactly the women's council that could say its weighty word during resolving these social problems. The stately approach is required also for such a problem as social protection of servicemen's wives. Recently, as it is well known, it was announced at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo that it is stipulated to realize measures directed toward overcoming lagging of the social-cultural sphere in the Army and Navy, and improving material and living conditions of servicemen and their families. Naturally, this announcement received the approval and support of the Army and Navy. Every question of the women was answered. Some of them were resolved immediately; the others will be investigated by sending inspections to the localities.

Unfortunately, some people still wait for somebody at the top to advise them what to do and how to do it. However, in our diverse life we cannot have cliches. This thought was stressed in the speech of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy A. Lizichev. The conference demonstrated that many problems remain. And our women's councils and instructors for work with servicemen's families have plenty of work to do. How to console a mother whose son has not returned from Afghanistan? How to help an invalid or a widow? To arouse conscience in a mother who left her new-born child in a hospital's maternity ward, as the deputy chairman of the Soviet children's foundation imeni V.I. Lenin A. Dragunkina told with such a pain during her meeting with women. How to retain human dignity? To bring up respect toward older people in a child... How? Questions, questions which make the fabric of our life. We will search for answers to them in the life itself

Conference on Legal Reform in Ministry of Defense

18010241 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Oct 88 First Edition p 4

[Article by Colonel of Justice I. Bashkyevich entitled: "Recommendations Developed"]

[Text] Problems of the improvement of legal work and the realization of legal reforms in the army and navy were illuminated at a scientific-practical conference of the personnel of the judicial service of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The Deputy Chief of the Directorate of Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Colonel of Justice V. Dzyuba, gave a report.

The conference developed recommendations for subunits of the judicial service for all areas of their activity.

Responsible workers of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the organs of the military judiciary and academics participated in the work of the conference.

UD/335

Reverse Language Training Improves Combat Readiness

18010256 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 88 First Edition p 1

[Article by Reserve Colonel N. Semenchenko of the Leningrad Military District, entitled: "In the Language of One's Friends"]

[Text] The Conversation of the deputy platoon commander, Senior Sergeant Yuriy Viletskiy, with Junior Sergeant Ilkham Ashmurov surprised me. A Ukrainian and an Uzbek talked in Uzbek.

Soldiers of ten nationalities serve in the SAM battery commanded by Major V. Nesterenko. Those who have weak knowledge of the Russian language are occupied in a special program. The soldiers also study the native languages of their fellow servicemen.

The council on international upbringing of the subunit has a vital interest in this experiment. The study of languages has spread. The "examinations" are removed to the end of each month during self-study hours. Those who have noticeably improved their language capacity have high marks.

This business, it is understood, is not included in the [official unit] evaluations. The effort of the missile personnel to associate with the language of their fellow servicemen brings them closer together, and improves interrelations. That friendship has a reverse side: the battery is the leading subunit in the SAM unit.

UD/335

Betekhtin, Kapitanets Promoted

18010270 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5
Nov 88 Second Edition p 1

["Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Concerning the Awarding of Military Ranks

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:
—the assigning of the military rank of:

General of the Army to Colonel General Betekhtin, Anatoliy Vladimirovich.

JPRS-UMA-88-029
16 December 1988

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ARMED FORCES

Admiral of the Fleet to Admiral Kapitanets, Ivan Matveyevich.

[Signed by] Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. Gorbachev.

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, T. Menteshashvili.

Moscow, the Kremlin. 4 November 1988.

Turkestan MD Commander Marks Tank Troops Day, 1988

18010253a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
11 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by General of the Army N. Popov, Red Banner Turkestan Military District Commander: "The Motherland's Armored Shield"; first paragraph is PRAVDA VOSTOKA introduction]

[Text] Annually on the second Sunday in September the Motherland honors its glorious sons, the tank crews, those who are tank force veterans, those who created the first-class equipment and all those who dedicated their knowledge and labors to strengthening the combat power of one of the Soviet Armed Forces' primary branches of service. Our tank forces are the children of the Party and the people, born during the formation of the Red Army, and they have traveled an important and heroic path.

Immediately after victory in the Great October Socialist Revolution V. I. Lenin stressed the enormous role that armored equipment had in defending the young Soviet Republic. At his order Soviet tank production was set up at the Sormovskiy factory. The first Soviet tank, "Borets Za Svobodu Tov. Lenin" [A Warrior for Freedom—Comrade Lenin] completed its road testing on 31 August 1920. Another 15 such vehicles were produced after it, from 1920 through 1922. During the final phase of the Civil War the Red Army had more than 100 armored trains and 50 armored detachments.

Thanks to the tremendous organizational work by the Communist Party and as a result of its implementation of Leninist industrialization policies, our tank forces were transformed from the small armored detachments of the Civil War years to important major tank units that made up the main strike force of Soviet ground forces. Young Soviet tank forces made a good showing during battles at Khasan Lake in July-August 1938, in the Khalkin-Gol region in 1939 and during the armed conflict with Finland in 1939-40. Volunteers in the International Brigade in Spain in 1936-1939 included 107 Soviet tankers who fought gallantly. Many tankers have been awarded orders and medals and have achieved the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The combat might of Soviet tank forces was displayed most fully and clearly in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. We had developed the masterpiece of tank construction, the T-34, by the time Fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union and that tank was used successfully throughout the entire war and was recognized as the best tank in the Second World War. We had also developed the KV Heavy Tank which, until 1943, was not penetrated by any tank gun or anti-tank artillery in Fascist Germany's Army. True, mass production of these combat vehicles had only begun. Our economy produced only 1,225 T-34's and 636 KV's by 22 June 1941. At this same time the enemy threw 3,712 tanks (33

tank and motorized divisions, primarily outfitted with new tanks) against us. Mass medium and heavy tank production in the USSR really developed during the course of the war.

Just as did the soldiers of the other branches of service, Soviet tankers displayed an inflexible will for victory, staunchness and mass heroism in the fierce battles against German Fascist forces. Our tank forces used their shattering might, mobility and maneuverability to defeat the enemy at the battles for Moscow where the Soviet Tank Guard (the 4th Tank Brigade became the 1st Guards and the 8th Tank Brigade became the 3rd Guards) was born, at Stalingrad where 1500 Soviet tanks took part in the counter-offensive, in the bloody battle at the blazing Kursk Bulge where the enemy lost up to 1500 tanks and in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Belorussian, Yasso-Kishinevskiy and Eastern Prussian Operations. Their decisive and swift operations in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin Operations were unparalleled. More than 6000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled guns] took part in the enormous battle for Berlin. Soviet tankers came to assist the people who revolted in Prague. They moved through the Greater Khingan Mountains which were considered impassable and they played an enormous role in defeating the Kwantung Army in the Far East and bringing about the unconditional Japanese surrender.

Our Motherland has shown high regard for the heroism that Soviet tankers displayed during the Great Patriotic War. 250,000 soldiers were awarded orders and medals and 1155 of them were awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. Fifteen tankers were awarded this high honor twice and 104 soldier-tankers became fully bearers of the Order of Glory.

Tank builders contributed enormously to our victory. They provided the front with 102,800 tanks and SAU. The Motherland held their labors in high regard as more than 9000 workers in the tank industry received state rewards and many of them were awarded the rank of Hero of Socialist Labor.

The soldier-tankers of our Red Banner Military District, which was a real force in replenishing Active Army command cadre during the Great Patriotic War, inscribed brilliant pages in the Armed Forces' combat journal. The 9th Tank Division, activated in Maryyskaya Oblast, and later the 104th Tank Division, whose personnel distinguished themselves in the battle for Smolensk and while repelling Gudarian's tank hoards at Moscow, were sent to the front from here. Alumni from the district who fought as part of the 221st Motorized Division, the 114th and 250th Guards Tank Regiments and other major units, units and subunits covered their combat banners with glory.

Our district's military training institutions trained cadres of tankers. The Red Army Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization and the 1st and 3rd Kharkov and Poltava Tank Schools were evacuated to

here. And they carried out their business deep in the rear area in a heroic manner, just as if they had been on the front lines. In 1941 the 1st Kharkov Tank School (now the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School imeni Marshal of Tank Forces P. S. Rybalko [TVTKU]) was recognized for its great services in training officer personnel by being awarded the Motherland's highest order, the Order of Lenin. That school graduated more than 7000 tank officers during the war. Sixty-six TVTKU alumni have been awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union and five of them, V. Martekhov, I. Merzlyak, G. Seleznev, Ye. Utkin and V. Shalandin, have been entered into its personnel roster in perpetuity.

The legendary "fiery tanker," commander and Guards Lieutenant Valdemar Shalandin, accomplished an immortal feat in battle at the Kursk Bulge. On 6 July he was ordered to keep the enormous enemy forces from moving into the village of Yakovlevo. During the uneven battle that unfolded, the Fascists attempted to envelop our positions, using a pincer movement to get at the Soviet tankers.

Situated on the flank, Lieutenant V. Shalandin's crew joined battle with the enemy and knocked out several German Panthers. The battle continued even after Lieutenant Shalandin's tank caught fire from an enemy shell. His crew fired from the combat vehicle as it was enveloped in flames and accurately hit the Fascists. The crew, led by courageous patriot Valdemar Shalandin, burned up along with their tank at the location where they had been ordered to hold, but they did not allow the Fascists to pass.

Thanks to the Communist Party's constant concern for strengthening the might of the Armed Forces, during the post-war years Soviet tank forces made significant advances and increased the qualitative level of their development to new heights.

The contemporary Soviet tank is a threatening combat vehicle with powerful armament. It has strong armor, increased cross-country performance, increased range and modern driving and control instrumentation. As compared to other combat vehicles, tanks are more resistant to the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion—shock wave, thermal radiation, initial radiation and radioactive contamination.

Finally, the combat might of our tank forces is affected not only by our first-class combat equipment, but also by our outstanding people who are totally dedicated to the affairs of the Communist Party and the behests of V. I. Lenin, are mastering their own military specialty, are disciplined and are physically strong and tempered. As defenders of the Socialist Fatherland, soldier tankers are constantly improving their military skills and strengthening the organization and cohesiveness of personnel in

subunits and units. They always clearly and vigilantly carry out their constitutional duty to be in constant combat readiness to guarantee that any aggressor will be immediately repulsed.

The heroic traditions of older generation Soviet tankers live and are being multiplied by Turkestan soldiers who are inheriting their military glory. Even after the war the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union has been awarded to four alumni from that same Tashkent Higher Tank Command School imeni P. S. Rybalko whose collective is marking its 70th anniversary this year. One of these was Colonel Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Vysotskiy. He went through the excellent school of command professionalism and military prowess among the troops of our district. In December 1979 Ye. V. Vysotskiy was sent to Afghanistan where he was awarded the Motherland's highest distinction for combat feats while providing international assistance to a friendly people.

Turkestani soldiers are setting examples of selflessness not only in battle, but also in military training and service. Personnel from the foremost tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel B. Plugin are emerging as sponsors of socialist competition in the military district for the third year in a row. It was in this unit that the movement for "soldier's acceleration" was born. The patriotic movement for "soldier's acceleration," one that is supported by the Military Council, has become massive and reflects the increased activity in the private ranks among Turkestani soldiers and also their desire to make their own contribution to perestroyka.

Turkestani soldiers such as the excellent tank crew of Sergeant N. Gurduyallo and the subordinates of Sergeant I. Osyk, Junior Sergeant V. Skileviy, Privates V. Bumchinov and N. Zharoyko and many others are again heading the "soldier's acceleration" movement.

Major Sh. Abdukadyrov who was awarded a major state reward for carrying out his patriotic and international duty is continuing the combat glory of the tank officers from this district in a worthy manner. This officer is actively using the combat experience that he gained in the Republic of Afghanistan as he trains his subordinates. At the forefront of socialist competition are the Turkestani soldiers commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Dyagilev. His company has the task of confirming the rank of best subunit in the unit during its final testing.

Thanks to the tireless concerns of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, tank forces now have the latest equipment and weaponry and these are in the hands of totally dedicated and highly qualified tank personnel. Soldiers in the tank forces are greeting their holiday with new successes in military and political training and with socialist competition under the banner "Selfless Military Labor, Exemplary Service and the Highest Discipline—Our Contribution to Defending the Motherland."

In accordance with the decisions of the XIX All-Union Party Conference we have the task of guaranteeing that military skills increase primarily through qualitative parameters. This increases every soldier-tanker's responsibility for the sector entrusted to him and dictates the need to work actively, purposefully and creatively.

Because of the difficult international situation, soldier-tankers, in solid unity with the soldiers of the other services of the Armed Forces and other branches of service, are prepared to decisively repulse any aggressor and carry out their patriotic and international duties with honor.

Proof of this are the successes that Turkestani tankers have achieved in their military labors. Tankers in this district are greeting their professional holiday with excellent results in improving combat readiness, conducting military and political training and further strengthening military discipline.

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Ground Control Radio Transmissions Interfere With Pilot Operations

18010207a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 July 88 p 2

[Article: "'Storms' in the Atmosphere—Whether All Commands From the Ground Help the Pilot"]

[Text] A military transport aviation pilot during his landing approach made an error in calculating the maneuver. He spent the remaining minutes until landing correcting his own mistake. Gusts of wind carried the airplane off course, and lack of confidence was manifested in the actions of the pilot. He knew that he would have to answer for his mistake at the critique of the flights.

I thought about this episode and thought: Does so-called "monitoring" always, in all of its forms, assist the pilot? Are we not attracted to them excessively, thereby fettering the independence of the crew commander?

Let not my questions seem strange to anyone, and there is no need to hasten to become indignant and ask how it is that monitoring can suddenly be excessive. Truly, we have become so accustomed to the authoritative arguments that it mobilizes, increases responsibility, facilitates, improves and so forth, that we ourselves do not pay attention to the fact that we have found ourselves in the role of a student unprepared for important lessons.

Through commanding a squadron I became convinced that many pilots do not notice that true monitoring of their actions in the air has given way to elementary prompting and become a kind of cribbing. And I am convinced that, by depriving the pilot of independence in decisionmaking, it distracts him and at times pushes him toward gross mistakes. This was what happened in the example with which I began this discussion; it was precisely an abundance of commands from the ground that created a complex situation onboard the aircraft. For that reason I am not telling the pilot's name.

Think! Is it possible to pilot a combat vehicle well if in five minutes of flying, a man, and not a computer, must process more than 300 words of monitoring information? The crew commander of a military transport aircraft receives that many words during a circular flight, from the moment the landing gears are extended until they touch down on the runway. This does not take into account the fact that, simultaneously, he hears radio conversations between flight leaders and other crews. There is an entire ocean of words on the airwaves.

Can this stream of conversation not be filtered out, leaving the pilot what is most necessary for safe work in the air? I have heard from my opponents a categorical "No!" Their answers stress the fact that it is so set forth in the guidance documents, which, they say, are not written by us. But aren't many of the instructions mechanically transferred from one document to another?

I agree that much of the radio conversation between crew members of a multi-seat aircraft makes sense; such as, for example, reading the monitor chart after the engine has been turned on, which involves checking the control systems and instruments. A report about extending the trailing edge flaps and landing gears before landing is necessary. These commands are characteristic of all branches of aviation. They verify the readiness of crew members and the flight control group to ensure a high degree of safety of mission accomplishment. They are natural for each pilot, do not divert him from analysis of the overall situation, give scope for making tactical decisions, and create the psychological frame of mind for high quality work.

However, when even military pilots first class take off the helmet with built-in headset and microphone after a mission and look at it with unfeigned amazement, saying, how talkative it has become, one feels that the conversations did not help create a working environment onboard the aircraft. In 37 minutes of flight in an An-12, Lt Col Kozhevnikov, the crew commander, heard 1,043 words of information! And he was tired not from the physical burden, but from the abundance of conversations, which even on the ground in a calm environment are difficult to decipher. The words are pronounced hurriedly, and many indecipherably, because, besides the conversations it was necessary to work with the cabin equipment and control the airplane. Even for the trained ear of a pilot, such "monitoring" recalls inarticulate mumbling.

From my own experience I know how frequently the pilot's actions outpace the information coming to him. At times he acknowledges it mechanically, after the fact. Given such "monitoring" it is not wise to overlook something that substantially influences the flight.

I hear the objections. You see, the author contradicts himself. He talks about reducing the monitoring, and at the same time is afraid to forget about some action of his in the airplane cabin. One thing is not taken into account in such objections; that such "forgetfulness" is the product of excessive piling up of verbal, distracting information.

Lt Col Kozhevnikov, Military Pilot First Class Capt Lobur, who exchanged 430 words on the radio in a 15 minute flight, and many other crew commanders know a reliable method to make their memory strong and work error-free in any situation. It is the path of purposeful drills on the ground, and high-quality preliminary preparation for flights. In training classes, aircraft cabins, and by the "flight walkthrough" method, crews have the opportunity to work out their actions in various flight stages until they become automatic. And if at first, when the crew has not yet flown together, there is sense in checking the actions of the crew members verbally, repeating radio exchanges dozens and even hundreds of times, as the level of training progresses, such monitoring should become more and more spare and improved.

Then the psychological burden of fear of forgetting to accomplish one or another operation will not weigh heavy on the crew in flight. And the prompting that exhausts the aviators, which has nothing in common with true monitoring, will not be necessary. In addition, having rid the airwaves of excessive conversations, we will reduce the opportunity for enemy radio intercept.

In analyzing the taped notes of radio conversations after crew flights, I paid attention to the "kitchen" (I cannot call this process anything else) of the ingredients in the list of radio conversations. Aviation specialists of many services supporting the flights took part in this. While burdening the crew, they, each in his own direction, literally ensure themselves against unanticipated situations. They work, as the saying goes in aviation, for the prosecutor. Let us say that some emergency took place in the air onboard an aircraft. Immediately there begins very painstaking listening to the magnetic tape of the conversation of crew members—Does everything here correspond to the listing of radio conversations? And rather frequently it happens that the true reason for what happened remains undisclosed, because some hitch is found in the radio exchange, and they hasten to declare the crew at fault. And I, as a pilot who has worked in the air for many thousands of hours, know that it is almost impossible to prove the opposite.

I can anticipate in advance the unhappiness of some officials caused by my frankness. But I initiated this discussion with one goal: to direct attention of aviators to the problem of excessive verbosity in the air, and to force them to think about how to free pilots and ground personnel of it, and to enhance flight safety. (Lt Col V. Yudenich, squadron commander)

At the request of the editors, Maj Gen Medical Service V. Ponomarenko, doctor of medical sciences, comments on the letter:

"The questions raised by Lt Col Yudenich are a good example of glasnost and democratization in such a field as ensuring flight safety. Aviation medical personnel and psychologists have conducted research concerning the professional reliability of crews, especially under non-standard conditions, and have come to interesting conclusions. It turned out that even in an emergency situation, when a crew is operating under a rigid lack of time, people's thoughts are always diverted to the question: 'And how will this end at the flight critique?'"

"In the area of ensuring flight safety, we have apparently reached the point beyond which prohibitions and rigid punishments cease to play a positive role. In examining the situations and reasons for various pilot errors, the natural and human question: 'And could the given aviator handle the specific situation?' at times does not arise. Experimental research into the conduct of the crew has shown that situations occur when people lack the necessary information to make the correct decision in the airplane cabin, and the requirements of manuals

known to them do not correspond, and even contradict the specific circumstances, and the situation develops at a speed that overtakes the psychological capabilities of the individual. But in the critique of the incident it, as a rule, is not taken into account, and therefore the assessment is unambiguous: 'Guilty!'"

"And now specifically about the question raised by Lt Col V. Yudenich, namely that of radio communication with the ground. What scientific data exists on this matter? Oral speech has a principal advantage over written (an inscription on the panel in the aircraft cabin), as well as various kinds of rings, sirens, lights, etc.,—speed and clarity in forming in the pilot the forthcoming image of his actions. But radio communication also involves a serious danger, increased suggestibility, and it reduces the evaluating function of the mind that receives the commands.

"Experiments have shown that if verbal prompting corresponds with the objective or intention of the crew in specific actions it facilitates their accomplishment, and if not, it hampers them. Moreover, a prompt that comes 'at hand' stops an already begun correct action. Those who command the crew from the ground must be guided not only by what they themselves see, but also by what the crew is seeing and doing. It has been proven that verbal commands in the end result are substantially inferior to informative input, that jargon (the name we give to specific aviation terms) has clear advantages for breadth and speed of understanding the situation over 'nomenclature language,' and that a 'verbal cocktail' interferes with the activities of the crew members. Moreover, an unrestrained, emotional verbal prompting can distort the real perception of the situation, and cause a gross error in the actions of the crew commander. Therefore, the squadron commander's letter merits the close attention of aviation commanders."

First Deputy CINC Commemorates Air Fleet Day
18010207b Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
21 August 88 p 3

[Interview of Col Gen Avn B. F. Korolkov, VVS first deputy commander-in-chief: "On Combat Watch"]

[Text] [Question] Boris Fedorovich, in the era of the scientific and technical revolution, fundamental changes are also taking place in the military field. Tell us what the VVS [Air Forces] are today.

[Korolkov] The VVS concentrate in themselves virtually all the achievements of technical progress: in the fields of engine construction, aerodynamics, mechanics, thermal physics, and materials technology. Take electronics, for example. Thanks to it, in recent decades computer equipment became widely employed in aviation. This made it possible to expand substantially the conditions under which various types of aircraft could be used, and to enhance their capabilities significantly.

Today, units and subunits that have in inventory supersonic missile-carrying aircraft and large load capacity, long range bombers comprise the foundation of the military might of the VVS. The missiles of these aircraft can destroy enemy targets without entering the zone of action of his air defense weapons. Military aviation is equipped with modern weapons, means of detecting the enemy and of aimed fire control, as well as the latest navigating and piloting apparatuses. Military transport aviation has also changed. Today it is large load capacity and long range. Today's Il-76, Antei, and Ruslany jetliners are capable of moving complete combined arms units and large units, as well as large-dimension and heavy military equipment great distances by air.

Army aviation is also taking on more and more importance today. Its objective is to support the ground forces. It has in inventory combat and transport helicopters. These are powerful and highly-maneuverable combat weapons, capable of making strikes with missiles of various classes and with bombs. They can shell an enemy from guns, destroy armored and various military equipment, and kill personnel. In short, the helicopters are capable of accomplishing the most diverse and complex missions.

[Question] What are the main demands that modern weapons and equipment place on personnel? What qualities must a military aviator possess?

[Korolkov] From a professional standpoint, the military pilot must master his aircraft and weapons to perfection, maintain high efficiency under conditions of protracted nervous and physical tension, and not lose his sense of self-possession in the most complex situation. The efforts of military aviation schools, and the entire process of the vital activity of VVS units and subunits, are directed toward training such an aerial warrior.

[Question] One would expect that the work of the military pilot itself is changing fundamentally and becoming more complicated. Is that so?

[Korolkov] Flights have become more tension-filled, risky and dangerous. You see, in the last 30 years the number of instruments and signaling and control devices in the cabin has increased. The time to analyze this extremely great stream of information has decreased due to the increase in speed. All this significantly increases the burden on attention, memory and thinking, and requires error-free and precise actions, especially when accomplishing complex types of maneuver. It is enough to say that for long range aviation crews flights last more than 10 hours. As for flights at night or in the clouds, the pilots must refer to piloting and navigation instruments 100-120 times per minute, fixing their gaze on each instrument for a total of 0.3-0.9 seconds. That is why any imprecision in calculations and in making decisions can lead to serious errors, which at times are impossible to rectify.

I emphasize that the work of a military pilot is very difficult. This is true regardless of whether he flies a fighter, a military transport aircraft, or a helicopter. Target intercept, aerial refueling, extreme low altitude flights, complex piloting, aerial reconnaissance, work on the range—none of these things are similar to work on the ground. Therefore, the requirements for training the class-qualified pilot, and for seeking out born aviators have grown immeasurably. In this matter, a system for selecting future flight school students is required. Aviation flight schools have already taken aero clubs and aviation sport clubs under their patronage, and their numbers will be increased. In addition to training sportsmen, the aero clubs and aviation sports clubs have already begun to teach youth to fly sports aircraft, helicopters and gliders. In a few years this will make it possible to shift completely to manning flight schools with youths who have had initial flight training.

[Question] We know numerous examples when still very young pilots demonstrated the highest skill. Which most recent instances can be cited?

[Korolkov] I agree with you. Selflessness, irreproachable flying skill, and high psychological staunchness are displayed not only by experienced aviators, but also by beginning pilots. I cannot help but admire the courageous deed accomplished a few days ago at the Orenburg Flight School, by third year student Yu. Ivanov.

He was accomplishing a training flight at night. Suddenly, after the takeoff and climb, an engine went out. This is an extreme situation not only for a beginning pilot. There were only seconds to make the decision and take action. It must be said that Yuriy displayed enviable self control, cool-headedness, and precise calculation. Acting competently and consistently, he made a landing in a field. He saved the costly equipment and his life. This is no accident. During three years of study Yu. Ivanov has been an outstanding student. He is distinguished by strength of purpose, single-mindedness, and great diligence, and is inclined toward research work. Undoubtedly, not only Yuriy himself, but also his mentors, deserve credit for the formation of such qualities. This is true most of all of instructor pilot Capt V. Akimov.

[Question] For more than 40 years already our country has been living under conditions of peace. But, among today's generation of soldier-aviators frequently one meets heroes of the Soviet Union, and persons who have been awarded orders and medals. Who are they?

[Korolkov] Their feats are the equal of those of the front line pilots. V. Gaynutdinov, V. Shcherbakov, Ye. Zeln'yakov, V. Kot, V. Pavlov, P. Ruban, V. Ochirov, N. Kovalev, V. Goncharenko, V. Kucherenko, S. Filipchenkov, V. Pismennyy, A. Levchenko, N. Malyshev, K. Pavlyukov, A. Raylyan, N. Maydanov and V. Kovalev have become heroes of the Soviet Union. They were

awarded this high title for courage and heroism displayed in protecting revolutionary gains in the Republic of Afghanistan. For example, Capt Nikolay Maydanov, a senior pilot in a helicopter squadron, had to operate repeatedly in the most difficult and dangerous situation. On one of those days he was assigned the mission of evacuating the crews of two of our helicopters that had been knocked down. A battle was in progress at the place they were located. Maydanov succeeded not only in landing right in this hell itself, but also in landing a reinforcing group and taking the helicopter crews and an assault group onboard.

Pilot First Class Maj V. Kovalev repeatedly saved the lives of crew members and passengers, and aviation equipment. His 180th combat sortie was interrupted by a Stinger missile. Attempting to save the vehicle, V. Kovalev gave the command to use the fire extinguishing system, and to stop the flow of fuel to the engine. Having become convinced that he would not succeed in saving the aircraft, he ordered the crew to abandon it. Remaining at the controls, at the last moment he succeeded in turning the burning vehicle away from a populated area, saving its residents.

These and other examples indicate that Soviet pilots are always prepared for selfless actions, if the matter concerns the lives of people, and the happiness and well-being of the homeland.

[Question] How are aviators implementing the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference?

[Korolkov] Many problems have piled up in recent decades. In military training, for example, here and there oversimplification and indulgences have become

chronic. There are negative aspects in the state of discipline, and in the social and cultural living conditions of the troops. Many shortcomings, errors and omissions, as a rule, were associated with poor knowledge and mastery of their functions by officials, an inadequate level of responsibility and responsiveness, and manifestations of indifference and self-complacency.

Today restructuring has touched literally all spheres of the activity of VVS units and large units. A system of measures and directions of restructuring in the main fields of military organizational developments, of training VVS units, and of training and indoctrinating the soldiers has been developed. Military soviets, commanders, political organs, and party and komsomol organizations are working persistently to solve all the tasks facing the forces.

With respect to aviation equipment, efforts are being concentrated on indoctrinating in the personnel a careful attitude toward aviation equipment, excellent knowledge of it, and the ability to work with it. In the field of military science a paramount task is to reduce the existing gaps between military-theoretical and military-technical research. As for Air Forces personnel, a course has been taken here to create the most advisable organizational structure, and to improve the effectiveness of control. Particular importance is being placed on precise organizational, and intensive operational-tactical and military training.

In short, the persistent military labor of soldier-aviators is aimed at ensuring that the military capability of the Armed Forces will continue to represent, as stated in the CPSU Program, a stable fusion of military skill and high technical equipping, ideological staunchness, self-discipline and discipline of the personnel, and fealty to their patriotic and international duty.

Proposal to Name Naval Academy After Kuznetsov

*18010136 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Sep 88 p 1*

[Letter to the editor under the rubric "The Reader Ponders, Criticizes and Suggests": "To Worthily Immortalize His Memory"]

[Text] We naval veterans received the order of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium from 26 July 1988 on the rehabilitation of Vice Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union with deep satisfaction as an act of humane-ness and as an act of the affirmation of justice. In our opinion Hero of the Soviet Union Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov was and remains a distinguished naval commander, an honorable commu-nist and a completely respectable person. Thanks to his personal courage and knowledgeable leadership the Soviet Navy entered the Great Patriotic War fully armed and made a large contribution in the achievement of victory. In fact, as the services of N. G. Kuznetsov have been fully and precisely presented to the Soviet people in the press, there is no need to repeat them.

We consider that the memory of N. G. Kuznetsov should be worthily immortalized. In this all sailors are unani-mous.

First of all we think it would be worthwhile to name the Naval Academy, which currently bears the name of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, after N. G. Kuznetsov. We ask you to consider that such a wish has been expressed before, but it was ignored and the deci-sion on naming the academy was taken without regard

for public opinion. At the same time, in our view, it would be appropriate to establish a stipend named for Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznet-sov for the command faculty of the Naval Academy.

We are also stepping forward to propose naming streets in Vladivostok, Severomorsk, Sevastopol, Leningrad, and Moscow, and one of today's naval vessels after the glorious naval commander. At the house where N. G. Kuznetsov lived a memorial plaque should be erected.

[signed] Major General of Justice P. Barabolya (retired), Rear Admiral B. Bobkov (retired), Rear Admiral P. Bukan (retired), Rear Admiral P. Galkin (retired), Rear Admiral I. Kovalenko (retired), Captain 1st rank V. Pilinevich (retired), Captain 1st rank A. Ryauzov (retired), Captain 1st rank V. Savitskiy (retired), Rear Admiral K. Sukachev (retired), Vice Admiral M. Tomskiy (retired)

UD/336

V Adm Kasatonov Port Call at Havana

*18010269 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Nov 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Unattributed article entitled: "Visit of Soviet Naval Vessels"]

[Text] In connection with a previous agreement a detach-ment of ships including the large ASW ship "Vice Admiral Kulakov," the destroyer "Zadornyy," a diesel submarine and a tanker under the command of Vice Admiral I.V. Kasatonov will make an official friendly visit at the port of Havana in the Republic of Cuba from 3 to 7 November.

**1st Deputy CINC Strategic Rocket Forces,
Interviewed**

*LD2011191188 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0700 GMT 20 Nov 88*

[Text] Today is Rocket Troops and Artillery Day. Our correspondent is talking with Colonel-General Kochemasov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces:

[Kochemasov] Our festival is a special one. It is glorious for the fact that it had its beginnings in the heroic events of the Great Patriotic War. It was instituted in 1944 in honor of the artillery exploits. The strategic rocket troops have become the heirs to the heroic traditions of the frontline artillerymen. For this reason, since 1964 this festival has been marked as Rocket Troops and Artillery Day.

[Unidentified correspondent] We know that the strategic rocket forces were created as a countermeasure to a real threat against us.

[Kochemasov] Yes, we were forced to respond to the arms race that was imposed on us, and respond not so much by political means as by military means. The separating of the strategic rocket forces into a separate arm of the Armed Forces demanded the speedy solution of many very complex problems. The chief of these was the creation of complex missile equipment, the construction of launching positions and missile complexes, and

the drawing up of the principles governing the combat use of the troops and their management. The missile troops are permanently on alert duty. They must be ready at any moment for retaliatory action. Our high combat readiness deters a potential aggressor. This was and remains the basic and main task of our missile troops.

[Correspondent] Our army exists for the defense of the Soviet people and for the defense of peace. Will the process of reducing a whole class of medium and shorter-range missiles and other possible accords in the future not lower the level of our defense capability?

[Kochemasov] There is no alternative to reducing armaments, but it will be effective if it is carried out on a mutually acceptable basis, maintaining parity at each specific stage. The elimination of weapons is valuable to all mankind only when it is conducted on an equal basis without detriment to mutual security and with strict compliance with treaty obligations regarding antimissile defense.

With such an approach, the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles will not lower defense capability. Time is changing the face of the planet and relations between states on the Earth, but what is not changing is our moral social position. Defense of the socialist fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR and the work of the whole Soviet people, and this must be the case for as long as there is a need for it.

Moscow Civil Defense Officer Responds to Readers' Criticisms

*18120025b Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 9, 1988 pp 13-15*

[Article by N. Toporikhin, major-general of aviation (Retd.), candidate of science (military), staffer at the Moscow Civil Defense HQ, under the "Letters To the Editor" rubric: "Let's Be Competent: On Concept of the USSR Civil Defense"]

[Text] Issues No 10/87 and No 5/88 of "XX Century and Peace" contained letters by L. Ptitsina, "The Games Adults Play," R. Smil and B. Vilner (GDR), "The Zone of Silence," Ye. Zalikhovsky "Our Life on Card," and Ya. Shnaider "It's Time To Have a Good Understanding." These materials deal with the concept of Civil Defense in our country and contain a number of critical notes, the essence of which boils down to the following:

- a misunderstanding of the role and significance of Civil Defense in modern conditions and, as a result, rejecting the notion that instructing the population in Civil Defense in case of war unleashed by imperialism and especially in peacetime is a necessity;
- incompetence in questions of using nuclear and conventional weapons in modern war;
- the assertion that Civil Defense was shrouded in mystery and that its work was carried out on a primitive level based on the thinking of the first postwar years.

The articles and reaction to them were first of all the consequence of an incorrect analysis of the present complex and contradictory international situation, which couldn't help but lead to a misunderstanding of the role and significance of Civil Defense.

Our international policy is a policy of peace. We support the complete liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons because the use of nuclear weapons in a war will lead to the destruction of mankind. We are not going to attack anyone.

Nevertheless, imperialism, headed by the U.S., continues the arms race and answers with extreme unwillingness to the complete liquidation of nuclear and conventional weapons. Recently the U.S. Senate approved the Pentagon budget of over 282 billion dollars for 1988 (in 1987 the military budget was 267 billion dollars). The U.S. has thousands of nuclear warheads and 1,500 military bases with one and a half million servicemen stationed on them. In recent years, the U.S. directly or indirectly invaded other states on 250 occasions in which over ten million people perished.

Though the threat of war is getting less and less and people in the world understand this, we cannot fully exclude the possibility of aggression on the part of imperialism.

Aggression can be unleashed both with the use of nuclear and conventional weapons. It may start suddenly, or after the prolonged aggravation of a situation.

While continuing its preparation for a war, imperialism also takes care of civil defense. For example, in the last seven years the U.S. spent 4.2 billion dollars on civil defense, worked out plans for the evacuation of the population and built shelters. In 1963 in Belgium a law on civil defense was issued, and an orderly system was formed: civil defense districts, areas, sub-areas and communes, volunteer mobile units—special platoons numbering 40 to 50 men (their total strength is 25,000), over 360 fire brigades numbering 16,500 men and 1,500 different medical institutions. Much attention is paid to the regular training of civil defense formations. They published pamphlets on civil defense which were widely circulated. Switzerland's civil defense system includes 480,000 people, 300,000 of them underwent the full course of special training. Their civil defense budgets over the past few years have been about 137 million dollars.

Apparently, one of the most important tasks of civil defense in the event of nuclear strike will be sheltering the population, since losses of those outside shelters increase greatly in comparison with losses of those in shelters (hundreds and thousands of times over). Almost each building, including institutes, have shelters. During a war with the employment of conventional weapons (bombs, missiles) people also must be sheltered as they were during the Great Patriotic War. Modern conventional means of destruction have a greater killing capacity than did the means of the past war.

Today's means of detection make it possible to determine the place and time of explosion, its type and power. In addition, it must be kept in mind that when planning the strike the aggressor always determines the object of strike, ammunition power, place and time. Therefore, civil defense has the right to forecast the situation for taking measures for protecting people. The important thing will be the correct choice of action and methods of civil defense, and the various possibilities for saving people.

The basis of our country's Civil Defense system is composed of non-military formations of workers and employees at various enterprises. Not all of these formations have permanent staff and besides, the available staff is small for the amount of work that needs to be done.

The Civil Defense staff is responsible for working out plans and training schedules, for constructing and maintaining shelters in operating conditions, for the preparation of nonmilitary formations. Sometimes as a result of insufficient demands in selection and personnel placement, and the incompetence of some Civil Defense leaders, posts of permanent staffers in the Civil Defense

are occupied by worthless people who lack modern knowledge, experience and training methods. Leaders of some enterprises invite incompetent people to conduct exercises in civil defense which lead to what was described in L. Ptitsina's letter.

Under modern conditions with the increased capabilities of all sides for delivering a sudden strike against cities and objects of the national economy, the military doctrine of this country assigns an important role to Civil Defense. This role vitally increases during peacetime since civil defense formations are used for liquidating the after effects of natural disasters and serious industrial accidents.

In accordance with established practice, our country's Civil Defense has worked out a large complex of measures for the protection of population and ensuring the survival of the national economy in times of war as well as peace.

Our Civil Defense complex takes care of the following:

- first, the population's protection against modern means of annihilation (the construction of shelters, covers, the provision of individual means of protection, evacuating the population to safe areas). Successful solution of this and many other tasks will be effective for the defence of our Motherland.
- second, increasing the stable functioning of the national economy and decreasing any possible damage to the national economy; the dispersal of the country's productive forces; the switching of branches and objects of the national economy onto a working basis during war time; duplicating the manufacture of vital items of production; the protection of industrial employees, technological documents and unique equipment, raw materials and finished products; the smooth functioning of transport, means of communication and energy facilities.
- third, the preparation of means and forces for the liquidation of the aftermath of the enemy's attack; carrying out rescue and emergency restoration work in stricken areas, in flood zones, after natural disasters and serious accidents. Civil Defense forces must carry out reconnaissance missions in stricken areas, search for the wounded and give them medical care, put out fires, localize and liquidate accidents at various objects, at city communication and energy networks, decontaminate territories, structure, equipment, clothing and footwear, food and water sources.

Responsibility for the state of affairs of civil defense at a national economy object is placed on the leader of the object who also happens to be in charge of civil defense. Each object has the Civil Defence HQ composed of the object's leading officials and civil defense professionals.

A vital element of the Civil Defense concept is training the personnel of the non-military population.

All citizens of the USSR are liable for civil defense training. The Civil Defense HQ organizes and supplies the necessary means and oversees the training. The following people are subject to training at an object in accordance with special programmes: civil defense executives, personnel of formations, workers and employees, local population.

The forms of training include lectures, practical instruction, special tactical exercises, practical exercises of the whole object and complex exercises of civil defense.

The main method of training consists of practical exercises. In addition, special lectures and group exercises are provided for civil defense executives. The training programme ends with participation in civil defense games.

Civil Defense games are the best and most active form of preparation for civil defense duties. The games are intended for working out the necessary skills, for punctual and coordinated actions of formations personnel, for the most sensible use of materiel, instruments, various equipment, means of communication and warning.

Depending on the aims, tasks, methods of fulfillment and number of participants, Civil Defense organize the following: special tactical exercises, command and staff exercises, training at an object and complex games.

Training of the non-working population is organized at the places of their residence. The head of house maintenance office is responsible for organizing and carrying out civil defense training. To increase the quality of training, the Civil Defense district head assigns him the objects of the national economy as well as branches of health care, public order protection and fire-fighting brigades.

Supervision of the training is performed by organizing committees at house maintenance offices consisting of a Civil Defense head—leader of the organizing committee; bureau member of the Party organization; representative of the house committee; representative of the organs for the protection of public order; representative of public health organs; representative of fire-fighting organs and Civil Defense chief-of-staffs of the relevant objects.

Training is performed by groups (of up to 15 people each) in residential areas.

After the training, the local population should:

- know how to act in case of natural disasters, accidents which affect residential areas;
- know Civil Defense warning signals and how to respond to them;

- know how to act in the areas affected by nuclear explosions and in other areas of destruction;
- know the location of shelters, routes to them and rules of behaviour in them;
- act energetically and correctly according to the signals and orders of the Civil Defense;
- occupy their places in a shelter as quickly as possible;
- render first aid to invalids, sick and old people, organize the protection of children.

As you can see from the above, the "grown ups" of Civil Defense "play" serious games preparing the city population for participation in Civil Defense measures. I'm sorry that some people don't understand the essence of Civil Defense and don't want to recognize its significance in modern times. Therefore, we can only wish that they'll be more serious in their attitude toward Civil Defense and more active in training themselves, their relatives and friends by participating in measures carried out by the Civil Defense bodies. Shortcomings, described in the letter, can take place in such a great and important matter. They must be eliminated, and the forms and methods of training must be improved.

Carpathian MD: Military Sovkhozos Overfulfill Plan

**18010226a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 October 88 First Edition p 4**

[Article by retired Colonel S. Kuts: "Self-Supporting Management Forces People in Military Sovkhozos To Calculate"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Sovkhozos in the Carpathian Military District are meeting a significant part of their annual troop necessities through agricultural production. Since the beginning of this year its value has been many millions of rubles—significantly more than called for by the planned quota.

The district recently held a seminar for primary experts and economic managers on the problems of increasing the effectiveness of agricultural production and introducing progressive methods.

The active search for the latest methods in organizing agricultural production had become a sign of perestroyka in the district. District Deputy Chief of Food Service Candidate of Veterinary Sciences Lieutenant Colonel V. Vlasenko and the sovkhos directors are supporting this. They have especially gained much by studying the achievements that have been concentrated in the country's main exhibition, VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR].

Well, and what are the results? It is still difficult to compare. While in the foremost economic collectives, to include those in the USSR Ministry of Defense, the average daily weight gain for meat cattle is 800 grams, it is 570 to 600 grams in the district's sovkhos. The average milk yield is also much less—3.2 to 3.5 million liters. Egg laying is lower by 20-30 units and grain crops are noticeably lower.

One can certainly make allowances for the fact that military sovkhos are primarily situated on worthless ground where expenditure on the production of agricultural products are significantly higher. But on the other hand the foremost producers are achieving excellent results under these conditions as well. For example Anna Vasilyevna Linnik is getting an average daily weight gain on young animals of up to 829 grams and Tamara Stepanovna Varanyuk is getting an average of 4.620 liters of milk per cow. Everything depends on the quality and quantity of the work that is put into it.

The decision was made to hold the seminar so that the progressive methods that they had and those that have been shared by others could be more actively put into practice. In addition to Carpathian Military District members, seminar participants included representatives from the Volga Military District and experts from USSR VDNKh. The seminar was held at Lvovskiy Sovkhos facilities.

It is worth noting that regardless of what problem the seminar participants discussed, its resolution was primarily based on economic considerations. People are learning to consider profit and look for ways to increase it. The seminar gained from the experience of Lvovskiy Sovkhos. That sovkhos gains the bulk of its income from the sale of meat, eggs and milk. But how can that income be large if labor productivity is still low and production cost is high. After becoming acquainted with equipment at VDNKh that was specifically designed for raising chickens, they themselves set up similar production facilities. To compensate for the expenses that are unavoidable in the initial stage, they set up a department for raising fur-bearing animals. They have now decided to increase the total number of fur-bearing animals to 1000 and this will allow them to increase their net profit on the order of 100,000 rubles per year.

In the interval between incubation periods some of the workers shift to making metal netting. This was necessary because they are being flooded with buyers. Every ruble that is invested there produces 35 kopecks of profit. I must say that the sovkhos is rapidly developing such ideas. They recently constructed a workshop to produce alcohol-free drinks. This workshop has a total of two people working in it. It turns out that every bottle of water produces a small profit, four kopecks in all, but this "adds up" to 70,000 rubles per year.

Sovkhos director Ivan Mikhaylovich Pribula says, "Self-supporting management forces you to think. You have to show initiative and keen wit. We recently purchased six horses..."

An anachronism? Seminar participants recognized that it was not. There are more than one hundred tractors in district sovkhos and as many other vehicles. One or two years ago there were few who thought about how they were used. Now people are indignant when the chief specialist goes to the field in an empty truck or when the heavy tractor pulls a trailer with hundreds of kilograms of mixed fodder. This is extravagance. And therefore they have begun to revive the long-forgotten animal-drawn transport.

The Carpathians still have a lot of experience that is of instructive value. Methods for preparing feed, for example, are worthy of attention. They had previously spent more than 70,000 rubles per year to buy cod-liver oil that goes into mixed fodder. After thinking, they concluded that they could get the same results by replacing the cod-liver oil with vegetable oil whose cost is about one-sixth as much. And they could obtain this from the rape plant or from "perko" plants which are produced by crossing rape with Chinese cabbage. They began to cultivate it extensively.

The problem of increasing the profitability of district sovkhos was of keen interest at the seminar. Their profit had currently reached 1.5 million rubles and their profitability is 22.5 percent. At first glance these are not

bad indicators. But according to expert estimates, we have to have the level of profitability at 30-35 percent to have a confident transition to total self-supporting management and self-funding in January of 1989.

How can we do this? Primarily by actively introducing the new norms for organizing labor—the collective and the tenant system. It is still difficult to get accustomed to them and their economic essence is not being put into practice very forcefully.

Labor collectives must feel an urgency in resolving these and other problems and, as was stressed in speeches by seminar participants, it is important that they feel that they are the masters of the land. It is more than a question of being materially interested, but one of showing concern for the people on a social and domestic

plane. We have already planned steps toward improvement. Lvovskiy Sovkhoz has planned to begin construction of a kindergarten and a consumer services establishment this year. At the same time military sovkhoz workers understand that the more income a farm has, the more possibilities there are for satisfying the wants and needs of the working man.

Volga Military District Deputy Chief of Food Services Lieutenant Colonel B. Bugar feels, "The problems are approximately the same in all military sovkhozes. And this extensive exchange of opinions with the more experienced Carpathians and also with representatives from USSR VDNKh with whom we have unfortunately not had contact until now has given us a lot of useful material."

DOSAAF Donates R2 Million to Quake Victims
LD0912221788 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 9 Dec 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The USSR Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy [DOSAAF] Central Committee has sent a telegram of condolences to the Armenian people in connection with the tragic consequences of the earthquake. In order to give assistance to those stricken and to eliminate the consequences of the natural disaster, the USSR-DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium has decided to allocate R2 million to the republic.

Opposing Views on Military Training Aired

Value of Defense Training
18120024 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 9, 1988 pp 9-10

[Article by Pyotr Nemerovsky, assistant professor of the political economy and philosophy chair of the Makeyevka Engineering and Construction Institute under the "Letters To the Editor" rubric: "My Questions for the Military"]

[Text] L. Ptitsina's letter "The Games Adults Play" and responses to it concerning our Civil Defense actions, which are at the very least ineffective, present the point of view of the majority of our population which participated in the so-called "exercises" of Civil Defense.

Our people understood and understand formalism and the unimportant nature of these "games"; therefore they regarded and regard them with indifference. They firmly believe (life has taught them) that in "case of something" everything will take place in some way different from the "games." It has become our habit to begin preparing for and solving our problems (mainly tragic) only when something has already happened, and when our actions are limited by time, etc. As a result of this, we have to pay a heavy price for everything. Chernobyl, the accident with the ship "Nakhimov," and many other things are examples of this. Only when the "thunder had struck" did we begin hurriedly learning how to "cross ourselves" and to make a cross.

In connection with this I would like to touch upon an unpleasant problem for us—our military actions (fortunately, past) in Afghanistan which led to great casualties for our military contingent—over 13,000 killed, hundreds of thousands wounded and hundreds of POWs. Our opponents in the West are gloating over this; for the first time, Soviet generals suffered a defeat. Our military leaders try to cushion this by explaining to them and to us that we allegedly went to Afghanistan at the request of the leadership of that country not to win, but to help a friendly, neighbouring people. How can military units, having military hardware at their disposal, help, apart

from taking part in military actions against the enemies of the existing regime? The logical and practical answer is to participate in military actions on the side of a friendly government. Such was the case. Otherwise, what is the reason for such heavy military casualties there? Once we decided to take part in such actions, we should have conducted them according to modern requirements and employed combat tactics which took the colossal striking abilities of modern weapons into consideration. And what have we seen?

We mentally recollect the pictures of these actions reflected in reports and photographs from the battlefields there: our soldiers with machine guns and grenades, often encircled, sometimes short of food and ammunition, stand to the last repelling attacks of mostly uneducated bandits, but the latter have excellent command of their highly modern, efficient weapons: grenade throwers, large caliber machine guns, rockets, etc.

In the photograph: our soldiers are attacking the entrenched bandits—some Soviet armoured carriers are on the move, and among them we see our highly educated and longsuffering soldiers with machine guns, charging into battle. Is this a picture of a modern battle? Is it not taken from those tragic days of the initial and heaviest stage of the Great Patriotic War when our soldiers (as they themselves say) were thrown up against the deadly fire of German machine-guns and mortars, to say nothing of tanks, artillery and aircraft? What can armoured carriers do against grenade throwers, machine guns firing armoured-piercing bullets, mortars and remote-controlled rockets and shells?

Perhaps this is an explanation of our casualties in Afghanistan? Instead of suppressing the enemy with effective modern weapons, we, as in the past, continue to rely on the "human factor." A thought comes willy-nilly: does our military leadership, first of all, understand its responsibility before our people if all our defensive armed forces have been prepared on such "modern" tactical and other levels? Though we are already withdrawing our troops from Afghanistan, this by no means removes the question of our effective and reasonable defense training of the Soviet Forces from the agenda....

Soviet people want peace and only peace. Western leaders say the same. The USSR and the USA have begun to disarm. Nevertheless, the West maintains its armed forces at the high level of tactical and other preparedness in accordance with the modern level of development of science and technology. The actions of England against Argentina and the USA against Grenada, and elsewhere, testify to this.

For that reason, we must take the level of our defensive forces training seriously and responsibly.

These thoughts came to me while reading the articles in your magazine, especially those that describe the quantitative level of our Civil Defense Actions. Maybe this "game for adults" has penetrated our Armed Forces?

Pre-Draft Training Equated With Militarism
18120024 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 9, 1988 pp 10-11

[Article by Olga Kokh, "Are All of Us for Peace?" under the "Letters To the Editor" rubric]

[Text] At last, critics have begun talking about our "sacred cows" and their concepts. True, one caste—the KGB—still belongs to the untouchables. Consider this letter a suggestion to investigate this problem in your magazine—the KGB's place in society, its role in the past and present, the limits on its authority and rights concerning citizens and organizations, and the rights of citizens in regard to it; how it's restructuring, etc.

And now about patriotism and military-patriotic education.

I agree with your articles in connection with this.

"Must you fear us?" you asked. Maybe, not. But they do anyway, and there are reasons for this. Fear is artificially forced upon us by those who can profit from it. One of the usual arguments of our opponents is the reproach of the militarization of our school.

It's true that in our secondary schools, vocational technical schools and technical colleges there is a course of primary military training (PMT) and summer military camp training, and that the amount of time has been doubled this year. How can we explain this to foreigners when we speak about our policy of peace? Do other civilized countries have something like this? An especially horrible thing for me is to see our girls marching.

Besides, all children in our country play military games—"Orlyonok" (Eaglet) and "Zarnitsa" (Summer lightning). [as published] In the games, the Central HQ is headed up either by a general or a marshal. How can they not fear us? Western ideologists needn't invent anything, it is enough to type up the orders given by the commanding officer of these games and photographs from the games' finals.

Besides a PMT room, each school has an outdoor military training ground. What for? All this wisdom is repeated in the army and is mastered in the course of a month.

And look how much money is spent!—salaries, weapons storage, a signal system, outdoor training grounds, equipment, etc. Wouldn't it be better to transfer all these means (or a part of them) to physical culture, whose poor state we all know about?

An ugly term has appeared in pedagogics and everyday life—"military-patriotic education."

There is no such education.

There is the education of a patriot and citizen. There is also military training—alas, an inevitable thing in our time. But is it correct to conduct it in schools? And what is military training—the training of the military? This is the army's duty. Education in the spirit of readiness for war? Is this not militarism?

Militarism is not only the arms race, but also an element of world outlook, the habit of thinking of foreign policy in military terms. If this component of everyday consciousness is absorbed during childhood, it gets the strength of an incontestable truth, prejudice.

Do military instructors solve the tasks imposed on them? Do they prepare young people for the army? I don't think so. The course involves no physical training. PMT doesn't psychologically prepare for the army, either—having prior to army become accustomed to the distance between themselves and the majors, school students carry this relation to the army and, as a rule, do not consider sergeants and lieutenants their superiors.

Military instructors are in great demand; there simply aren't enough of them to go around. And so most everyone is welcome. Many of them are not model officers, but martinets instilling fear of the army and killing the romantic expectations of youth. Most military instructors lack pedagogical ability and experience. Attempts to introduce military pedagogics into school have failed because school, thank God, is still not a barracks.

War is evil. The army—a sad necessity. So let's regard them this way. A military person is by no means mankind's ideal nor the only patriot. At the moment, when the main task of school is to refuse the commanding style and bring up a free, independently thinking person, the presence in schools of an element whose main value is subordination seems to me to be an alien element.

Another aspect I'm afraid of touching upon. Now special hope is being set on involving soldiers who returned from the war in Afghanistan—a war most likely unnecessary—in school functions seeing some human qualities in them. If this is the case, then we must quickly find another hot spot on the planet and send our boys there, as if to a school for the bringing-up of real men.

I know many of these former soldiers, including some whom I at one time taught. All of them are poisoned with an evil known as war. Not all of them are broken or spoke cold-bloodedly or with shining eyes about death, but I don't want any of them to tutor my children.

Patriotism cannot be created using special methods. And it is not only the sum total of pedagogical efforts, but also the sum of all influences in life. Today we are making attempts at self-purification and are renovating our lives.

The status of our Motherland is increasing abroad, as well. This can't help but tell on the growth of such a sacred feeling as patriotism. We'll have to work on this.

**Military Education Chief on Restructuring,
Qualitative Parameters in Schools**

18010223 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Sep 88 pp 1-2

[Interview with Col Gen V. Vostrov, Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate of Military Schools, by Major V. Kazakov, correspondent: "Military Higher Education Institutions; Parameters of Quality"; first paragraph is a boldface introduction]

[Text] Yesterday, the new school year began at military schools. On this occasion, our correspondent asked Colonel General Vladimir Andreevich Vostrov, Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate of Military Schools, to answer several questions.

[Kazakov] Comrade Colonel General, what can you say about the early results of perestroika in military schools, and in particular, about the results of the past academic year?

[Vostrov] Approximately 2 years have passed since party and government decrees aimed to restructure the country's specialized high schools and the higher education system have been adopted. The time has been relatively short, but a lot has already been accomplished. New curricula have been adopted, which place the main emphasis on the study of the student's specialty. Officer training has been made to conform to the principles of the defensive military doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact member states.

A number of measures have been adopted to increase students' and cadets' motivation and personal responsibility for the results of their schooling. A system of material incentives for excellent and good work has been introduced. Best students and cadets showing inclination to scientific work have been permitted to use individual curricula. Leading schools use computers to model combat situations; land army schools use mobile instruction centers, which allows cadets to acquire solid tactical control skills quickly.

Still, both the reach and the pace of perestroika in military school have remained inadequate. At higher education institutions, stagnation phenomena such as sluggishness of thought, fondness for established patterns and inability or unwillingness to think in a new way are still in evidence, slowing perestroika. Many undertakings are still carried out merely for the sake of marking them off the list.

[Kazakov] How do you assess perestroika in military school compared to the pace of renewal in higher education as a whole? Has it been lagging behind?

[Vostrov] In my opinion, it has not. Military school, while quite specialized, is nevertheless inseparable from the education system as a whole. A number of complex problems related to the strengthening of the scientific

and educational potential of higher education institutions and democratization of the life of the student body remain unsolved. In the case of military school, the work of bringing the educational process closer to real-life combat situations and replacing or selecting new study aids, especially for field training, requires a great effort. Additional measures are needed to better equip higher education institutions and create appropriate living conditions for the student body. Finally, we must persistently and systematically fight superficial attitudes, red tape and petty regulations of all aspects of life in the administration of higher education institutions.

[Kazakov] Which areas can be singled out as most important, decisive in the current phase of perestroika?

[Vostrov] The most important figure in perestroika at higher education institutions is the teacher, as was noted at the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee's Plenum.

Our academies and officer training schools have a great number of excellent innovative teachers who bravely seek new approaches to education and training and enrich military school with their fresh ideas and methodological discoveries. Among them are Colonel A. Malyshev, Department Chairman at the Armored Troops Military Academy imeni USSR Marshal R.Ya. Malinovskiy, Colonel G. Serov, Deputy Department Chairman at the Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin, Captain 1st Rank A. Bubnov, Education Department Chairman at the Sevastopol Higher Navy Engineering School, Colonel Yu. Fomin, senior instructor at the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Commanders' School imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and many others.

Today, every military school instructor must be innovative, basing his innovativeness not only on total expertise in his subject but also on a solid and systematic pedagogical training. It is often thought that almost any officer with active duty experience can teach at a higher education institution. Experience has shown that this is far from true. Military teacher is a profession requiring serious training. This is why in addition to post-graduate study and a doctorate, a systematic, formal psychological and pedagogical training must be required of all officers appointed to teaching positions.

Since we require teachers to be innovative, we must exclude petty supervision. How can one be creative if every little thing is unambiguously regulated and all actions and teaching methods in every subject have been passed down from above, whereas the teacher's freedom is constrained by an entire code of plans, methodological regulations, directions, recommendations and even "technological charts"? While broadening teachers' authority and increasing their accountability, we should pay more attention to organizing their labor, freeing

them of various tasks that are alien to their work, of endless meetings and conferences, so that they could devote more time and effort to their main job of training and educating.

We must also radically improve the process of selecting officers to work at higher education institutions. It is no secret that those who work at academies and officer schools are often luckless people, indifferent to their work and strange to institutions of higher learning. This is dead weight that slows down perestroika and harms officer training, since mediocrity inevitably breeds mediocrity and incompetence in the teacher, incompetence in the pupil.

[Kazakov] An equally important question is, perhaps, what should students and cadets be taught, isn't it?

[Vostrov] Absolutely true. The educational curriculum is a second key problem of perestroika in military education. Graduates of military schools must be able to organize and control combat engagements using complex combat equipment with maximum efficiency, lead their subordinates with confidence, train them and build their character.

All this and many other requirements are contained in the qualitative parameters, which serve simultaneously as a kind of state order for qualified specialists and a quality standard for their training. The main question is how to meet these parameters in a standard course of study. Studies have shown that curricula and school programs are often grossly overloaded with educational materials, including those that are by no means crucial to officers' professional training.

The desire to cover all bases at once and offer students a volume of knowledge and skills much in excess of their ability to learn often leads to a situation whereby the main goal is lost in the ever-growing flow of information and the forest can no longer be seen behind the trees. The great shipbuilder and mathematician academician A.N.Krylov once likened this educational system to the way the wives of Moscow merchants used to fatten geese for Christmas: they would stitch them into a bag up to their necks, hang the bag on the wall and stuff them full of dry peas soaked in water. This kind of education, whereby students are crammed full of ready knowledge leaving them no time to think about what they have learned, digest the material and diligently study the subject on their own, often serves no purpose.

We must clearly understand that the goal of a higher education institution is not to fill as much as possible of the student's head with ready solutions for all of life's situations, but to build a foundation of military education, shape the student's innovative personality, instill in him respect for knowledge and teach him to acquire it independently.

Yet, the link between higher education institutions and the armed forces should not be one-sided. Military service is the continuation of military education. Unfortunately, in many units we all too often encounter insufficient care and assistance to military school graduates during the period when they mature as officers. This causes unnecessarily lengthy on-the-job learning periods, loss of purpose and even disillusionment of many young officers in military service. The result is reproaches—frequently unjust—to military schools and the desire on the part of some commanders to blame the schools for the deficiency of their own work with young officers.

[Kazakov] The question what to teach is inseparable from the question how to teach. Could you briefly describe the problems and difficulties facing military schools in this area?

[Vostrov] Currently, we are systematically working to develop and introduce new, more efficient teaching methods and techniques. I could cite many examples of active, creative experimentations, whereby higher education institutions boldly introduce new forms and do not hesitate to break established patterns. For instance, the Military Academy imeni M.V.Frunze and the Armored Troops Military Academy imeni R.Ya.Malinovskiy adopted this year a new system of administering state examinations in social sciences and tactical training. This has already been reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

The same method is becoming increasingly popular in specialized training. The Ryazan Higher Military Automotive Engineering School, the Gorkiy Higher Military Construction Commander School and other schools pioneered this area.

Unfortunately, the situation is different at other schools. Many teachers have for many years remained prisoners of the set way of thinking, unable as they are to part with their familiar methods and curricula developed once and for all. If we are indeed serious about active search and experimentations in educational methods, we must give more freedom to departments in their choice of teaching forms and methods and support and encourage experimentation.

We urgently need to increase the role of independent study. This is why we must be bolder in moving the study process out of the lecture hall and into the library, the lab, and especially the study center and onto the tactical training ground, where future commanders and engineers could test their ability to act independently.

The questions of character building at higher education institutions is inseparable from those of education. Today, such personal qualities as self-reliance, ability to take initiative and social responsibility have become especially important for officers. They should be built continuously, in all forms of scholastic activity, with the

help of everything that surrounds the student or cadet. It is impossible to train a self-reliant, initiative-taking officer without constantly placing him into situations which demand these qualities. Moreover, training benefits from the teacher's personal example, his self-discipline, high professionalism and responsible approach to the subject.

[Kazakov] Will the rules of admission to military schools be changed?

[Vostrov] USSR State Committee on Education has adopted an entirely new set of rules of admission to the country's higher education institutions. The radical difference is that practically all advantages and special treatment have been eliminated in the selection process. Selection and admission of those who meet admission standards are based, first of all, on the results of the entrance examinations in the most important subjects in the student's field.

A review of the great number of letters that we get indicates that the process of selection and admission to military schools also needs improvement. The responsibility for setting military professional requirements and organizing and carrying out the selection process should lie primarily with military schools themselves. We feel that we must pay more attention to applicants' knowledge as they enter school and increase the importance of the entrance exams. In the selection process, we must primarily take into account the applicants' preparation level and learning ability.

[Kazakov] Which tasks in managing perestroika in military education do you view as most important for you personally?

[Vostrov] The responsibility of military education management is to identify practical measures needed to carry out perestroika in the near and long term, and to organize and ensure their implementation. The Main Directorate of Military Schools, as a USSR Ministry of Defense entity, sees its task in coordinating and providing scientific and methodological supervision to higher education institutions in the course of perestroika. Its attention is focused on solving perestroika's fundamental questions, coordinating its solutions with those of the USSR State Committee on Education.

Pressing problems include, in my opinion, improved management of military professional requirements, increased use of computers in education and introduction of information management and computer technology. The need to staff management entities of higher education institutions and of military schools with officers who have strong military and teaching qualifications and hands-on experience both on active service and in teaching at higher education institutions is more acute than ever.

One of the goals of perestroika is democratization of all aspects of student life and restoration of real, not just formal, authority of schools' social organizations, especially of teachers' councils at institutions and departments. We must review the composition and the selection process of teachers' councils, broaden their authority and provide for practical participation in them by students and cadets.

To conclude, I would like to remind students and cadets who have just started their studies at military schools the following words of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: "Our only motto should be to study military science seriously..." I wish you a great success in your studies.

A.P. Aleksandrov Recounts Soviet Development of Atomic Bomb

*18300439 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Jul 88 p 3*

[Interview of Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov by Kim Smirnov: "How We Made the Bomb"]

[Text] In the "Forest Ranger Shack" (as the physicists nicknamed the house in which Kurchatov lived right on the territory of the institute), I still remember the modest landscape painting. It was a gift of the author—Vannikov. Stillness. A path. A birch grove penetrated by the soft evening light, and three pine trees had lost their way in it.

"This is where they made the bomb?"

"Not, it was not made in the Urals. It was made at another place where there was an industrial reactor and a radiochemical enterprise producing plutonium, including for the first bomb."

I am talking with a close friend of Kurchatov, now 28 years later his successor in the post of director of the Institute of Atomic Energy, academician, thrice Hero of the Soviet Union, and in the recent past president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The conversation is about how work was begun 45 years ago in the USSR on practical use of atomic energy for defensive and peaceful purposes. Today we now can talk about some of the little-known pages of the Soviet Uranium Project.

I am talking with Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov.

[Smirnov] Anatoliy Petrovich, how did research on the uranium problem come about in our country? How did involvement in it begin for you personally?

[Aleksandrov] In order to understand that this was not some flash in a vacuum (nothing happens from nothing!), we need a short excursus into history. We will have to recall the critical situation which emerged at the country's leading physics center—the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute (LPTI) of academician A.F. Ioffe in the early 1930's. The main field of the institute up to 1931—dielectric physics—was to change significantly. Its main part, thin-layer insulation, proved to be unrealizable, and work in this direction was halted. I.V. Kurchatov shifted his attention to ferroelectric physics. The laboratory of P.P. Kobeko concentrated on the properties of amorphous bodies. My laboratory was working on polymer physics. Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and his associates created new ferroelectric materials quite quickly and made a fundamental contribution to the development of ferroelectricity. A specific area was soon found for their use as acoustic wave generators. Materials of these classes are still being used in hydroacoustics. However, Igor Vasilyevich, urged on by academician Ioffe, put more and more work into a new field—nuclear physics.

At this time, neutrons and positrons were discovered in the West. It seemed that neutrons could "bombard" atomic nuclei much more effectively than the alpha-particles used earlier by Rutheford: the neutron did not have to be repelled from the atomic nucleus. In late 1932, Ioffe organized at the institute an atomic nucleus laboratory under his own direction. An excellent weekly seminar was formed for all who wished to attend. Kurchatov energetically developed the necessary equipment for this work and involved a number of other institutions in it—the Kharkov and Tomsk physico-technical institutes and the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute. The Physics and Radium institutes of the Academy of Sciences and others also worked in this direction. Already in 1933 Kurchatov headed the organizing committee of the first All-Union Conference on the Atomic Nucleus in Leningrad, in which the most prominent scientists of the world participated.

In the next 2-3 years, Soviet physicists I.V. Kurchatov, D.V. Skobeltsyn, A.I. Alikhanov, L.A. Artsimovich, K.D. Sinelnikov and others carried out a number of outstanding works which gain world fame. These were the discovery of nuclear isomerism, resonance processes, interaction of neutrons of different energies and substances. At the same time, academician Ioffe developed studies in his laboratory on semiconductor physics, and the work in the field of nuclear physics was turned completely over to Kurchatov. The first accelerators and the small cyclotron of the Radium Institute were created.

Although a significant number of scientists recognized the importance of the work in the field of nuclear physics, the leadership of the academy and of the USSR Council of People's Commissars believed that this work had no practical importance. Even at general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1936, the Physico-Technical Institute and A.F. Ioffe himself were subjected to harsh criticism for "breaking away from practical work," meaning namely nuclear research. For the results of Kobeko's and my laboratory were valued quite highly. We were able to develop a method for producing cold-resistant rubber from synthetic rubber, and this made it possible to make tires for aircraft and many other items for military equipment out of domestic "Lebedev" synthetic rubber. Methods for protecting ships from magnetic mines were developed in my laboratory. They later proved very useful during the war.

Less than a couple of years after the criticism for the "useless" nuclear physics, uranium fission with neutron capture was discovered. This immediately inspired hope for the possibility of a fission chain reaction and use of the enormous energy release both under explosive and controlled conditions.

Already in 1940, at a seminar at the Physico-Technical Institute we heard a report by Ya.B. Zeldovich and Yu.B. Khariton, who were the first in the world to make a correct assessment of the possibility of setting up a uranium fission chain reaction. In 1939-1940, Soviet

works on nuclear physics comprised almost one-third of the world publications. It was clear to us that it was necessary to develop methods of enriching natural uranium with isotope 236 and to learn to produce neutron moderators with low absorption. Soviet physicists already held the opinion that the chain reaction could be regulated by absorption of the "delayed" neutrons.

[Smirnov] Then this was virtually the idea of a reactor already?

[Aleksandrov] Of course. In Kurchatov's laboratory, his associate today, academician G.N. Flerov, and an associate of the Radium Institute, K.A. Petrzhak, discovered spontaneous uranium fission. Splitting of lithium nuclei was done at the Kharkov Physico-Technical Institute, I.V. Kurchatov, K.D. Sinelnikov and others almost simultaneously with work in the West.

During the prewar period, I had a heavy workload with protecting ships from magnetic mines. Although we had solved this problem in principle back in 1936, our developments, initially tested on the small ship "Dozornyy" of the Mine and Torpedo Institute, had to be used on all classes of vessels on the oceans, seas and rivers. Thus, in the Baltic we conducted work on torpedo boats, cruisers and battleships. We conducted tests in the Black Sea for the Governmental Commission in January 1941.

As far as I remember, in April of that year the Fleet Military Council approved accepting the "LPTI system" into the inventory and decided immediately to install it on ships. Zhdanov, present at the Military Council, told Fleet Commander in Chief Kuznetsov, who was showing some hesitation: "Do you want to enter the war without the equipment? We must do it immediately!" That was the first time I heard about war being a reality in the next few months. All of my laboratory (B.A. Gayev, V.R. Regel, P.G. Stepanov, D.V. Filippov, K.K. Shcherbo) and the naval officers attached to us (B.Ye. Godzevich and I.V. Klimov), with the aid of shipbuilders and shipbased teams, very efficiently began equipping the ships with protective systems. I am telling you all of this so it will be clear in what context nuclear research was in among other directions of the institute.

So, by the start of the war, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and I were laboratory heads at the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute of Abram Fedorovich Ioffe. We were bonded not only by friendship, but also by a deep interest in each other's work. That is why, when nuclear research was not regarded as defense research and protected, we agreed to connect his laboratory with demagnetizing ships.

Thus, in the fall of 1941, he and I ended up in Sevastopol. Kurchatov set up a test range for demagnetized ships and demagnetizing courses for officers. He also worked

in Sevastopol after I was transferred to the Northern Fleet. In the winter of 1941-1942, Igor Vasilyevich arrived in Kazan, where the LPTI had been evacuated.

In September 1942, after flying to Kazan from Stalin-grad, I did not find Kurchatov. When he returned from Moscow, he said to me: "We will continue work on nuclear physics. There is information that the Americans and Germans are making atomic weapons." "How do we turn such a mess around during wartime?" "I have been told not to stand on ceremony and to make any requisitions and immediately begin to act."

Later he moved to Moscow. Soon physicists began to be summoned to him from the front and from various cities. The line even reached me.

Naturally, at that time I did not yet know either about G.N. Flerov's letter to Stalin (not detecting any reports in American physics journals about uranium fission and chain reactions, he came to the correct conclusion: the United States was making an atomic bomb) or that in the spring of 1942 a letter addressed to Stalin from S.V. Kaftanov, State Defense Committee (GKO) science representative, containing the same information pertaining to Germany, was received. Proof was a notebook of a dead German officer. It contained calculations clearly related to the development of nuclear weapons.

I also did not know that three candidates were being considered for the post of director of our Uranium Project—A.F. Ioffe and two of his pupils, A.I. Alikhanov and I.V. Kurchatov. And Igor Vasilyevich [Kurchatov] was not the first candidate. Here is how the senior assistant to the GKO science representative, Professor S.A. Balezin, who participated in resolving this issue, recalls this: "First, Kurchatov was summoned to Moscow simply to get acquainted with him before rejecting his candidacy. But he came in and everyone was struck by both his modesty and charm; he had a very good smile. And he had a thoroughness about him. I showed him the translation of the notes from the German officer's notebook. He read them for a bit. I did not say that the government's decision was already made. I only asked: If such work were to begin, would he take it upon himself to head it? He hesitated, smiled, stroked his beard—it was still quite short at that time—and said: "Yes."

[Smirnov] For the majority of our readers without access to atomic secrets, the sequences from the movie "Risk-II," showing the German physicist Klaus Fuchs who worked in the United States and of his own free will notified the USSR about the creation of the atomic bomb, were a revelation. It turns out, the stories about atomic espionage were engendered not only by a "witch hunt"? Was there or was there not such a thing?

[Aleksandrov] There was some. But overall it played a very insignificant role. Neither Kurchatov nor the others involved in the project relied on someone else's ideas—

they searched for their own. I already said that by the time the discovery of the neutron and uranium fission had cleared up the way to practical mastering of nuclear energy, our research in this field was already at the level of the rest of the world. I.V. Kurchatov, A.I. Alikhanov, L.A. Artsimovich, and P.I. Lukirskiy were conducting research in their laboratories at the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute, and K.D. Sinelnikov was doing so at the Kharkov Physico-Technical Institute.

Incidentally, the scientists had other, more reliable sources of information than intelligence data. Paradoxical as it may seem, but perhaps the primary source was namely the very fact that the information was being classified. Knowing the latest work of a prominent foreign researcher before the curtain of secrecy came down and not finding his name in scientific publications (meaning that he had not changed his field of interests), it was not hard to determine that he was moving in the same direction and that this direction would be tested in secret atomic work.

Here is a specific situation. The first work Kurchatov assigned me was thermal diffusion isotope separation. There was nothing ingenious about this process. It had been reported from German publications at a physico-technical seminar back before the war. Apparently, this had become ingrained in Kurchatov's memory.

I objected: "After all, Artsimovich proposed other, more promising ways of separation at this same seminar." Igor Vasilyevich [Kurchatov] said that we would test different ways. I said: "But why do what is not necessary?" "God knows what is necessary. In any case, we must also cover this path." "Well, there are great energy costs, it will be very expensive." "Right now, cost means nothing!"

Later we found out that the Americans were working in precisely the same direction. They had built a thermal diffusion plant, and it was working. But we conducted all the experiments, achieved separation, made a rather large plant at one of the Moscow power plants and...rejected this variant in favor of a better one.

There there was the problem of producing ultrapure graphite, over which V.V. Goncharov and others were struggling under the direct supervision of Kurchatov. Goncharov's memoirs contain a significant admission: "If the works of I.V. Kurchatov and his associates would have been published in a timely manner, the storage of latent energy during irradiation of graphite could have been called the 'Kurchatov effect.' In the United States, the American scientist Wigner is credited with this discovery."

In short, it was not a matter of pursuing atomic secrets but one of the inevitability of developing scientific and technical thought, which no secrecy can stop.

[Smirnov] According to publications about the Uranium Project, one gets the feeling that all threads, both scientific and administrative, meet at Kurchatov. But, you see, there were also other management levels above him, at the top of which stood Beriya. Only Stalin was higher. Did these levels help or hinder the project?

[Aleksandrov] You see, this is a very simplified picture of the administrative pyramid at that time. Stalin's word decided in general the fate of the project. One gesture by Beriya could have sent any of us into nonexistence. But it was still Kurchatov who was at the top of the pyramid. It was our good fortune that at that time he personified competence, responsibility and also authority. And perhaps this is the tragedy not everyone was aware of: What a wonderful, very sumptuous personality literally burned himself out and radiated without remains to save his country and his people.

Were there other scientists equal to him in strength, who combined not only various talents but also various dispositions and concentrated them on a single goal? No, at that time there were not, although the intellectual cream of the crop of Soviet science worked on the project, and many of these people significantly surpassed Kurchatov himself in their fields. This, by the way, is also a sign of real, great talent in science: not to be afraid of surrounding yourself with people who may also contradict you.

[Smirnov] How did Kurchatov's relations with the authority above him take shape?

[Aleksandrov] Stalin and those around him were forced to believe and trust him. They simply had no other choice. As far as the specific leaders and generals who were above us at the top command levels are concerned, they can be divided into two categories.

There were those leaders, such as B.L. Vannikov, Ye.P. Slavskiy, A.P. Zavenyagin and M.G. Pervukhin, who, possessing a tremendous amount of organizational experience, naturally were starting from ground zero in the atomic problem. But they were not afraid of learning and quite rapidly became deeply absorbed in our affairs.

The second category—those who did not understand anything in the matter but all the time tried to demonstrate power, once it had been given to them. Many of them understood the problem on the following level: Will it detonate or not detonate? And, it seems, Beriya also understood it, although all information naturally flowed together to him.

If we talk about competence, it was not Beriya but Boris Lvovich Vannikov who worked directly with us. He was chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council for the Uranium Project under the USSR Council of People's Commissars. Kurchatov was his deputy. They were the

ones who determined all routine decisions. Very major decisions, of course, went through the State Defense Committee, through Stalin, through Beriya.

When we at Kapitsa's institute were developing methods of producing deuterium, I sent to the Defense Committee a proposal to introduce our technology at one of the plants. So it would be further clear, I said that other ways had been tested in various places and that there had been an explosion of deuterium on a pilot-scale plant in one of the laboratories.

I received an invitation to a special committee meeting. The picture was this. There were several military men, Kurchatov, Vannikov, Pervukhin, Malyshev, Zhdanov, Makhnev (the general working on the uranium problem), and Meshik (responsible for procedures, later arrested in connection with the prosecution of Beriya). I was seated on one side of Beriya, Makhnev on the other side. He reported: "Here, Lavrentiy Pavlovich, Comrade Aleksandrov proposes building a plant for producing deuterium." Beriya acted as if he did not see me. He addressed only Makhnev: "Does Comrade Aleksandrov know that the pilot-scale exploded?" He replied: "Yes, he knows." "But Comrade Aleksandrov does not withdraw his signature?" "He does not." I was sitting right beside him—why not ask me! "Does Comrade Aleksandrov know that if the plant blows up, he will be sent to the ends of the earth?" I could not contain myself: "I represent myself." He turned to me: "You do not withdraw your signature?" "No, I do not." The plant was built. Thank goodness, up to now it has not yet blown up.

With people such as Beriya, all their awareness was confined to the bomb. I do not think they understood the multipurpose and fundamental nature of the research. As an example, in 1945 it was Beriya who imposed a ban on the idea of atomic ships: First the bomb, all else later. You see, back then we at the Institute of Physics Problems had begun designing an atomic plant for ships. This was long before the Americans made their "Nautilus."

Kurchatov considered the military applications of atomic energy to be forced and temporary. He linked all prospects with its peaceful use. After returning from the testing of the hydrogen bomb, he said to me: "Anatolius, this is monstrous! Heaven forbid if they use this against people. This must not be permitted!"

[Smirnov] When did Stalin begin to understand the entire gravity of the atomic threat? After Potsdam?

[Aleksandrov] No, apparently it was much earlier. At the Potsdam Conference, when Truman told him about the atomic bomb testing, he just appeared as if he knew and understood nothing. But after returning from Berlin, I know that he summoned Igor Vasilyevich and pounced on him with accusations about why he was demanding so little for maximum acceleration of work. Kurchatov replied: "So much has been destroyed, so many people have died. The country is on starvation rations, there is

not enough of anything." Stalin angrily said: "If a child does not cry, the mother does not understand what he needs. Ask for anything you like. You will not be turned down."

[Smirnov] Anatoliy Petrovich, there were rumors that shortly after the war P.L. Kapitsa was removed from the institute because he had refused to work on the bomb. Is this true? Or was it just Beriya's attempt to destroy him?

[Aleksandrov] As I see it, Petr Leonidovich simply believed that if we were to follow the same path which the Americans were taking and which was clear to us in general terms, we never would surpass them. It was absolutely necessary for us to select our own path. Then we would have preferable chances in this race. Just how they sorted it out upstairs with Kurchatov, I do not know. But it is not true that he opposed the Uranium Project for some moral reasons. For example, the basic technological idea for the plant which we were to work on within the framework of the project at the Institute of Physics Problems belonged namely to Kapitsa. Regarding Beriya's desire to destroy him—it is possible. They were terribly incompatible people.

[Smirnov] There is a story that Beriya expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that Kurchatov was hiding geneticists "under his wing." Supposedly, Igor Vasilyevich responded: "It is clearer to me who is needed for the work. If it is clearer to you, then make the bomb yourself."

[Aleksandrov] No, that did not happen (something similar happened with me, but in a different connection; I will tell you later). But there were quite a few among the physicists who were seriously concerned about the situation with genetics. I would name at least three: Igor Yevgenyevich Tamm, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, and I. What were our reasons? First of all, we believed that it was simply unwise to press science.

In addition, we also had a practical interest in genetics. We were building reactors, plants for refining radioactive material, and mines for mining ore. And we expected recommendations for radiation protection from the geneticists. We set up our own radiobiological department. It was headed by Viktor Yulianovich Gavrilov, an experienced specialist on atomic weapons. Working in the department were both young people and prominent scientists—R. Khesin, F. Shapiro and others. They all were irreconcilable enemies of Lysenko.

We also did not conceal our attitude towards him. Nevertheless, we tried to make it so our radiobiological department did not get involved in direct battles with Lysenko because they could simply break up the department. Then we would have been without their hands and minds in a matter extremely important for us.

[Smirnov] Still, was not Kurchatov reproached for the fact that you were giving shelter to enemies of Lysenko under the wing of the Uranium Project?

[Aleksandrov] More than that. They tried to shut down the most modern directions in physics as well. Here they were searching for some false science. The attacks began back before the war.

At one of the prewar meetings in Leningrad, atomic physics was violently attacked, and from disgusting positions. I remember Mitkevich's address. He was a good power engineer, by the way. And how did he fit into this matter? Totally incomprehensible! Then Ya.I. Frenkel said: "You have the same senseless way of posing the question as the argument about what color is a meridian—red or green." To which Mitkevich replied: "My meridian is red, I do not know what color yours is. Maybe it is green."

Soon after the war, in 1946 it seems, they summoned me to the Party Central Committee and struck up a conversation about what is quantum theory, the theory of relativity—all this nonsense. Some group, not very understandable to me, had been assembled. Two officials from the Moscow State University were trying particularly hard.

But I told them very simply: "The atomic bomb itself demonstrates such a transformation of substance and energy, which follows from these new theories and not from any other. Therefore, if you reject them, you must also reject the bomb. Go ahead. Reject quantum mechanics and make the bomb yourselves, as you like."

I returned. I told the story to Kurchatov. He burst out laughing and said: "Don't worry." Indeed, they did not bother us any more in this regard. But the story went around that the physicists had strayed away from their Lysenko atomic bomb.

Indeed, a Lysenko was not found among the physicists. More correctly, their Lysenkos did not have time to develop and gain strength. The situation was very dangerous. However, there turned out to be few people among the physicists who would build their careers on this. By the time the Uranium Project came around, Kurchatov already possessed an enormous amount of prestige and influence over the levers of power. But he was a perfectly decent person. The Lysenko clique in all variations disgusted him.

[Smirnov] It is known what an emotional tragedy Hiroshima turned out to be for some of the physicists who made the American bomb. Is it possible that the same doubts disturbed our scientists?

[Aleksandrov] Not in the least. There were doubts, of course. We are all human! But still the American scientists and our scientists faced different moral problems. The result of their work was Hiroshima. Our bomb did not kill anyone, but prevented a large-scale atomic conflagration.

In essence, Churchill's speech at Fulton already was a call for nuclear war against us. Then a plan for such a war was developed and approved by the U.S. president. The date for an atomic attack on the USSR was set for 1957. It was planned to detonate a total of 333 atomic bombs on the territory of our country and destroy about 300 cities.

Scientists have always been in favor of international cooperation, for without it science reaches a deadlock. But one still must remember that 333 atomic bombs against the USSR in American strategic plans at that time was also a real fact which you cannot erase from history. The feeling of the threat was almost physical: All our country's borders were encircled by American military bases, about 100 of them, and every aircraft launched from them could carry an atomic bomb.

During those years, the American magazine LOOK wrote that isotope separation would take the Soviets about 20 years. But at that time, here where you are now located, we already had an experimental section of factory-made machinery which separated isotopes perfectly well. I.K. Kikoin was working on this. So they were sorely mistaken.

Domestic uranium was needed for plutonium. There was much uranium, much more than was mined in the individual antiquated prewar mines. And here the ideas of V.I. Vernadskiy on the role of radioactivity in the development of the planetary system, including the earth, and on geology of uranium were of great service to the country. Vladimir Ivanovich himself and his pupils, academicians A.P. Vinogradov and V.G. Khlopin, director of the Radium Institute, were working on this aspect of the project. They brought out the first batches of our uranium ore on mules, right in sacks!

V.V. Goncharov, as I already said, was producing ultrapure graphite—and he had to produce it 1000 times purer than what we had at that time. We did not even have methods for measuring such purity. We also developed them. A.A. Bochvar, A.P. Vinogradov and V.G. Khlopin were producing metallic uranium from ore. And this technology also was perfected.

On 25 December 1946, the first Soviet atomic reactor "F-1" ("Physics-1") was started up. The fact that we had managed to do this showed that we would later master all technology. Soon a small amount of plutonium was produced—micrograms.

[Smirnov] Kurchatov's brother started this?

[Aleksandrov] Yes, Boris. Strictly speaking, he did not begin but finished this. He separated it. Later he developed all the radiochemistry for this. When the "F-1" was being built, a large reactor was simultaneously being built in the Urals which could already produce plutonium for weapons. The industrial reactor was ready just after "F-1" had just began operation. Incidentally, they also began building a radiochemical enterprise, in which plutonium was to be separated from uranium irradiated in the reactor, long before plutonium itself was in our hands.

Igor Vasilyevich, naturally at an awful risk to himself, went so far as to build the largest plants without yet having the final technological solutions and products, at a time when a significant part of the experiments had to be done using micrograms, not even test tubes. Large special equipment which had never been used before was made for these micrograms. We did not have anything like it at all.

When the industrial reactor was built in the Urals, Kurchatov transferred me there. The director of the combine there was Ye.P. Slavskiy (he was also USSR deputy minister of nonferrous metallurgy). He was a totally unselfish person! The first amounts of the Ural plutonium went precisely for making the first atomic bomb. But only the materials which had to be used to make it were developed there. True, some of the parts for the first bomb were also made there. Later, the production facility was moved to a completely different place.

Well, we know the rest. On 29 August 1949, the first atomic explosion took place at a test range. The most fantastic time which American specialists had figured for it was beat by 5 years. In 1954, which the Americans wrote about as the year of the Soviet atomic bomb, we already had the world's first atomic power plant in operation.

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Historical Background of 14th Guards Tank Brigade

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in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 2-3

[Article by Sr Lt P. Kashuba: "Under the Guards Banner"]

[Text] On 8 September 1946, tank columns of the Guards Tank Kantemir Twice Order-Bearing Division, and the 14th Guards Tank Zhitomir-Shepetov Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 2d Degree Brigade passed along the stone blocks of Red Square in a ceremonial march. Thus marked the beginning of a new holiday, Tanker Day, established by edict of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 11 Jul 1946. Since that time, every year on the second Sunday in September our homeland honors the valorous tankers, and remarkable toilers—designers, engineers and workers—all those who devoted

their knowledge and labor to the creation of first-class combat vehicles, and to the cause of strengthening the combat might of the main strike force of the Ground Forces.

It is no accident that the 14th Guards Tank Brigade was in one formation with the Kantemir Division on that ceremonial day. It earned this right by the unparalleled courage and selflessness of its soldiers and commanders on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

The unit was organized in June 1942. Then it was named the 174th Tank Brigade. In the difficult days of the defensive battles on the Voronezh Axis, it was transferred to the vicinity of the Gorshechnoye populated area, where the tankers clashed with superior enemy forces. In only one day the valorous soldiers destroyed 67 enemy tanks, 103 guns, and 6 aircraft. But the losses on our side were also heavy. Out of 70 combat vehicles, only 11 remained.

Here are but two examples of the heroism displayed by brigade tankers.

The crew of Lt Matrosov tore through a railbed into the Hitlerite rear and destroyed five firing positions. The fascists opened a hurricane of fire against the bold tanks. A track was torn off by a round, but the Soviet soldiers continued the battle. The Hitlerites surrounded the immobile tank and called upon the crew to surrender, to which the soldiers answered by fire. Having expended their ammunition, they blew up themselves and the enemies who surrounded them.

In the same battle, the tank of Lt V. Yeliseyev was first to break through toward the highway in a swift rush. First Sgt N. Petrov, the driver-mechanic, ably using the folds in the terrain, moved the combat vehicle to a position from which Yeliseyev opened accurate fire. The crew succeeded in destroying six enemy tanks before the driver-mechanic was seriously wounded, but, even bleeding profusely, he was able to break through to the enemy artillery firing positions and flatten several guns with his tracks. For this feat 1st Sgt Nikolay Semenovitch Petrov was the first man in the brigade to be awarded the title, Hero of the Soviet Union.

The brigade, by then already commanded by Maj V. Shibankov, also distinguished itself in the battles on the Middle Don. It gained experience in the organization and all-round support of combat actions in the capacity of army mobile group. For the first time, along with infantry, artillery and aviation, it took part in completing an offensive in the operational depth.

The homeland greatly appreciated the military feats of the tankers, and awarded many of them orders and medals. On 1 January 1943, for its valor displayed in battles against the German Fascist invaders, and for the

staunchness, courage, discipline, self-discipline, and heroism of its soldiers, sergeants, and officers, the 174th Tank Brigade was transformed into the 14th Guards.

On 18 February of that year, in an unequal clash with the Hitlerites, brigade commander Shibankov died the death of the brave. He led the battle up to the last minute. When his vehicle was set ablaze he pulled the entire crew from the fire, but in so doing perished himself.

Guardsmen of the 14th Tank Brigade carried with honor their banners, covered with glory, through the fire of battles. They traveled more than 19,000 km, and destroyed 293 enemy tanks, 490 guns and mortars, 13 aircraft, and approximately 4,000 pieces of various other equipment. For the courage of its men in seizing the cities of Zhitomir and Shepetovka, the brigade was awarded the honorary names "Zhitomir" and "Shepetovka." Three combat orders decorated the guardsmen's banner, and its personnel earned the gratitude of the supreme commander-in-chief on 20 occasions.

The people said this about them: "Where the guard defends, the enemy will not pass; where the guard attacks, the enemy will not withstand."

Its present day soldiers are proud of the heroic legacy and glorious history of the unit, and are multiplying the traditions of the front line soldiers. The guardsmen of the 1980s are persistently perfecting their level of military training, and raising the combat readiness of the unit. Approximately 20 officers and warrant officers experienced the harsh test in the mountains of Afghanistan. Guards majors N. Churakov, V. Dodonov, and A. Afanasyev, guards captains I. Chudakov, Yu. Lemishchenko, and S. Denisov were awarded orders of the Red Star for fulfillment of their international duty and personal courage, and Guards Capt A. Palamarchuk was awarded the medal, "For Combat Services."

Unit soldiers also made their contribution to eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [atomic electric power plant].

Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Col Shibankov!

Evening roll call begins with this legendary name in the 1st Tank Co, commanded by Guards Capt A. Palenyy. The guardsmen consider it a high honor to accomplish firing and combat vehicle driving exercises for this hero of their regiment. In the 1st Tank Co intense competition takes place for this right at each exercise. Most often this honor is earned by the crew of platoon commander, Gds Lt A. Trofimenko. They are rightfully called "Shibankovites." The platoon is one of the best in the unit. There each soldier is a highly class-qualified specialist, and excels in military training.

The "enemy" was assaulting in large numbers. Guards Lt A. Trofimenko received the mission to carry out an enveloping maneuver, and to break the plan of the "blue

forces" by flanking fire. However, this was not so simple to accomplish; the "greens" had to negotiate a swampy river bed. This required skill, boldness, and intelligent risk taking. The tankers accomplished the difficult mission. They were able to occupy an advantageous position, stopped the attackers by sudden fire, and then boldly counterattacked, thereby ensuring success for the entire battalion.

"There are hours of happiness associated with the singing of a lark, the breathing of a child, or with tender speech. For millions and millions of people recollections about hours of happiness are associated with the thunder of tanks. These millions of people, whether residents of Rostov, Minsk, Lublin, or Prague, will never forget that Soviet tankers brought them freedom." So stated Ilya Erenburg, speaking on the radio on Tanker Day in 1949.

The Shibankov guardsmen destroyed the Hitlerites on Polish territory, took the Duklin Pass, liberated Czechoslovakia, and stormed Berlin and Dresden. Today heirs of the front line soldiers are adding to the glory of the veterans on the training fields, under the guards banner.

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Historian on Stalin's Relations With Military Leaders

18300019 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 23 Oct 88 p 6

[Interview with Lt Gen Nikolay Pavlenko by Edmund Iodkovskiy: "The 'Conquerer's' Heavy-Handedness: How Stalin Became a Great Military Leader"]

[Text] The interview is conducted by Journalist Edmund Iodkovskiy with military historian Lt Gen Nikolay Pavlenko, doctor of historical sciences and professor.

E.I.: In your article "In the First Phase of the War" published in the magazine KOMMUNIST (No. 9, 1988) I was struck by the idea that in no other area of human affairs is the quality of leadership of people as acutely important as in battle. Experience has shown what an enormous tragedy incompetence of strategic leadership is for a nation in a war.

Remember Engels' thought about the Italian War of 1859. In the battle at Solferino the young but haughty Austrian Emperor Franz Josef got the idea all of a sudden that he could make decisions and direct the armies in the battle as well as the professional military men. "The Austrian forces," Engels stressed, "were defeated not by the allies (the French and Sardinians—E.I.) but by the stupidity and arrogance of their own emperor."

N.P.: I sense where you are heading.... Unfortunately, I. Stalin also got the idea that he was a great military leader. He did not have the professional military expertise or the foresight, however. And there is no such thing as a military leader without these qualities.

E.I.: Stalin's biography depicts his work during the civil war this way: "Stalin's iron will and brilliant farsightedness defended Tsaritsyn and prevented the Whites from forcing their way to Moscow."

N.P.: Let us start with the fact that during the difficult years of civil war V.I. Lenin was not afraid to call up around 60,000 officers and officials of the former czarist army to serve in the Red Army. This was a bold and wise decision. P.P. Sytin, former czarist general, was named commander of the Southern Front. He went over to the side of Soviet power during the very first days of the revolution, for which the White command declared him an outlaw.

He arrived in Tsaritsyn on 29 September 1918 along with K.A. Mekhonoshin, member of the republic's Revolutionary Military Council, and 9th Army Commander A.I. Yegorov. The next morning there was a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, in which, in addition to Sytin, his assistant K.Ye. Voroshilov, I.V. Stalin and S.K. Minin, chairman of the Tsaritsyn Soviet, took part. Sytin presented his credentials at the very first meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council. They explicitly stated that he was granted complete authority in the conduct of the operation and that no one should interfere with the commander's operational orders.

Stalin, Minin and Voroshilov felt that the front's operations should be directed jointly (by all of them), however. Mekhonoshin went to Balashov for talks with Moscow, and Stalin convened a new meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council on 1 October. At that meeting—the third day after Sytin's arrival in Tsaritsyn!—the decision was made to relieve Sytin of the position of commander and to appoint Voroshilov to the post.

The repression of military specialists at the initiative of Stalin, who was there as director of food supply for Southern Russia, became extensive. The terroristic "barge policy" was begun: Military specialists were executed by firing on prison-barges. Even former Russian General A. Snesarev, prominent military scholar and military head of the North Caucasus Military District, was listed among the enemies.

E.I.: Snesarev was miraculously saved at that time, in 1918, but all of them—Sytin, Snesarev and Mekhonoshin, who made a great effort to rectify the situation at Tsaritsyn—were subjected to repression in 1930, following the trial of the mythical "monarchistic organization" of military specialists....

N.P.: That is true. I had the opportunity to meet with Sytin's daughter and grandson at the beginning of the '60s. They informed me of his tragic fate. I was a third-year student at the Kiev Artillery School in 1930. All of us who had not been tested by life were greatly surprised when we arrived for classes but there were no instructors. Later we learned that they had been arrested in the night. I had the same experience at the Military Academy imeni Frunze 7 or 8 years later.

Primarily instructors from among the military specialists who had gone over to the Red Army during the civil war were subjected to arrest in 1930. Such well-known scholars as Verkhovskiy, Kakurin, Lignau, Lukirskiy, Sapozhnikov, Svechin, Snesarev, Sukhov... were among those subjected to repression. Svechin was a major general in the old Russian army. He served in the Red Army from March 1918. He was the author of many major works on military theory and history.

A.Ye. Snesarev, a lieutenant general in the Russian army, was an even more colorful figure. He went over to the Red Army in April 1918. He served as chief of the General Staff Military Academy during the years 1919-1921. He specialized in the military geography of Asia and had a command of 14 languages.

Of all the old military specialists I have mentioned only Major General Sukhov survived all of the troubles of the prisons and camps. The others perished....

E.I.: Among the millions who died Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy was a true talent of the era. The vast foreign literature on the "Tukhachevskiy case" promulgates the idea that German intelligence, skilfully exploiting Stalin's mistrust and suspiciousness, played the main role in the destruction of Soviet military cadres during the period 1937-1938. Is that true?

N.P.: This is only a small part of the truth. Relations between Stalin and Voroshilov, on the one hand, and Stalin and Tukhachevskiy, on the other, deteriorated badly as early as 1920, during the Polish campaign. Stalin's dislike of Tukhachevskiy did not decrease in the '30s. It was whipped up by Voroshilov, who hated the military leader. The foreign press also inflated the lies. The bourgeois press with its penchant for the sensational depicted Tukhachevskiy as a "red Bonaparte," who, it alleged, was fated to repeat on Russian soil Napoleon's climb to the pinnacles of power. Stalin knew what was written in the foreign press about the Soviet military cadres, including Tukhachevskiy. This gave him no peace, of course. The "undermining" of Tukhachevskiy went on also in 1930, during the destruction of the military specialists, and in 1936, when Primakov, corps commander of the "scarlet Cossacks," was arrested.

A German forgery did serve as the pretext in Tukhachevskiy's case. The Gestapo had not yet begun fabricating falsifications about Tukhachevskiy and Yakir, however. According to the writer I. Dubinskiy, Yezhov's agents

were already beating the needed statements against them out of military chiefs previously arrested. As early as February 1936, that is 9 months before the notorious forgery came into Stalin's hands, Yezhov agents forced Division Commander Shmidt and later, Corps Commander Primakov, to make false statements against Yakir and Tukhachevskiy.

I had the opportunity to speak with Lt Gen V.S. Golushkevich, who was present at the mock trial of Tukhachevskiy and others. Before beginning the discussion I let him read the chapter "The Tukhachevskiy Affair" from Walter Hagen's book. This is the chapter in which is concentrated all of the specific information concocted by German intelligence. After looking over the copies of the falsifications, Golushkevich said that the interrogation of the accused did not raise the issue of the letters from Tukhachevskiy, Yakir and others to German generals and did not mention the receipts for money or other "documents" of the falsification. According to him, the entire process was carried out extremely rapidly. One felt that the court did not need to bring out the truth, that it already possessed the truth. One of the accused made statements against Tukhachevskiy. Without looking at the military leader, he mumbled something about "espionage intelligence" allegedly received from Tukhachevskiy. When Tukhachevskiy asked the "witness," "Did you dream all of this?" Chairman V. Ulrich cut Tukhachevskiy off and did not return to the matter.

Stalin was not so naive as to fall for this kind of typical bait, which one can read about in any basic textbook on intelligence. Stalin would have committed his infamous deed even without the notorious forgery.

Stalin received no forgeries after the Tukhachevskiy case, but the repression continued with new vigor. During the repression the Red Army lost more of its higher command personnel than during the entire war.

E.I.: The German fascist command was delighted at the destruction of the military cadres in the USSR. Here is just one piece of evidence. After hearing a report on 5 May 1941 from Col Krebs, who was temporarily replacing the German military attache in Moscow, Chief of German General Staff Halder wrote in his diary (which we have published):

"The Russian officer corps is extremely poor (it makes a pitiful impression), far worse than in 1933. Russia will need 20 years for its officer corps to reach its former level (the impression of Krebs)" (F. Halder, "Voyennyy dnevnik" [War Diary], Moscow, Vol. 2, 1969, p. 504).

N.P.: The "case" of K.K. Rokossovskiy gives us an idea of how an investigation was conducted during the Yezhov period. In the summer of 1966 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, of which I was the editor, was preparing an article for his 70th birthday. I visited the marshal at his dacha. He mentioned certain gloomy

aspects of his biography. In the mid-'30s he had commanded the 5th Cavalry Corps in Pskov. In 1938 he was arrested, delivered to Leningrad and thrown into the prison called Kresty. He was accused of having been recruited by a certain Polish agent named Juszkievich.

The case was examined by a "troika" in Moscow. Rokossovskiy had been delivered to the court somewhat earlier and locked up in an iron safe. He stood at attention in the safe for more than an hour, awaiting the beginning of the session. The subject of Juszkievich resurfaced during the trial. At the mention of that name, according to Rokossovskiy, he exploded and told the judges: "Try me and punish me if you take evidence even from the dead." He then stated that Adolf Kazimirovich had died the death of the brave at Perekop in 1920. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA had written about his glorious feat in the fall of 1930.

The trial was postponed, and Rokossovskiy found himself at Kresty once again. New investigators were now in charge of his "case." One of them asked Rokossovskiy what he would do if he were freed. "I shall work marble, like my father." "What else?" The corps commander exploded once again:

"I shall go to Moscow, get an audience with Stalin and tell him that there are many honorable people devoted to the Soviet State imprisoned at Kresty for nothing."

The collapse of the fabrications did not stop Yezhov's agents. They hurriedly instigated an army-wide search and found... a new Juszkievich, who gave the "needed" testimony under certain pressure. This testimony also fell apart, however. Rokossovskiy was freed (with Beriya's assumption of power) and reinstated in the Red Army.

Rokossovskiy carried out, albeit belatedly, his intention to tell Stalin about Kresty. In September of 1949 the marshal and his family were vacationing in Sochi. One day a Stalin guard came to him and said:

"Yosif Vissarionovich invites you and your family to his place."

The conversation during the dinner was conducted in Bulganin's presence. The idea was for Rokossovskiy to respond positively to the request of President Bierut and agree to assume the post of Poland's minister of national defense. The marshal refused at first but then agreed on the condition that he would continue to be a citizen of the USSR.

When the main issue had been resolved, Stalin suddenly asked Rokossovskiy:

"Is it true that you were unjustly imprisoned?"

"Yes, it is. There were many honorable people with me at Kresty who would not spare their lives to defend the homeland."

Rokossovskiy felt Bulganin, sitting next to him, tugging vigorously at his jacket.

E.I.: It should be noted that far from all of the main butchers of the Stalin era were justly convicted. Some of them succeeded in covering up their deeds or remained in the background. Others departed this world, while other "heirs of Stalin are tending roses in retirement....," as Yevtushenko wrote.

N.P.: But some of the criminals, as the folk saying goes, met with God's judgment. V.V. Ulrikh, the once terrible chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, was a half-witted old man in his declining years. He did not hesitate to tell people that he was tormented by nightmares.

E.I.: Army Gen A.V. Khrulev, chief of rear services for the Red Army, was one of the prewar members of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense. Tell me about your meetings with him.

N.P.: This was an outstanding military leader. He held the additional position of People's Commissar of Communications. He attended almost all of the sessions of the State Defense Committee. This enabled him to see Stalin's work methods and techniques, of which we had no concept.

Incredible traffic jams developed on the railways during the first months of the war. It took an enormous effort to force the trains carrying reserves through to the front. They were delayed, which worsened the situation of the field army. Stalin and Kaganovich placed the blame for the stoppages on the railways upon the Red Army's Directorate of Military Communications. Lt Gen N.I. Trubetskoy, directorate chief, was accused of betraying the homeland and executed by fire.

Stalin's personality traits greatly harmed the organization of control of the field armies in 1941. He frequently exhibited irritation, even hysteria. According to Zhukov, a meeting with Stalin on 7 October 1941 left with him with a particularly bad feeling. The discussion took place in the presence of Beriia, who remained silent during the entire conversation.

E.I.: What was the discussion about?

N.P.: Stalin gave an extremely pessimistic assessment of the situation on the fronts and of prospects for the fighting in the fall of 1941.

E.I.: Nikolay Grigoryevich, I see that you have a lot of pictures of you next to Zhukov. Tell me more about him.

N.P.: I particularly recall one comment by Zhukov about the fascist army. After the routing of the Germans at Moscow, he said, Hitler had removed Brauchitsch, Beck and other prominent leaders of the German army and assumed command of the German ground forces himself. "He undoubtedly did us a major service with this.... The German army's previous level of independence in the resolution of operational questions was reduced. And the dismissal of Brauchitsch, with whom it had all begun, played into our hands, of course."

E.I.: But the enemy also derived considerable benefit from the unjustified shuffling of cadres at our higher command levels....

Hitler had a powerful and smoothly functioning engine of war when the war against the USSR began. "Yes, the enemy was brave—therefore the greater our glory," wrote Konstantin Simonov in a poem. I would like to cite Zhukov's amazing words which I read a year ago, also in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

"We need to give due credit to the German army which we encountered during the first days of the war. We were not withdrawing thousands of kilometers before a bunch of imbeciles but before the world's most powerful army. It needs to be plainly stated that at the beginning of the war the German army was more ready, better trained and armed than ours, more prepared psychologically for the war, more into it.... It should also be acknowledged that the German General Staff and the German staffs in general performed better at that time than our General Staff and our staffs in general, that the thinking of the German commanders was better and more thorough than that of our commanders at the time. We learned during the war, learned well and began to beat the Germans. It was a long process, however. And the process began in a situation in which the Germans had the advantage in every respect."

Up to now there has not been such a candid and honest assessment of the former enemy's army in our literature, including the specialized literature. With this statement G.K. Zhukov self-critically assesses also his own performance as chief of the General Staff.

N.P.: Stalin too changed during the war. He began to understand many things which he had not understood before. Furthermore, he began to consider the objective reality to a far greater extent. The attitude of "what I have decided must be" gave way to a more sober position based on an objective assessment of the reality. One can only do what is possible; what is impossible cannot be done.

In the mid-'60s G.K. Zhukov told us, a group of military historians, in the editorial office of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL that Stalin and Molotov had made unprecedented concessions to Hitler prior to the war. They had permitted the Germans to search on our land for "the graves of soldiers who died in World War I."

Under the guise of searching for graves, however, the German "archaeologists" were scouting the area—roads, gullies and bridges in the immediate rear of the Soviet forces. Special attention was given to studying those areas later traveled by the tank armadas.

Zhukov's prestige and popularity increased greatly following the victory at Moscow. This fact apparently did not suit Stalin and Beriya. The gathering of "compromising information" on Zhukov was soon renewed. The arrest of Maj Gen V.S. Golushkevich, chief of the Western Front's operations section, in the spring of 1942 was the most conspicuous of these actions. Beriya's agents hoped to get to Zhukov with Golushkevich's help. Their hopes were not justified, however. Despite all of the tricks, the arrested general did not give any testimony detrimental to Zhukov. According to Golushkevich, a single arrest order signed by Abakumov loomed in his file for many years. Those around Zhukov were arrested in subsequent years.

During the Potsdam Conference Stalin got to see his son Vasilii, a pilot. The latter complained that our aircraft were very poor but the American planes were real aircraft. The complaint was sufficient for Stalin to arrange for the arrest of A.I. Shakhurin, people's commissar for the aircraft industry, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.A. Novikov. When they got their hands on Novikov, Beriya's agents did everything possible to get him to testify against Zhukov.

Stalin used Novikov's statements in two ways. First, at one of the large meetings held in the Kremlin at the end of 1945, Stalin accused Zhukov of ascribing all of the victories to himself. The second action in Zhukov's "undoing" took place at the beginning of 1946. This time leading officials in the People's Commissariat of Defense were present. The session was conducted by Stalin. The floor was turned over to Shtemenko to read the testimony of A.A. Novikov and K.F. Telegin.

E.I.: We know that Marshal I.S. Konev's recollections of that session of the Supreme Military Council have been preserved in the records of K. Simonov.

N.P.: Yes, they are being prepared for publication in the magazine ZNANIYE - SILA. This is what Konev had to say about the "historic" session:

"Stalin's speech cited statements by, among others, Chovikov, who had been arrested and was imprisoned at the time. Stalin was followed by Beriya and Kaganovich. They added fuel to the fire, saying the same things he had said and elaborating on his thoughts.

"Zhukov sat there, stunned by it all and pale. Stalin then turned to us: 'What do you have to say'?"

"I asked to speak. It was an oppressive atmosphere in which to speak after Stalin had spoken. I still said that Zhukov was making and had made mistakes, of course, that he was

difficult to work with and was sometimes abrupt, impatient and proud, but I was profoundly convinced that Zhukov was an honorable man. What was written about what he had allegedly said about the government was not true. He was devoted to the government and to the nation. 'A person not devoted to the nation would not crawl under fire in a war, risking his life to carry out your orders,' I said to Stalin. I repeated once more in conclusion that I believed profoundly in Zhukov's integrity.

"Pavel Semenovitch Rybalko spoke after me. He was in general a decisive and firm person, and he spoke positively of Zhukov in general, stressing the latter's honor and devotion to the homeland, while criticizing him for his shortcomings. Then Sokolov spoke. His statement was somewhat meeker, but to give him his due, he also spoke out overall in defense of Zhukov.

"Others spoke. Then Stalin took the floor once again....

"Yes, at the end of my address he had hurled a rejoinder at me: 'Here you are saying this.... But did you know that Zhukov tried to claim your victory at Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy for himself? He said that it was the result of his efforts.'

"I told him I did not know about this, that I had not heard it. And no matter what anyone said on the subject, history would sort it out. With that I sat down.

"Stalin spoke last. He spoke sharply once again, but in a somewhat different manner. Apparently he had planned in the beginning to arrest Zhukov after that Military Council session. Sensing our inner—and not just inner—resistance and the solidarity of the military with respect to Zhukov and to the assessment of his performance, he apparently got his bearings and abandoned his initial intention. It seemed that way to me."

E.I.: A wonderful example of moral resistance to Stalin! But what did Zhukov himself tell you about that session?

N.P.: He was very upset that lies and the truth were combined in Novikov's testimony. It stated that Zhukov considered Stalin to be absolutely incompetent in military affairs. Something actually said by Zhukov about Stalin was cited: "He was and still is just a civilian (shtafirka)." (A term applied to civilians in the old Russian army). It was pointed out, however, that when Zhukov visited the troops he allegedly stayed a long way from the frontline, a hint at cowardice on the part of the military leader.... when Shtemenko finished reading the testimony, F.I. Golikov spoke out most radically. This was the prewar intelligence chief who, buttering up Stalin, considered all reports on a future war to be "provocation." Golikov accused Zhukov of abuse of power, citing the case in which Zhukov had relieved him

of command of the Voronezh Front in 1943. Stalin inserted a significant rejoinder: "In this case Zhukov was not exceeding his authority; he was carrying out my instructions."

According to Zhukov the statement by Marshal of Armored Troops P.S. Rybalko made the greatest impression on everyone. He came right out and said that it was time to stop believing "testimony extracted by force in prisons" and rejected the slander about Zhukov's cowardice. He told how Zhukov had flown in to his army when it had been encircled in the spring of 1944.

After that address Stalin went over to the military leader and said: "You need to leave Moscow temporarily...." And Zhukov did leave—first to Odessa and then to Sverdlovsk to assume command of the military districts. The period of disgrace had begun.

Taking advantage of the military leader's absence, Beriia's agents went through all of the documents at the dacha in Sosnovka, removing the most valuable ones.

Even before that, however, in the fall of 1945, they had confiscated documents and personal notes stored in a safe in Zhukov's office. Stalin knew about this. He telephoned the military leader and asked:

"Are you planning to write a history or something? Don't. Let the historians do that after we are dead...."

Zhukov told me that he regretted the loss of the material. According to him, its absence impoverished his memoirs.

E.I.: Well it is the job of the historians to find all of those documents, to recreate the course of the Great Patriotic War without omissions.

Stalinism perverted the moral sources of our military history and undermined the unity of policy and morality. Yes, history was at times immoral. The truth can be restored only through purification and a return to the moral sources.

History of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Program

18010151 Moscow EKHO PLANETY in Russian No 24,
Sep 88 pp 26-31

[TASS report from Xinhua, and from the PRC newspaper RENMIN RIBAO, by Grigoriy Arslanov and Sergey Frolkin: "Project 596"]

[Text] "The ancient spirits of Lop Nor have awakened. Not to look at caravans crossing the sands of Central Asia, however, but to laugh diabolically at the mushroom-shaped cloud over the Takla Maklan desert. The tinkling of bells attached to the necks of camels, which in ancient times carried bundles of swords and chain mail, have now been replaced by the metallic clanking of the tracks on heavy cross-country vehicles delivering the components of something new—nuclear weapons." (From the book "Cloud Over China" by W. Rayan and S. Summerlin)

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and other Chinese leaders arrived at the People's Congress Building on 16 October 1964. A grand musical show with the title "Dongfang Hong" (The East Is Red) was performed that evening. The theme song began with the words: "The East is red, the sun has risen, and Mao Zedong has appeared in China...." That performance, which glorified the "Great Helmsman," had a cast of 3,000. Zhou Enlai, one of the deputy chairmen of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, addressed the audience and the performers. "At 03:00 today," he said, "an atomic bomb was exploded in one of our nation's western regions. The first nuclear test was successful." The auditorium applauded....

Not until several years later did the world learn that the testing ground for the nuclear weapon was in the area of Lake Lop Nor in the western part of China, in what is now the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. The famous Italian traveller Marco Polo traveled through that Godforsaken region in ancient times, back in the 13th Century, on his way to China. N.M. Przhevalskiy also studied the mysterious Lop Nor.

The development of China's first atomic bomb and the names of its creators were carefully concealed, and work on the bomb was performed in strict secrecy. Preparations for the first atomic explosion were not successfully concealed, however. According to the American journalists who wrote the book "Cloud Over China," the U.S. CIA had for a long time carefully observed the unusual activity in the area of Lake Lop Nor by means of U-2 intelligence aircraft and spy-satellites. They had photographed the tower of metal structures, growing by the day, and the transportation lines being built there, and detected the "breath" of the enterprises preparing the enriched uranium. All of this indicated that feverish preparations were underway on the ground for an atomic explosion, and the only thing the intelligence could not reveal was when.

Mao Zedong used to like to repeat the saying that the atom was a "paper tiger." But was Chairman Mao sincere? Were his words not merely a cunning trick bordering on hypocrisy? After all, the plans for the nuclear project were conceived back in 1949. At that time Chiang Kai-shek's forces were still being battled in the southern part of China....

This year, which marks the 90th anniversary of the birth of Zhou Enlai, People's China's first premier, articles on his life have stated that he "was the main person around whom were united the scientists, engineers and technicians working to develop the nuclear weapon." The memoirs of Liu Jie, former minister of the Second Machine-Building Ministry, which dealt with atomic energy, have been published for the first time in connection with the anniversary. He maintains that it was Zhou Enlai who, following the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, arranged for the allocation of foreign currency for the acquisition abroad of equipment, instruments, scientific and technical literature pertaining in any way to the releasing of the atom's energy.

Liu Jie's memoirs contain facts unknown up to now. He reports, for example, that in 1954 Chinese geologists discovered rich deposits of uranium ore in the southern part of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. This was immediately reported to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. At the premier's instruction a special department was set up in the State Council for overseeing the exploitation and extraction of the uranium ore and the development of scientific research and scientific and technological work on nuclear fission. On 14 January 1955 Zhou Enlai summoned for a talk Li Siguang, vice president of the PRC Academy of Sciences, who was in charge of uranium exploration, and Qian Sangiang, director of the Physics Institute. Liu Jie was present, as was Bo Yibo, chairman of the State Committee for Construction at that time. The premier enquired in detail about the state of affairs in the area of atomic technology and the preparation of enriched uranium, and asked about the principles involved in the use of atomic energy and the development of an atomic bomb. That same evening Zhou Enlai wrote a note to Mao Zedong containing the following: "Chairman, this afternoon I talked with Li Siguang and Qian Sangiang. Comrades Bo Yibo and Liu Jie were present. The discussion lasted a fairly long time. Li Siguang developed a toothache, and he left early. The discussion will therefore not be continued this evening. I am now sending the pertinent documents to higher authorities for their perusal. It would be a good thing if you could talk with Li Siguang and Qian Sangiang tomorrow after 15:00. Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Liu Jie... could be there in addition to the members of the Secretariat (CCP Central Committee). Chairman, please let me know when you wake up in the morning. I could come an hour ahead of time and report on the talks which I have had today. Tomorrow instruments and drawings could be brought for a graphic presentation for the talk with you.—Zhou Enlai, evening of 14 January"

The following day, Liu Jie recalls, Mao Zedong convened an expanded session of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee. The "strategic decision" which laid the foundation for the development of China's nuclear industry was adopted at the session.

A "supervisory group" was set up during the first half of 1955, which included Deputy Premier Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, chairman of the State Planning Committee, and Marshal Nie Rongzhen. The group began compiling a long-range, 12-year plan for the development of Chinese science. Priority was given to branches related to nuclear power engineering. At that same time, before the plan was given final approval, the PRC Academy of Sciences received personal instructions from Zhou Enlai to print training literature for "supervisory cadre workers and the broad masses" on atomic matters. Beginning in 1955, nuclear physics departments were opened at Beijing University and other higher educational institutions. Several hundred upper-class students were transferred to those departments, and more than 100 Chinese students studying in the USSR and the socialist nations of Eastern Europe were switched to those fields.

It should be noted that the Soviet Union was extensively developing cooperation with many foreign nations, primarily the socialist nations, in the peaceful use of atomic energy and sharing its knowledge and experience with them. The Chinese People's Republic was no exception. An agreement between the USSR and the CPR signed in April of 1955 called for providing China with assistance in the development of research in nuclear physics and the use of nuclear energy in the national economy. A nuclear reactor with a thermal capacity of up to 10,000 kilowatts was built in China under this agreement. Heavy water was used as the moderator in the reactor. A cyclotron was also delivered and placed into operation. All of the special materials, the uranium, the heavy water and numerous kinds of equipment installed at the Chinese scientific research center were Soviet-produced. Cadres of Chinese specialists studied and underwent practical training at Soviet higher educational institutions and scientific research organizations, including the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubno.

Presenting a report on the first five-year plan in July 1955 at a session of the National People's Congress, Li Fuchun said the following: "In order to further the development of research into the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Soviet Union has at its own initiative offered our nation scientific and technological and production assistance and has signed an agreement with our nation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.... The government and the people of China express their sincere gratitude for the assistance coming from the Soviet Union and the people's democratic nations, particularly for the great, constant, all-around and selfless assistance provided by the USSR."

Unfortunately, there was no place in Liu Jie's memoirs for an objective assessment of Soviet-Chinese cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

nor for assurances that China could feel totally secure beneath the "nuclear umbrella" of the Soviet Union. However, a subjective assessment by the author of the memoirs contains the following: "Zhou Enlai," Liu Jie writes, "took advantage of the altered international situation and, seizing a favorable moment, strove in a planned manner, step by step, for Soviet assistance in the field of atomic technology. This enabled us relatively rapidly to master it and to gain time to some degree. Zhou Enlai at the same time stated that China must possess equipment making it possible to turn it into a nuclear power on its own."

With respect to events relating to the break in Soviet-Chinese cooperation at the end of the '50s, including cooperation in the area of nuclear technology, the Chinese press presents specific facts in a one-sided manner. It ordinarily makes banal assertions to the effect, for example, that the Soviet Union "severed the agreements and recalled its specialists from China, placing the nation in a difficult situation." Not a single such article gives an honest answer to the questions: Why was the USSR forced to take this step? In what kind of situation did Soviet specialists in the PRC find themselves at that time? What internal political events were unfolding in China at that time? Liu Jie writes in his memoirs that all of the Soviet specialists working in the Second Machine-Building Ministry departed for the homeland in August 1960. The fact should be mentioned that a drastic deterioration of the treatment of Soviet specialists by the cadre workers of Chinese enterprises, ministries and departments began as early as the second half of 1958. The slogan "Combat Blind Faith in Foreign Know-How" proclaimed that year by the CCP was essentially directed against the use of Soviet know-how and Soviet specialists, and toward the rejection of strict adherence to standards and the specifications contained in technical and technological documents.

Nonetheless, implementation of the strictly classified plan, code-named "596," for the development of a nuclear weapon continued—now, however, the fact is stressed in China today, "relying on our own capabilities."

According to the newspaper GUANGMIN RIBAO, a military subunit arrived on a secret mission in an uninhabited area near Lake Lop Nor. It was commanded by General Zhang Yunyouya, a Chinese army veteran who especially distinguished himself during the civil war and took part in the war in Korea (1950-1953). Back in mid-1958 he had been urgently summoned to Beijing from the Shenyang Military District. General Chen Geng, deputy CPR minister of defense at that time, spoke with him and informed him confidentially of what Mao Zedong had said at a meeting of the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee. This is what the chairman had said: "We have to start doing something to develop atomic and hydrogen bombs. It is perfectly possible, I believe, that complete success will take 10

years." Following that discussion, at the recommendation of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, one of those in charge of Project 596, Zhang Yunyouya was appointed chief of the future atomic proving ground.

Prospecting had revealed an area suitable from the standpoint of terrain and geological structure. A total of 100,000 military construction workers arrived in the area of Lop Nor in March of 1959 and set to work.

But let us return to Liu Jie's memoirs. He tells us that in August 1962 he entered the CCP Central Committee with a recommendation that the first atomic bomb be exploded in 1964-1965. He did not receive an immediate answer. On 3 November Mao Zedong wrote in his own hand on the minister's proposal: "Very good. Do just that. Assist with this work in every possible way."

...It was the end of 1963. Work on the development of the atomic bomb was nearing completion. The testing procedure was defined at a regular session of a special commission headed by Zhou Enlai. It was decided that the test would be conducted on the ground. Instructions were simultaneously issued to continue preparations for subsequent explosions in the atmosphere and underground.

Hundreds of scientists and engineers, thousands of skilled workers and technicians worked at the center for the development of Project 596. This was a sort of scientific-technical and production association consisting of representatives of 26 ministries and state committees, the Academy of Sciences, 900 enterprises and scientific research institutes, higher educational institutions from 20 provinces and cities under central jurisdiction—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin—and large autonomous regions. Experiments were conducted in the field, at a hastily erected tent city lost in the desert but closely guarded. Its inhabitants were scientists representing various generations. Project 596 was carried out by Chinese physicists with a world reputation. Most of the leading theoreticians who worked on the first atomic bomb had received training in the USA or in the nations of Western Europe, however, and returned to China on the eve of or following the proclamation of the CPR. Some of them had studied in the Soviet Union.

Both the Chinese and the foreign press named physicists with a world reputation among those who worked directly on Project 596: Qian Sanqiang, Wang Gangchang, Peng Xuanwu, Guo Yonghuai, Zhu Guan. Those who worked on the project also included Chemist Jiang Shengze, physicists of the middle and young generations Wang Chengshu and Deng Jiaxian, who earned a doctor's degree at an American university in the city of Lafayette, Zhou Guangshao, who studied in the USSR and subsequently became a vice president of the CPR Academy of Sciences.

Liu Jie's memoirs report that an adequate quantity of uranium for producing an atomic bomb had been acquired by the end of 1963. Work at the center was proceeding at an outstripping pace, but Beijing continued to push the scientists. On 14 October 1964, after receiving a favorable weather report, Zhou Enlai issued instructions for the nuclear device to be hauled to the explosion site. The next day Zhou Enlai telephoned Liu Jie, who was in Beijing and maintaining contact with the party Central Committee and with the premier personally. Preparations for the explosion were directed at the site by Colonel General Zhang Aiping (former CPR minister of defense, currently member of the Standing Committee of the Central Council of the Chinese Communist Party).

"What can come out of the test?" Zhou Enlai asked.

"There are three possibilities," Liu Jie answered. "Either everything will be in order or some error will be detected, or else it will all end in complete failure. The probability of the first outcome is the greatest, however."

"You must take every possible precaution," the premier ordered.

It was 16 October 1964. The hands of clocks in Beijing were approaching 15:00. This was the time designated for the explosion....

"After 15:00 I heard excited voices on the telephone," Liu Jie writes. "Zhang Aiping informed me of the explosion. I immediately reported the joyous news to Zhou Enlai. After informing Mao Zedong, the premier conveyed the latter's instructions: 'Check everything and ascertain whether it was truly an atomic explosion.' I passed Chairman Mao's instructions on to the testing ground. Zhang Aiping informed me that a mushroom-shaped cloud had formed following the explosion. Mao Zedong then issued new instructions: 'Continue verification and observation.'"

In Beijing it was decided not to rush but to publish the official statement only after thorough verification. The reaction was carefully followed abroad. A Japanese news agency report was the first to reach Beijing. Tokyo reported that "a nuclear explosion has possibly been conducted in the western region of China." Some time went by, and American radio stations reported the explosion of the atomic bomb. A government communique was issued in the Chinese capital that evening, 7 hours after the explosion....

A second atomic explosion was carried out in China on 14 May 1965. Work was simultaneously begun on the comprehensive testing of missiles and nuclear warheads. This work was conducted by departments under the jurisdiction of the Committee for Defense Science, Technology and Defense Industry headed by Marshal Nie

Rongzhen. The first missile carrying a nuclear warhead was successfully launched on 27 October 1966, and a hydrogen bomb was exploded in the atmosphere on 17 June 1967.

In the meantime, the anthem "The East Is Red" was being sung more and more loudly in China, and the little red books of Mao's quotations were raised higher and higher above the people's heads. At the 6th Plenum of the CCP in June 1981 the decade from May 1966 to October 1976 would be called "the years of chaos" which brought the Communist Party of China, the state and the Chinese people "the most serious failures and losses since the founding of the CPR." All of this would come later. At that time "the years of chaos" were called the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," when many party and state workers were defamed and subjected to outrages. The atomic industry was also caught up in the wave of the "struggle using force." Liu Jie was relieved of his job.

"The struggle," he recalls, "was conducted at scientific research institutions of our system and at the enterprises. There was a danger that weapons production would be halted. Zhou Enlai made telephone calls and sent telegrams demanding that there be no disruptions of the work. Twice, he sent his representatives to the center for the development of nuclear weapons in the northwestern part of China, where the situation was approaching the point of armed conflict...."

According to big-character posters, the Red Guard wall press at that time, the most dramatic events, fraught with the danger of unforeseen consequences, developed in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region, where China's main nuclear facilities were located. The authors of big-character posters and leaflets posted in Beijing complained about the fact that General Wang Enmao, first secretary of the Sinkiang-Uigur party committee, had ordered Red Guard members who had come from Beijing "to exchange experience" to be beaten, arrested and driven out of Sinkiang. Wang Enmao rejected a proposal by the group for "Cultural Revolution" affairs under the CCP Central Committee (it was headed by Cheng Boda, and his first deputy was Mao's wife Jiang Qing) to come to Beijing "for talks." Only after receiving assurances of his personal safety issued by Premier Zhou Enlai did he arrive in Beijing, and the explosive conflict about to flare up was resolved "by peaceful means."

Apparently even those closest to Mao Zedong understood the importance of continuing work in the nuclear field, linking far-reaching plans to it, and they therefore preferred to protect the nuclear physicists from the raging Hongweibing.

... "The decade of chaos" passed. New leaders came to Zhongnanhai, the residence of the Chinese leadership.

Who Made the Bomb

Liu Jie: served as deputy minister of geology following the founding of the CPR; later appointed minister of the Second Machine-Building Ministry, which dealt with matters of nuclear energy; one of those in charge of Project 596; removed from ministerial post and investigated during "Cultural Revolution"; following rehabilitation in 1978 headed party committee in Hengnan Province for several years and was first political commissar of Hengnan Military District; currently member of State Council of CCP.

Li Siguang: professor at Beijing University during years 1928-1935; studied for lengthy period at Birmingham University in Great Britain, where he defended his doctor's dissertation; Zhou Enlai played large role in his return to China in May 1950; elected foreign member of USSR Academy of Sciences in 1958; awarded Gold Medal imeni A.P. Karpinskiy for scientific works in field of geology; as vice president of CPR Academy of Sciences directed prospecting for uranium ore; served as minister of geology for many years; died in 1971 at age of 84.

Nie Rongzhen: born in 1899; studied natural sciences in youth in France and later in Belgium; was in Moscow in mid-20s, where he received military education; returned to China and took active part in revolutionary movement, becoming military cadre; reached rank of marshal; headed State Committee for Defense Science and Technology; was one of those in charge of Project 596.

Qian Sanqiang: studied physics at Paris University, worked under supervision of Joliot-Curie team, received prize from French Academy of Sciences for research in gamma- and alpha-radiation; directed Physics Institute of China's Academy of Sciences.

Wang Ganchang: graduated from Berlin University in 1934; worked at California University in USA in 1947-1948; returned to homeland on eve of China's liberation; served as deputy director of Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubno.

Peng Xiuanwu: studied at Edinburgh; became prominent scientist in field of theoretical physics; returned to China and educated a galaxy of talented scientists.

Guo Yonghuai: specialist in field of mechanics; studied in USA; became professor at Beijing University after returning to homeland.

Zhu Guanya: nuclear scientist; studied in USA; was professor at Beijing University.

China's Nuclear Arsenal

The American magazine INSIGHT has published an article on the CPR's nuclear strategy. It states that after China tested its first atomic bomb, launched a ballistic

missile and exploded its first hydrogen bomb, it continued to stress the development of nuclear weapons. According to U.S. CIA data, China spent more than half of its funds allocated for military scientific research and experimental design work on its nuclear weapons program between 1965 and 1979.

The magazine cites a statement from the new book "China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition in the Framework of Evolution" by Chong Pinling, assistant director of the Department for Forecasting Chinese Policy at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. "Based on my research," he writes, "it appears that from the very beginning China had a comprehensive plan for producing all the components simultaneously in order later to combine them and build a nuclear weapon of restraint. At least from the beginning of the mid-50s China's government attached great importance to the development of nuclear weapons." The author reports that China has more than 200 units of nuclear weapons and has produced four types of land-based nuclear missiles: medium-range, intermediate-range, limited-range and full-range intercontinental ballistic missiles. "It is even now quietly developing enhanced-range intercontinental ballistic missiles," Chong Pinling asserts. In addition to the land-based missiles China has an arsenal of bombers and recently produced a ballistic missile for submarines.

INSIGHT states that most observers in fact say that despite successes in the field of nuclear weapons the CPR still lags far behind the United States and the Soviet Union. "They obviously have real problems with the production of nuclear-powered submarines and their ability to launch ballistic missiles at sea," states D. Shambaugh, junior scientific associate at Washington's Woodrow Wilson International Science Center. In his opinion, submarines are the weakest component of China's nuclear forces. With respect to its land-based missiles, most of them are relatively primitive liquid-fuel missiles. The medium-range CSS-1 ballistic missile, for example, uses short-storage liquid fuel. "These missiles have to be constantly refueled," says P. Godwin of the National Military College. China has produced the solid-fuel CSS-NX-3 missile, however, which can be launched from a nuclear-powered submarine or possibly from a land-based mobile launcher.

Although Beijing's ballistic missiles are many years behind American and Soviet missiles with respect to accuracy, P. Godwin believes the fact that the Chinese space program "can place payloads into geosynchronous orbit indicates that their ability to destroy targets accurately has been improved, at least theoretically." Possessing Western technology, Chong Pinling states, "the Chinese are taking it and using it to develop their own military technology."

"Beijing's nuclear arsenal is intended strictly for defensive purposes," is the opinion held by D. Shambaugh. "These are weapons of restraint," he says. "I believe the

Chinese when they say they have proclaimed a doctrine of refusing to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. They have also signed an agreement on turning the southern part of the Pacific Ocean into a nuclear-free zone. The Chinese are not troublemakers."

**Markushin Commentary on NATO Emphasis on Conventional Forces [V. Markushin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Sep 88]
18010250a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Sep 88 Second Edition p 3**

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Markushin: "The Inertia of Opposition"]

[Text] It is easy to guess the rest of the train of thought when articles in a NATO military magazine begin by asserting that suggestions to eliminate nuclear weapons are no more than melodious phrases to which one should relate very warily. What will certainly follow will be a narration about how the potential enemy is not as simple as he seems, that it is rash to be attracted to his ideas about a nuclear-free world and that the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be abolished either today or in the near future.

The majority of the speeches by representatives of NATO's ruling element have an ideological base of this type. It has become the foundation of their verbose argument that we should prepare for military action in the event "war is started despite all of the West's efforts to avert it."

We can say in this vein that there is one thing that is true: the NATO countries still do not have a military policy that is realistic, for militaristic-minded circles are hindering its approval. Attempts by military-industrial complexes are driving it back. NATO's upper echelons are clearly feeling discomfort because of the process of real disarmament that has begun. They do not want to reconcile themselves to the loss of Pershing and cruise missiles and intend to replace them with other nuclear armaments.

However it is important to note the theorizing that is appearing today in the pages of NATO journals. We will examine the obvious change in emphasis in defining the direction of efforts in improving the component parts of NATO's triad toward the third component—conventional weapons. The reason for this change is being explained in this way. The Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles became the first real step toward eliminating nuclear weapons and more radical steps may follow. The nuclear disarmament process would signify the undermining of the West's security because of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's existing conventional weapons superiority over NATO. Because of this it is time for very energetic efforts to be

taken, especially among the Western European NATO members who are relying too heavily on American nuclear weapons and are ignoring their own non-nuclear defense.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization's relatively imaginary superiority over the North Atlantic Bloc has been spoken and written about a lot. The groundlessness of this assertion has been proven many times. And all the same the West continues to make attempts to "make a point" for the supposedly existing need to expand the North Atlantic Bloc's conventional weapons. Supreme Allied Commander for NATO Forces in Europe General Galvin is setting the tone for this. Wanting to seem an impartial analyst, he notes that preparedness for war involves many factors. NATO holds a leading position in many of those factors. For example, there is professional training for personnel: pilots fly more and soldiers shoot more often. According to the general, the Eastern Bloc has a more advantageous position in other areas: the enormous mobilization potential about which the West has a very vague idea because socialist countries are "closed," the geographical advantage, weapon standardization...

So the conclusion can accordingly be made that NATO must compensate for its own weak points with more advanced "technology" in its military construction. And this is already being pointed out by the need for greater specialization among the national forces in NATO so that some concentrate their efforts on increasing the might of their air force or navy and other put more attention into ground forces. At the same time the suggestion has been made to increase capital investment in mobilization infrastructure and reserve forces to support the rapid deployment of up to an additional 15 divisions. This agenda includes problems associated with the effective use of the latest systems, reliable and flexible command and control and the realization of principles of military art that have justified themselves in the past and have become classic. This includes such principles as maintaining the offensive, gaining surprise and concentrating forces in the key area.

As expressed by General U. Kirk, Allied Air Force Commander for NATO's Central Army Group, for example, from a purely military point of view it is possible to maximize the possibility of achieving superiority over the Warsaw Pact by rapidly concentrating forces, centralizing fire power and making sensible use of available forces and assets.

And the discourse on this topic by retired British General M. Farndale who until recently commanded the British Army of the Rhine has to attract attention. According to him, the concept of a "non-offensive defense" can only exist in the imaginations of armchair strategists. Those who defend exclusively using the rules of defense are doomed to defeat. An offensive passion multiplied by surprise and military cunning allows a small number of forces to destroy superior enemy forces.

Heavy strikes on the opposing force's second echelons from the very onset of combat operations create the foundation for the achievement of a quick overall success.

In the opinion of NATO military strategists this approach to training headquarters and forces is important at all levels, but is especially important at the army level. It is the army commander who has the possibility of extensively employing the special sabotage subunits that operate in the enemy rear area. At his disposal are aviation and missile systems with up to 200-kilometer ranges, systems that are accurate enough to destroy command posts, communication centers, bridges and air strips and inflict heavy losses in tank and artillery units.

NATO feels that major helicopter units have been called upon to play a special role in army operations. These fall into two basic types. First, there are those that are designated to operate along with tanks and artillery. Their primary mission is to destroy tanks. Second, there are the helicopters in airmobile units. Their mission includes rapidly transferring forces into areas into which enemy forces have penetrated, making sudden strikes to paralyze enemy operations and so forth.

There is a lot of hope being placed on multiple-launch rocket systems—MLRS. Their effectiveness is linked with the possibility of making tremendously heavy attacks on areas where tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are concentrated in the second echelons. It is felt that one MLRS launcher equals the fire power of 22 203.2 mm howitzers. Based on this calculation they feel that they can very effectively destroy armored equipment even before this equipment can be committed into combat operations.

The further development of highly accurate long-range weapons which the American-NATO Command intends to selectively use to destroy targets deep in the enemy rear area is being included in the high-priority tasks. People in the West feel that they can use present technology to attain a "surgical accuracy" which, for example, will allow a cruise missile launched several thousand kilometers from the target to hit with a circular probable error of no more than three meters. This correspondingly makes it possible to drastically reduce the missile's warhead yield (by a factor of one thousand and more). This means that they can practically manage with conventional explosives. Nuclear weapons would then play a unique security role and would also become the means which one would use to guarantee the destruction of an especially important target.

And there is one important aspect that is being stressed in this regard. The constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons will force the enemy to operate so that his forces are dispersed according to tactical considerations and will make their concentration for a penetration or to develop a success in any area problematic.

And other discussions about the future for employing the latest conventional weapons systems in war are ongoing on this plane. They obviously reflect the attempts of known NATO circles to work under the flag of "making up for omissions" to gain conventional weapons superiority over the Warsaw Treaty Organization and thus guarantee themselves the ability to resolve political tasks through the threat of employing conventional weapons.

All of this shows the lack of peaceful intent in the concepts that are being nurtured in NATO headquarters. And regardless of how often they repeat the word "defense," the essence of the North Atlantic Bloc's military policy is hardly changing. In order to change their policy, they have to give up the slogan "The sword decides everything" and finally understand that: 1) stability in the world can be maintained through the use of international legal and political means; and 2) they should base their military means on sensible sufficiency.

It has been correctly noted that weapons and fear are two communicating vessels. How firm is a peace based on fear? Probably as safe as living in a neighborhood with an ammunition warehouse. A warehouse may not explode for decades, but you still do not envy those who live nearby. The Europeans are being freed from this fate. Now, when there is every chance to make real disarmament an irreversible process, is the very time for joint active efforts to strengthen the beginning of good and of mutual trust. Opposition must yield its place to good neighborly relations.

'Penetrating Warhead' for New U.S. Missile Reported

18010245 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Sep 88 First Edition p 3

[Own information—TASS article entitled: "We Noted"]

[Text] As the Pentagon officially noted, a new type of nuclear missile with a penetrating [pronikayushchiy] warhead has entered into development. Research work on the study of the possibilities for the creation of such warheads, particularly for the destruction of underground objects, has been conducted for several years by the U.S. Department of Energy, which is responsible for

the construction of nuclear warheads. Already in August of the current year, on the basis of its research, the Pentagon council for military purchasing [acquisitions] recommended that the new warhead be entered into development.

UD/335

Nigerian Ground Forces Commander's Visit

18010240 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "On an Official Visit"]

[Text] The Commander of Nigeria's ground forces, member of the Ruling Council of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, Lieutenant-General S. Abacha [transliteration] arrived on the 26th of October for an official visit.

At the airport the guest from Nigeria was met by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces—USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Army Ye. F. Ivanovskiy and other generals and officers.

Among those greeting [the guest] was the ambassador from the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Isa Modibo [transliteration].

UD/335

Arrival of Syrian Defense Minister in Moscow

18010266 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 30 October 1988 publishes in its second edition on page 1 an Unattributed article entitled: "On an Official Visit." It states that the Defense Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, Corps General Mustafa Talas, arrived in Moscow on the 29th of October for an official visit. He was met at Sheremetyevo airport by General of the Army D.T. Yazov, Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, General of the Army A.N. Sorokin, Colonel-General A.V. Betekhtin, and others.

The flags of both countries were raised and the anthems of both countries were played before an honor guard.

UD/335

Yerevan Meeting on Unmet Needs of Afghan Veterans

*NC2311134888 Yerevan Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 23 Nov 88*

[Text] The veterans who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan held their first rally in the Yerevan youth palace. The rally's opening speech was delivered by Khakopyan, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian Komsomol. The participants paid tribute by one minute of silence to the memory of their fallen comrades.

Directing the socio-political activities of the 3,000-strong cadre of the republic's internationalist warriors for fulfilling transformations that have begun in the republic and directing the military-patriotic education of the young generation were topics dealt with in the report by (Ara Panyan), chairman of the republican council and post-graduate student at Yerevan State University. He and other speakers also pointed out that sufficient attention is not being paid in the republic to improving the

working, social, and living conditions of the internationalist warriors. In Yerevan alone, 200 of their families have not been provided with housing. In this regard the initiative of the people of Leninakan deserves praise: a multistoried apartment building is being put up in the city ahead of plan for the internationalist warriors and their families. But not all of the warriors have their place in society, so many leave to work outside the republic's borders. Necessary care is not being given to invalids and the families of those who fell.

Account number 700-982 has been opened in the Spandaryanskiy rayon branch of the [name indistinct] bank of the USSR to collect funds for a memorial to the warriors who fell.

Arutyunyan, the military commissar of the republic, read the decree of Afghan President Najibullah dated 15 May 1988 by which all Soviet internationalist warriors were decorated with a medal from the grateful people of Afghanistan.